

Managing a Literate Laity: *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man* in Fifteenth-Century
England

By

KRISTEN LOUISE ALDEBOL
B.A. (Duke University) 2005

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

English

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

DAVIS

Approved:

Dr. Seeta Chaganti, Chair

Dr. Noah Guynn

Dr. Jeffrey Ruda

Committee in Charge

2014

UMI Number: 3637789

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 3637789

Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Constructing a Devotional Reader: Regulating Circulation and Access to Grace	25
Chapter 2: Figuring the Body as Text: Instruction in Allegorical Reading	71
Chapter 3: The Senses: Gateways to Regulation	117
Chapter 4: Empty Bodies: Dangers of the Allegorical Text and Image	151
Bibliography	191

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my committee, Seeta Chaganti, Noah Guynn, and Jeffrey Ruda, for their patient guidance and encouragement throughout the development of this project. They have supported me throughout the many incarnations of this project and have suggested areas of inquiry that helped it grow from an idea into a dissertation. In particular, I would like to thank Seeta Chaganti for sticking with me from this project's inception, through all of the office visits, e-mails, and moments of doubt. As my dissertation advisor, she challenged what I thought were my limitations and displayed an unwavering confidence that I would exceed my own expectations. I am so thankful for the many ways she has helped me grow as a scholar. I would also like to thank Emily Albu and Claire Waters for their support, intellectual rigor, and suggestions during and in preparation for my qualifying examination.

Abstract

The fifteenth-century English translation of Guillaume de Deguileville's *Le Pèlerinage de la Vie Humaine* opens with the author figure making a strange assertion about the text: "In Frensch I haue set it so þat lewede mowe vnderstande it" [I have set it in French so that ordinary people may understand it]. The cognitive dissonance created by this phrase, written in English but claiming to be written in French, underscores the vexed status of the vernacular in fifteenth-century England. Translating *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man* into English expanded the circulation of the text by making it available to a group of "ordinary people" that included English monolinguals. This dissertation argues that the two fifteenth-century English translations of the *Pilgrimage*, one anonymous and one by John Lydgate, work to regulate this expanded audience because of their unknown educational backgrounds. Many scholars read fifteenth-century concern over the vernacular allowing lay access to religious ideas as tied to the Wycliffite heresy and Archbishop Arundel's *Constitutions* of 1409. I argue, however, that this concern is part of a conversation with a much wider scope: the debate over the use of religious images in Christianity, under discussion as early as the letters of Pope Gregory the Great (c. 600 CE). This debate questioned the use of images in Christianity, and many arguments over these religious images pointed to the fact that images are empty inside and can fail to signify; the *Pilgrimage* articulates these same concerns about its allegorical form. The *Pilgrimage* offers its audience guidance in determining what the allegory signifies, but this dissertation demonstrates how that guidance also regulates the text's audience. The *Pilgrimage* manages its lay audience by constructing an ideal reader, denigrating the material body, substituting sensory information, and conflating allegorical

bodies with the audience's bodies. However, the text continually undermines its own attempts to regulate its audience, drawing attention to both the flexibility of the allegorical form and its inability to signify concretely. The way the *Pilgrimage* manages—and fails to manage—the “lewede” audience to whom it claims to appeal points to how visual and textual representations of religious topics undermine ecclesiastical control. The failures of signification in the *Pilgrimage*'s texts and manuscript illustrations demonstrate the interpretive power these representations offer their audiences as well as their resistance to functioning as methods of ecclesiastical control.

Introduction

Though writing an extended case study on one of the lesser-known works of the fifteenth-century—the English translations of Guillaume de Deguileville’s *Le Pèlerinage de la vie Humaine*—may seem like an arbitrary project, these translations can provide insight into the connections between concerns about the use of the vernacular in religious writing and concerns about the use of images in religious devotion. This dissertation will argue that the *Pilgrimage*’s consistently expressed desire to control its literate lay audience—as well as the methods by which it attempts to enact that control—demonstrates that the debates over the use of the English vernacular in fifteenth-century England are an outgrowth of the centuries-old debate about the proper use of images in western Christianity.

I narrow my focus to fifteenth-century England for two reasons. First, though Deguileville composed his *Pèlerinage* in 1331 and then completed a revision of it in 1355 (referred to as the first and second recension, respectively), it was not translated into English until it appeared in an anonymous prose translation of the first recension, dated to the first quarter of the fifteenth century, and in John Lydgate’s poetic translation of the second recension, which Lydgate dates within the text as 1426.¹ Second, the timing of these English translations means that they moved from a language with a relatively known audience—the learned nobility and clergy (Kibbee 37)—to a language with an unknown audience. The unpredictability of this unknown audience, capable of reading

¹ In her edition of the anonymous Middle English *Pilgrimage*, Avril Henry dates all the hands of the surviving manuscripts of the anonymous prose Middle English translation to the fifteenth century, placing most in the first half of the fifteenth century. See “Description of the Manuscripts”, *The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode*. Vol. 1, Introduction and Text (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. xxxi-xlix.

texts in the English vernacular, led to an environment in which Archbishop Arundel published his *Constitutions*, part of a move to regulate the production and use of texts in the English vernacular, particularly texts treating religious subjects. Ownership of texts

...making heavy use of scriptural quotation...was now forbidden for those who failed to obtain due permission. More significant still, the composition of any similar texts became, in principle, directly illegal: given their use of biblical quotation and their extensive treatment of an array of theological subjects, none of these works [*Pearl*, *The Scale of Perfection*, *Piers Plowman*, etc.] could have been written after the publication of the *Constitutions* without contravening several of the articles therein.
(Watson 829-30)

These *Constitutions* responded to ways that the English vernacular had been used subversively in religious matters: in the Wycliffite movement and in secular matters, in the Rising of 1381 (Breen 174). Arundel's *Constitutions* had appeared by 1409, and so both English translations of Deguileville's *Pèlerinage* were published in an environment where the very act of translating this religious allegory into English was potentially suspect. I suggest that both translations demonstrate an awareness of how appearing in the English vernacular has opened the text up for misuse from its unknown lay audiences.

What, then, might motivate two different translators to translate the *Pilgrimage* from its French original into the English vernacular under the potentially perilous conditions created by the *Constitutions*? Nicole Rice has noted that some prefaces to Middle English texts on religious subjects address

a wid[e] group of lay readers who “al day askin how þei schul loue God, and in what maner þei schul liue to his plesaunce for his endless goodnes.” In response to this perceived demand, each of the guides proposes techniques for transforming lay existence into...a dedicated religious life in which the reading subject might “serve” and “love” God without undermining priestly intellectual, pastoral, and penitential power. (Rice x)

Rice’s estimation grants these lay readers a nicely orthodox view in which they actively desire not to subvert any “priestly intellectual, pastoral, and penitential power,” but the *Pilgrimage* has no such confidence in its lay audience.

In spite of differences between the versions, the two translations (representing different styles and translating different versions of Deguileville’s *Pèlerinage*) do in fact translate the same story. For this reason, I will refer to both versions, the anonymous prose translation titled *þe Pilgrimage of þe Lyfe of þe Manhode* and John Lydgate’s poetic translation titled *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man*, collectively as the *Pilgrimage*. When details are unique to one of these versions, I will indicate the version to which I refer. A brief overview of the story of the *Pilgrimage* will help orient the specific portions of the text to which I turn in the following chapters. The *Pilgrimage* opens with a figure asking for attention as he tells of a dream he had. In this dream he saw the Heavenly Jerusalem, enclosed by a wall, and he saw many figures trying to enter the city through various means. Upon waking from the dream, the speaker decides to go on a pilgrimage to try to reach the city he saw. Now a pilgrim, the figure immediately encounters Grace Dieu, who shows him through her house, introduces him to the sacraments, and prepares him for his journey. The pilgrim departs Grace’s house and

begins his journey towards the Heavenly Jerusalem; on the way he is beset by many vices and frequently rescued by Grace. After surviving the vices, the pilgrim enters the Ship of Religion, chooses an order, and is afflicted with Old Age. As Death stands over him with scythe ready to strike, the pilgrim awakens to the bells of Matins, safe in his monastic cell.

When I speak of the audience of the *Pilgrimage*, I refer to anyone able to interact with the manuscripts of the *Pilgrimage* translated and circulating in England in the early fifteenth century. This audience includes those learned in Latin, such as the clergy, as well as those learned in French, such as the nobility, but my primary focus is on the portions of the *Pilgrimage*'s audience that was relatively unknowable: the monolingual literate laity. The *Pilgrimage* itself articulates the audience it imagines as "lewede" and identifies the unlearned audience as its reason for its composition in the vernacular: "so þat lewed mowe vnderstande it" (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, l. 13); this explicit attention to its unlearned audience invites further examination of how the *Pilgrimage* interacts with and instructs that audience. In his historical overview of the use of the French language in England throughout the medieval period, Douglas A. Kibbee notes an increased translation of French devotional texts into the English vernacular by clergy members like Robert Mannyng, a Gilbertine canon, and Dan Michael, a monk (Kibbee 37). This increased production of English devotional texts seems to cater to a new population of clergy in light of Kibbee's other observation about the effect of the drastic population reduction caused by the plagues: "[i]n the Church, the plague depleted the educated population of the monasteries and convents, opening the door to poorer, less well-educated English monolinguals" (Kibbee 59). Of course, even if the increased production

of English devotional texts was initially intended for the clergy, they could also be read by a laity capable of reading English. Malcolm Parkes has also laid out convincing evidence (drawn from literary texts as well as official documents) for the increased literacy of the laity in fifteenth-century England (the beginning of the circulation of the *Pilgrimage* in English in England), and notes that this literacy “was becoming more widespread among the population and was no longer confined to the top” (Parkes 288). Wendy Steiner points out that “by the end of the thirteenth century...the charter had replaced traditional objects such as ancient family knives, which had often accompanied a conveyance of goods or property” (Steiner 4). This shift indicates that written documents had become widely valued and trusted to the point that they could supplant earlier forms of legally binding objects.

The appearance of the act of vernacular reading in late-medieval texts supports Kibbee’s and Parkes’ estimations. For example, at the beginning of the *Pilgrimage*, the author figure explains that his dream vision occurred because he “hadde in wakinge rad and considered and wel/ seyn þe romaunce of þe Rose” (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, ll. 4-5). The narrator in Chaucer’s “The Book of the Duchess” reads in bed to try to help himself sleep because he finds reading pleasurable (Chaucer 7-8, ll. 44-51). The author figure of the *Pore Caityf* (c. 1380s) emphasizes the fact that he writes to “teche simple men and wymmen” (l. 3) how to get to heaven “withouten multiplicacion of many bokes” (Wogan-Browne et al. 240, l. 5), implying a literate audience that might not have access to (or funds for) many books.² This widening group of literate readers, that now might

² The editors of *The Idea of the Vernacular* translate the “multiplicacion of many” as indicating that “the work will both save readers expense and protect their ‘simple’ natures by avoiding unnecessary learning” (Wogan-Browne et al. 240, note to line 5).

include monks like Deguileville's author figure or perhaps "simple men and wymmen," underlies both the *Pilgrimage*'s anxiety over how its English vernacular audience might use it and its attempts at controlling its own devotional use.

One of the dangers of English vernacular writing was that it could circulate to unknown readers with potentially different educational and social backgrounds, which authors of late-medieval English religious texts could not necessarily predict or imagine. The dangers of the types of readers educated enough to read in English but not enough to read in French or Latin lies in their uncertain educational background. As Katharine Breen has noted, in contrast to the disciplined practices of the clergy,

...lay people formed customs...that lacked the essential relations to rules constitutive of *habitus*. While *habitus* and *consuetudo* could each, in theory, describe a propensity for either positive or negative acts, in practice *habitus* was usually the virtuous product of discipline, clerical status, and Latinity while *assuetudo* was usually the vicious product of willfulness, lay status, and the vernacular. (Breen 4)

As Pierre Bourdieu points out, "habitus...[is] a set of *acquired* characteristics which are the product of social conditions which, for that reason, may be totally or partially common to people who have been the product of similar social conditions" (Bourdieu 29). The social conditions of lay readers were not necessarily "common to" authors like Deguileville (or his translator, Lydgate), and so the "set of acquired characteristics," the habitus of lay readers, could be unknown and unpredictable. The aspects of the *Pilgrimage* that attempt to regulate its audience, then, rely on the belief that "[habitus] may be *changed by history*, that is, by new experiences, education, or training" (Bourdieu

29). This concept of the habits of mind created by an audience's social background as well as "education or training" manifests within the *Pilgrimage* as a methodology for regulating its audience—habituating them—through encouraging habitual interaction with itself and providing models for proper devotional behavior.

The *Pilgrimage* seeks to develop its audience's devotional practice, educating lay readers who have not received the same training as clerical readers, and yet it also fears the power that training might grant its lay audience. This tension leads to the *Pilgrimage's* conflicting ways of interacting with its audience—conflating and separating the audience from the *Pilgrimage*, as well as teaching the audience to read allegorically while asserting its inability to read properly. Donna Ellington sees this same conflict appearing in those in charge of developing the spiritual lives of their flocks, like cardinals, noting that the "private devotional life which they sought to develop in their hearers could become the vehicle for ecclesiastical control of the most intimate aspects of a person's faith, or it could become the final stage for the creation of a personal self, distanced from the corporate and public expectations of either Church or state" (Ellington 154-55). Because the *Pilgrimage* is a text written in the English vernacular in the fifteenth century, when lay literacy was increasing, its audience's responses to the *Pilgrimage's* spiritual instructions could be unpredictable. This audience, unknown in terms of educational background and thus unknown in terms of how they will respond to the *Pilgrimage's* instruction, evokes conflicting responses in the *Pilgrimage* that acknowledge both of the outcomes Ellington outlines: either the *Pilgrimage* could fully become "the vehicle for ecclesiastical control" in its audience's private devotion, or it might, through educating its audience, spur "the creation of a personal self." The

cardinal's flock is a known quantity, but the readership of the *Pilgrimage* can continue expanding as long as the text continues circulating, making it difficult to define. The *Pilgrimage* cannot tailor its didactic apparatus to whatever audience comes into possession of the text, and its incorporation of a variety of methods to regulate its audience both recognizes its attempt to negotiate between the development of private devotion and personal self (and to achieve the former rather than the latter) and illuminates the lack of power a text has over its audience. This lack of power distinguishes the effect produced by religious texts like the *Pilgrimage* from that produced by the ministrations of clergy members. It demonstrates the space these texts create: a space where the spiritual development encouraged might lead to increased "ecclesiastical control" or to "creation of a personal self," but where the regulating mechanisms of interpersonal interactions between members of the clergy and their lay charges are absent. The *Pilgrimage's* treatment of the figure of the pilgrim deals directly with this unregulated space by enacting regulation on an audience, the pilgrim, whose responses to the *Pilgrimage's* didactic lessons *are* subject to the text's regulation.

The *Pilgrimage* models ways that devotional texts tried to understand and establish new relationships with their readers as their potential readership expanded with the increasingly literate laity of fifteenth-century England. Again, Breen's study of *habitus* offers a clear example of the potential of texts to regulate their audiences. She uses the term *habitus* to characterize the type of habitual practice that allows master artisans to work their craft without constant attention to the way they work their craft, explaining that *habitus* is the result of a habituating practice that changes the practitioner. Taking as an example a student of language, Breen explains that "[a]s he acquires the

habitus of grammar, the student does not merely learn rules, but is himself regulated, made regular, by the language he studies and the discipline of the classroom in which he studies it” (Breen 2). Breen sees this transformation as heavily indebted to the study of Latin grammar because of the repetition and memorization of rules that accompany such study. While Breen sees the lack of regimented rules for the study of English as underlying the difficulty of regulating lay readers, I suggest that the *Pilgrimage* demonstrates other methods for enacting this type of regulation on audiences of English texts.

In particular, the allegorical form of the *Pilgrimage* encourages specific interpretations of the potentially opaque, abstract ideas figured as characters in the narrative, thus working to regulate its imagined audience in a way that does not rely on the reader having had a particular educational background. The *Pilgrimage* uses allegory to invite reader participation; it relies on a mode of narration seen in the *Romance of the Rose*, in which a protagonist encounters personifications who try to help or hinder him. The difficulty of proper interpretation of these characters is part of the purpose of the text as it allows these allegorical figures to encompass multiple meanings and connotations. The allegory that provides the spiritual instruction of the *Pilgrimage* creates a resistance to clear, singular meanings embedded in its narrative. This resistance then encourages the very interpretive reading by its audience that other elements in the text continually curtail: its conflation of the pilgrim and reader, instructions for reading bodies, imposition of sensory stimulation, and movement between allegorical and audience bodies. Rita Copeland and Stephen Melville point to this difficulty of interpretation as an essential part of allegory, asserting that “[a]llegory becomes frozen only when we cease (or

become unable) to engage with it in that struggle, taking it only as an object of decoding interpretation” (Copeland and Melville 185). Even as the potential for contradiction and nuance in allegory allows the *Pilgrimage* to discuss spiritual matters, it also opens the door to the very misuse and misinterpretation attributed to vernacular religious texts. John Ball’s citation of *Piers Plowman* in the Rising of 1381 had given a very real face to those fears of misuse (Hanna 240), and misuse could have only become more threatening when combined with the strictures that Arundel’s *Constitutions* placed on English vernacular writing. The author figure in the second recension of the *Pilgrimage* expresses fears over these unknown “particular circumstances of interpretation and receptivity” (Copeland and Melville 173) of the text that was stolen from him (the first recension of the *Pilgrimage*) precisely because he cannot know who has received the text and how that unknown audience may interpret it.

This concern, while applicable to any dissemination of the *Pèlerinage*, whether in its original French or in translation, seems particularly apt in its fifteenth-century English translations. These two translations, the anonymous prose translation and Lydgate’s poetic translation, appear at a point in time when concern over misunderstandings of religious doctrine arising from the availability of religious texts in English had escalated to the point of becoming the object of legislation in Arundel’s *Constitutions*. So although the concern over the “particular circumstances of interpretation and receptivity” are original to the *Pèlerinage*, examination of its English translations within their historical context reveals how closely the concerns over unsupervised reading appearing throughout the text align with concerns over the use of religious images.

In spite of the misuse that the allegorical frame of the *Pilgrimage* can permit, its usefulness for creating meaning, and particularly for encouraging its audience to create meaning, means that allegory also offers potential assistance in the *Pilgrimage*'s regulation of its lay audience. Suzanne Conklin Akbari articulates this potential as a "crucial purpose of allegory" because "...by avoiding the limitations inherent in literal language, allegory creates meaning within the reader, bypassing the inevitable degeneration of meaning as it passes through the obscuring veil which makes the transmission of meaning—the revelation—possible" (Akbari 9). Because some personifications in allegory can represent abstract ideas, the way these characters develop in the course of the allegorical narrative allows these ideas to gather accretive meaning and become nuanced. Within the *Pilgrimage*, this form of idea development permits the ideas personified in the text to become more restrictive in their interpretive possibilities; the more details these personifications gather in the course of the narrative, the fewer attributes of these personified ideas are left to the audience's imagination. For example, even though the character of Nature is presented as a morally good character, she tries to protest against the Eucharist as breaking her laws and chides Grace:

"Of þe heuene ye haue þe lordshipe,
 withoute any ooper havinge part þerof...
 ...And wol loth certeyn
 wolde ye suffre, and loth wolde ye be þat I entermeted me
 anything þerof. And so wolde I troweliche be riht weri if
 ye in my part clemede hynesse, or medlede yow: I
 dye as soone as suffre it. Bitwixe me and yow was sette
 a bounde þat divideth us so þat noon of us shulde mistake

ayens ooþer...” (Henry *Vol. I* 20-21, ll. 827-836)

Nature represents herself and Grace as figures with clear boundaries, a move that discourages the audience from confusing the roles of the two characters. Nature’s accusation against Grace, that Grace has “clemede hynesse” [claimed highness] and “medded” [meddled] in Nature’s domain, depicts the two characters as sovereigns of their own discrete territory. Grace, however, quickly puts Nature in her place while also demonstrating how the character development of the allegorical figures can assert the types of interpretation available to the audience. Grace warns Nature, “...if ye were riht wys ye wolde not/ speke of bounde þat is set bitwixe yow and me; for it/ boundeth yow, not me” (Henry *Vol. I* 23, ll. 929-931). Grace’s retort demonstrates that the idea of grace supersedes the idea of nature in terms of power, restricting the way that the idea of nature can be represented: rather than a sovereign figure equal to Grace, Nature has developed into a subject who rules her territory only by Grace’s sufferance. These types of character developments create restricted allegorical figures, in which the character’s attributes that develop over the course of the narrative foreclose some of the available interpretations of those figures.

This restriction in interpretive possibilities can, in turn, regulate the way the audience understands the ideas figured in the allegory, allowing the character development of the allegorical figures within the narrative to function as iconography does for visual materials. It encourages a particular type of interpretation without fully managing to erase possibilities for other interpretations. The manuscript illustrations of the *Pilgrimage* utilize these visual iconographies, for example, by representing the Heavenly Jerusalem as a walled city guarded by an angel wielding a sword. Employing iconography similar to that found in Last Judgment images, the illustrated manuscripts of

both the anonymous prose and Lydgate's version of the *Pilgrimage* depict the "Sea of the World"—a sea fished by Satan in the allegorical narrative—as containing multiple bodies underneath the water tended, or perhaps threatened, by angels.³ I contend that the *Pilgrimage* employs both visual and textual iconographies, relying on representations that draw on common images to inculcate a particular understanding within the audience. In the manuscript illustrations of the "Sea of the World," the confusing mass of human limbs and the bodies under the surface of the "ground level" point to images of the Last Judgment, in which sinners are cast below the earth into hell, falling into a mass of tortured sinners. The audience familiar with these iconographies of the Last Judgment expects humans appearing below "ground level" to be in some kind of spiritual trouble, and indeed in the Melbourne manuscript of the *Pilgrimage*, the figure tending the humans caught in the water in the "Sea of the World" is a clearly monstrous Satan.

The *Pilgrimage*'s generic hybridity as a dream vision and allegorical pilgrimage narrative allows it to draw on generic expectations as well, using, for example, aspects of mysticism dealing with the spiritual body while also treating in generalizing terms what appears as personal in visionary texts. Where Julian of Norwich experiences a union with God in her visionary experience, the pilgrim figure receives only didactic experience so that he may provide a model for all readers. Patricia Dailey sees a "promised body" invoked in mystical texts, in which the visionary perceives a holy body in the vision that models how her inner self, which Dailey reads as an inner body, should appear. These promised bodies provide the hoped for state of the visionary's future body. She identifies

³ See Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Laud Misc. 740, 109r for the Sea of the World in Lydgate's translation (available digitally here: <http://bodley30.bodley.ox.ac.uk:8180/luna/servlet/s/x35f6b>), and the State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 for the Sea of the World in the anonymous prose translation (available digitally here: <http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/93606>).

the promise of this future body as evidence of a medieval perception of embodiment that encompasses two bodies, which Dailey terms the inner and outer bodies, that appears throughout mystical literature. When I refer to the body in this dissertation, I refer to the bodies of the *Pilgrimage*'s audience—the aspect of them that exists independent from the text—and to bodies as constructed by the *Pilgrimage*. The bodies constructed by the *Pilgrimage* rely on physicality to define them fully, whether that physicality involves great beauty (as with Grace), fatness (as with the pilgrim), or physical attributes that do not fit into the idea of a normal human physical body (as with Avarice's six arms). I argue that the *Pilgrimage* subscribes to the perception of embodiment described by Dailey, encompassing two bodies through its treatment of the pilgrim's body and soul. Rather than presenting a promised body for the pilgrim to emulate, however, the *Pilgrimage* denigrates the pilgrim's body as an assertion of authority. As a model of ideal regulation, the *Pilgrimage* replaces the promised body of the visionary with the idealized reader in the form of the pilgrim.

The *Pilgrimage* struggles with the issue of how to value the fleshly body, and I argue that this struggle appears throughout the *Pilgrimage* as an attempt to negotiate how to understand things that have an inner and an outer portion: the human being as spirit and flesh, the allegorical text as metaphor and signified. This difficulty in distinguishing between the material thing and what it signifies appears, Sarah Stanbury argues, in late medieval debates over the use of religious images, in which the empty object is confused for a living thing. She identifies this confusion as one of the main issues that Lollard reformists had with the devotional use of images, because worshipers could be tempted to venerate the image rather than what the image represents. Yet the problem with the

complete dismissal of material objects in devotional practice comes, Stanbury explains, from the role of the material in incarnation. The incarnation is significant in Christianity precisely because the spirit became flesh (Stanbury *The Visual Object of Desire* 20-21).⁴ The *Pilgrimage's* attention to the incorporeal body and how it interacts with the flesh allows the text to work through how its own allegorical form relates to the spiritual lessons contained within it. Its presentation of the Eucharist and transubstantiation during the pilgrim's visit to Grace's house reminds the audience early in the narrative that flesh is not matter that stays firmly within the boundaries set for it. The pilgrim observes Moses sitting down to eat, and is astonished to see matter change forms:

...Moses wolde go dine
and his mete was redy al ooperwise þan it was,⁵ for þer was
nothing but onliche bred and wyn: but it was not mes at his
wille, for he wolde haue flesh to ete and blood þerwith for
to deface þe olde lawe þat hadde seid þat no blood ete þei
shulde. To helpe him he cleped Grace, and she wente to him
anoon. And þanne I sigh a gret wonder, to which þer
is noon lich: þe bred into quik flesh he turned, as Grace
ordeyned it; þe wyn he turnede into red blood þat seemede
wel be of a lamb. (Henry *Vol. 1* 19, ll. 776-785)

⁴ For Stanbury's detailed explanation of how late-medieval image debates figure the improper use of images as fetish, see her "Introduction" in *The Visual Object of Desire in Late Medieval England*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

⁵ Though the Middle English is strange in this clause, "and...it was," Henry translates the French as "Moses wanted to go to his meal, but wished to prepare it quite differently from the way in which it had been done for him" [*Moyses vout aler disner / Et son mangier vout aprester / Tout autrement qu il n'estoit*] (Henry *Vol. 2* 389).

In this passage, flesh is bread, meat, and also alive (“quik”). Though the pilgrim introduces the episode by explaining that the meal set before Moses was “al ooperwise þan it was” [in quite a different way than it was] to say that “it was not mes at his wille” [it was not a meal to his desire], the pilgrim’s repetition of “was” also implies that the nature of the food was deceptive: it “was...ooperwise þan it was.” The pilgrim’s language asserts that the food can somehow be something and also “otherwise” than that something. This assertion prepares the reader for the Eucharist of which Moses is about to partake, but it also contributes to the *Pilgrimage*’s instructions in reading allegorically. The meal before Moses is bread and wine, but it is also flesh and blood. The extensive explanation of the Eucharist that follows this scene, in which the argument between Grace and Nature, mentioned above, occurs, also encourages the audience to accept the allegorical form of the narrative: a thing (the meal, the allegorical figures) can have multiple significations; they are not bound into one signified.

Indeed, the *Pilgrimage* points to ways that boundaries, like those between the material and the spiritual or the allegorical form and the lessons contained within, are not impenetrable. Grace explains the boundary between her and Nature as a permeable one in the exchange above, pointing out that Nature is bound but Grace is not. Grace’s language indicates that she seems particularly interested in the way these boundaries restrict (or fail to restrict) movement. Regarding the boundary between them, Grace says to Nature “it forshetteth yow from passinge/ ouer, for so I wole bounde it. But to þat ende þat I/ shulde not entre weene not þat I bounded it, for I may entre/ whan I wole” (Henry *Vol. 1* 23, ll. 931-934). Grace repeats words of restriction and bounding (“forshetteth,” “bounde,”

“bounded”) as well as words of movement (“passinge ouer,” “entre”), pointing to restricting movement as a primary purpose of the boundaries she’s established.

Just as incarnation troubled easy separation between the spirit and the material in the image debates, the allegorical form resists that same separation; allegorical figures within the *Pilgrimage*, like the pilgrim and the author figure, reside somewhere between signifying literally and figuratively. Akbari notes that this slippage became more common in late medieval allegory, which often included the “minimization of the difference between human narrator and superhuman personification...and combination of personifications with classical gods and even with real, historical figures” (Akbari 237). The slippage between the historical figure of Guillaume de Deguileville as the author, the extradiegetic author figure of the frame story, and the intradiegetic pilgrim figure of the narrative, means that the *Pilgrimage* has to help its audience read properly. With such unclear boundaries between the external/literal and the internal/figural, the audience may not understand how to navigate the allegorical narrative of the *Pilgrimage*, but the *Pilgrimage*’s regulating aspects come together to create textual iconographies that try to help its audience read properly.

In Chapter 1, “Constructing a Devotional Reader: Regulating Circulation and Access to Grace,” I begin examining the *Pilgrimage*’s construction of its ideal audience by identifying ways the narrative both conflates its audience with characters within the narrative and also emphatically separates the audience from characters within the narrative. I argue that it conflates the audience with the pilgrim figure in the allegorical pilgrimage narrative in order to exert control over the audience’s ways of reading; because the text controls the pilgrim’s ways of understanding the information presented

to him, in conflating the audience with the pilgrim, the *Pilgrimage* reveals a desire to exert similar control over the way its audience understands the information the text presents. At the same time, the *Pilgrimage* must establish its authority in spiritual instruction as greater than that of its audience, and so it also separates the reader from itself by reminding the audience of his or her difference from the author figure of the text. Stephanie Kamath has conducted an extensive study of the *Pilgrimage* and how its allegorical nature allows it to play with constructions of authorship. She sees the mechanisms of establishing authorship in the *Pilgrimage*, such as embedding the name of Deguileville's father into one of Reason's speeches, as evidence of great investment in the text's production of authorial identity. This performance of authorial identity also asks, I suggest, for consideration of the *audience* of that performance of authorship. My investigation of this audience notes how the *Pilgrimage*'s allegory fragments the figure of its author in order to conflate its audience with the author and pilgrim in the text. The conflict between the *Pilgrimage*'s method of using both conflation and separation to control the audience becomes exemplified in confusion about who the narrative "I" figures and the placement of the "I" within or without the narrative of the pilgrimage. The anxiety over controlling the audience that appears in the *Pilgrimage* becomes linked to both the author figure's anxieties about textual circulation and the pilgrim's anxieties about access to the allegorical figure of Grace throughout the text. Appearing within the same narrative, these anxieties combine to demonstrate a concern with the circulation of religious texts like the *Pilgrimage* and the way they may offer direct, unmediated access to the divine when they are used in private devotion.

Chapter 2, “Figuring the Body as Text: Instruction in Allegorical Reading,” identifies how the *Pilgrimage* models the allegorical bodies of its narrative as texts to be read, instructing the audience of the *Pilgrimage* in proper allegorical reading. The circulating text of the previous chapter becomes figured as a circulating pilgrim’s body, and the body is constructed as a veil, obscuring the soul’s ability to understand spiritual matters. This construction of the body as a veil and impediment to understanding invites the *Pilgrimage*’s audience to read the allegorical narrative of the pilgrimage as *sub integumentum*, asking the audience to conduct allegoresis on the allegory. At the same time, however, this invitation allows the audience interpretive power that might allow the audience control over the *Pilgrimage*; the *Pilgrimage*’s denigration of the pilgrim’s body—which has been conflated with the audience’s bodies—asserts the audience’s inability to understand due to the obscuring body and helps curtail this interpretive power. Lisa Cooper reads these conflicting distributions of control as “the paradox inherent to the pastoral syllabus, whose curriculum insisted on the individual’s responsibility for internal regulation, on the one hand, and on the inviolable authority of the penitential system that the syllabus ought to enforce, on the other” (Cooper 108). It is because of this paradox that the *Pilgrimage* strives to regulate the type of allegorical reading its audience conducts.

In Chapter 3, “The Senses: Gateways to Regulation,” I turn from the *Pilgrimage*’s construction of the pilgrim’s body and soul as a model for allegorical reading to examine how the text’s treatment of the senses within the *Pilgrimage* suggests movement between the pilgrim’s inner and outer bodies. Entering the conversation through the *Pilgrimage*’s figuration of the bodily senses as gates, I argue that the *Pilgrimage* figures the senses as

moving between inner and outer portions of the allegorical figures as a way to model movement from the text to its audience. The *Pilgrimage* also uses language of enclosure and binding to demonstrate the regulation it hopes to enact on its lay audiences. In these instances, the *Pilgrimage* seems to offer its audiences the senses it has regulated within the allegory, suggesting a movement between the text and the bodies of the audience reading the text that will become more clearly expressed in light of the text's construction of allegorical bodies, the subject of the next chapter.

In Chapter 4, "Empty Bodies: Dangers of the Allegorical Text and Image," I argue that the *Pilgrimage* uses visual and textual representations of allegorical bodies to highlight the potential dangers of bodies that, like allegories, require interpretation. The *Pilgrimage*'s concern with its audience's interpretation of its allegorical figures draws on the rhetoric of fifteenth-century debates over the proper use of religious images in order to demonstrate the similarly fraught position of religious writing in the English vernacular. In this chapter I examine how the *Pilgrimage* interacts with the concept of religious images functioning as "books for the unlettered" in light of the access to religious writing offered through the increase of religious writing in the English vernacular. This chapter demonstrates how the *Pilgrimage* grapples with the question of what justification remains for the use of religious images when the "unlettered" now have access to books written in the vernacular of the less-educated: do they still need images to provide religious instruction?

In the long-standing argument over the validity of images in Christianity, proponents of the use of religious images point to their usefulness as books for those who cannot read, providing those without the benefits of clerical education access to spiritual

information. At times, these images represented specific textual aspects of Christianity in visual art forms that carefully mimicked religious documents, lending credence to the argument about images serving as books for the laity since they provide access to the contents of these documents without requiring the ability to read. E.A. Jones reports one example of these art forms, appearing in

...the painted west wall of Trotton (Sussex), which has at its apex a scene of the Last Judgement while, flanking the west door and window, on the left side the seven deadly sins issue from seven dragons' mouths each of which emerge from an appropriate part of a man's body, and on the right a man is surrounded by seven medallions each portraying one of the works of mercy. (Jones 414)

These visual representations provide religious instruction: in the case of the seven deadly sins paired with the seven works of mercy, they provide a warning of what to avoid along with a suggestion of what to do. The Last Judgment scene offers an explanation of what results from choosing either set of seven, providing a narrative created in the images. Just as these images can educate those unable to read, vernacular literature can serve a very similar purpose for those unable to read Latin; Michelle Bolduc argues that “[r]eligious manuals written in the vernacular...bridge the distance between the vernacular and Latin, between the court and the Church” (Bolduc 128-29).

The question that the *Pilgrimage* asks, how to imagine an audience for an English vernacular religious text, springs from the lack of regulated education that lay readers had. Parkes tracks the path to lay literacy as frequently occurring

...in commerce, seignorial administration, and the law [where] we find that the practitioners were not only using written instruments in the course of their professional activities but also that many of them had acquired the habit of having at their elbows a book to which they could refer for information. The problem is not whether there were literate laymen, but how far they used this literacy outside their professional activities. (Parkes 283)

This type of pragmatic literacy would not have provided the training that would create a critical reader of religious allegories like the *Pilgrimage*, and so the *Pilgrimage* sets out to constrain the way its lay audience might read it much in the way that an image might restrict its interpretation. Shannon Gayk has observed Lydgate's interest in combining visual and textual description in this way, particularly in the *Pilgrimage*. She asserts that "[i]mages and words work together in this didactic task. Reading and seeing are collapsed into one act: to see well is to know how to read an image" (Gayk 89). I contend that this conflation between text and image, between the skills of reading and seeing, allows Lydgate to connect the proper reading of the allegorical figures of the *Pilgrimage* with proper reading of the images, both of which may reveal an emptiness. Lydgate's concern with the proper reading of figures in the *Pilgrimage*—both textual and visual figures—appears most clearly in his expansion of the figure of Idolatry. This figure, absent from the first recension and occupying a much smaller amount of space in Deguileville's second recension of the *Pèlerinage*, connects the author figure's concern over the misuse of his text with debates over the proper use of religious images.

Gregory the Great's letter, heavily cited in support of the use of images in religion, positions the purpose of images as particularly important to those unable to read, "for in [the image] the ignorant see what they should follow and the illiterate read the same from it" (Letters *The Letters of Gregory the Great* p. 745 11.10). Gregory's comparison of the image to the letter, as well as his description of those who will benefit from religious images as being in particular those who are "illiterate," ties the usefulness of the image to the educational value of the act of reading. Jeffrey Hamburger traces this idea of images as the "books of the unlettered" beyond Gregory the Great's first articulation of it, noting similar statements by Cistercian monks and Bonaventure (Hamburger 14-15), and claims that, when employed "...by authorities such as these, a single image can spawn a vast sphere of 'experience.'... The practice of piety itself becomes pictorial, with paintings providing not only the substance but also the model and method for a devotional regime" (Hamburger 16). The *Pilgrimage* identifies itself as this same kind of "model... for a devotional regime," and these connections between the purpose of images and the purpose of vernacular devotional writing, in which both types of representation strive to model proper devotion for their audiences, further invite a consideration of the uneasy status of English vernacular writing in fifteenth-century England alongside its debate over the use religious images. Indeed, Archbishop Arundel's *Constitutions* require veneration of religious images even as they prohibit vernacular translations of the Bible and other English vernacular religious writing, showing a clearly perceived link between the two, even if their treatment within the *Constitutions* is different.

This dissertation explores how the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to manage an audience that included the literate laity develops these conversations about individual devotional experience and the common anxieties that such individual experience evokes, whether the devotional object is image, text, or a blend of the two. Though it is tempting to read these anxieties as a precursor to the English Reformation, the divestment of the churches and destruction of religious images indicate a continued belief in the power of those images to function as books for the laity, even when the laity may no longer be "illiterate;" if the images did not have the potential to invite interpretation and misinterpretation, then they would not need to be destroyed. The rise of lay literacy and the increase of English vernacular devotional texts like the *Pilgrimage* means that, as these texts continue to write to an imagined audience (and perhaps attempt actively to construct their audience like the *Pilgrimage* does), they begin to develop textual iconographies that help restrict lay interpretation, even if the text is "Dyscured thurgh the world a brode" (Lydgate 71, l. 233) and circulates far beyond the author's control.

Chapter 1: Constructing a Devotional Reader: Regulating Circulation and Access to Grace

The two fifteenth-century English translations of *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man*, one an anonymous prose translation of Deguileville's first recension of *Le Pèlerinage de la Vie Humaine* and the other John Lydgate's poetic translation of Deguileville's second recension of *Le Pèlerinage*, attempt to exert control over readers by at once conflating the audience with characters within the text, in particular the pilgrim figure, while at the same time separating the reader from the text. The prose translation creates confusion about whom the "I" figure signifies in order to engage in this particular dynamic of conflation and separation. Lydgate's translation, meanwhile, mingles the author figure's concerns about the *Pilgrimage*'s circulation with the pilgrim's worries over access to the allegorical figure of Grace. The mingling of these two separate anxieties, exhibited through the similar behaviors of the author figure and the pilgrim, highlights a relationship between concern over textual circulation and over open access to Grace. I argue that this relationship between textual circulation and the pilgrim's access to Grace points to larger unease over the access to religious writing that vernacular devotional texts offer. This unease appears even more specifically in the *Pilgrimage* as a concern over lay access to vernacular religious documents in light of the text's confusion regarding the signified of the "I" figure and its use of Latin to restrict the readership of portions of the *Pilgrimage*. The text's anxiety over circulation and access to Grace draws attention to the *Pilgrimage* as a document of vernacular devotion and thus with a relatively unknown level of education among its readership. Because this conflation and separation of the audience and the narrative's characters work against one another,

however, the *Pilgrimage* consistently fails to establish its authority and to undermine the audience's authority and, in that failure, reveals larger anxieties about the types of access it provides, as a vernacular religious text, to lay audiences.

The *Pilgrimage*'s construction of an ideal reader seems to address these anxieties, as the pilgrim character models both proper and improper reading; these reading models ostensibly help mitigate the dangers of inappropriate reading created by lay access to the vernacular text. The English translations of the *Pilgrimage* first appear in England after another religious allegory, *Piers Plowman*, had already been used in the Rising of 1381 in ways the author had probably not anticipated, so these concerns over improper reading already present Deguileville's *Pèlerinage* found particular resonance in the fifteenth-century English translations. Indeed, Langland's revisions to *Piers* following the text's appropriation in the Rising provide an example of a text addressing and attempting to control its potential readership; Breen argues that "authors such as Langland had no choice but to imagine a potentially national readership for their works and devise strategies to control, or at least contain, their readers' responses" (Breen 174).⁶ I suggest that one of the strategies the *Pilgrimage* implements to control reader responses is constructing an ideal reader. I will refer to this ideal reader as the "constructed reader" because the term "ideal reader" requires constant qualification that the reader is "ideal" only in terms of the *Pilgrimage*'s expressed desires for its readers. This chapter first examines how the prose translation of the *Pilgrimage* creates the identities of the author figure, the pilgrim on the allegorical pilgrimage, and the idealized reader and then blurs

⁶ For further reading about how the use of *Piers Plowman* in the Rising of 1381 affected later versions of the text of *Piers Plowman*, see Ralph Hanna, *Pursuing History: Middle English Manuscripts and Their Texts*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, especially pp. 239-243.

the boundaries between these identities in an attempt to control the reader's devotional use of the *Pilgrimage* text.

Religious writing in the vernacular in late medieval England seemed to draw forth anxieties about how readers would interpret these texts since their reception was no longer confined to Church-educated readers of Latin; the *Pilgrimage* expresses these anxieties by distinguishing between the authority granted ordained priests and that granted laymen at the beginning of the pilgrim's journey. The pilgrim realizes immediately upon beginning his journey that he does not have the tools necessary for his pilgrimage; luckily, he encounters the allegorical figure of Grace. She takes him to her house where he witnesses several sacraments, including the ordination of priests, and where he sees the priests receiving a sword and keys from the figure of Moses: the sword is "Hy Justice" and the keys are the keys to heaven.

The sword of justice goes hand in hand with the keys, because, as Grace tells the priests, "Porteres ye ben...of þe kyngdom of/ heuene. Þe keyes ye haue, withoute lesinge, for to shette þe/ doore and for to opne it; withoute yow may no wight passe" [Porters you are of the kingdom of heaven. The keys you have, in fact [without lying], in order to shut the door and to open it; without you no man may pass] (Henry *Vol. 1* 17, ll. 669-671). These priests are granted the power to judge (the sword) and the power to admit or refuse admittance into heaven. And yet the text makes clear that this power is not for just anyone; when the pilgrim sees Moses hand over the swords and the keys to the priests he has just ordained, the pilgrim confesses, "Iust took me and gret desire for to haue þis brennyng/ swerd and þe keyes þerewith for to be vsshure of þilke passage, and porter. But to what ende I shulde come þerof I hadde/ nowht yit thouht." [...longing took me and

a great desire to have this burning/ sword and the keys in addition in order to be keeper of this passage, and porter. But to what consequences I should come because of this I had/ not yet thought.] (Henry *Vol. 1* 17, ll. 692-695). The pilgrim does not treat the instruments with the gravity they deserve, as hinted by his admission that he “hadde/ nowht yit thouht” about the purpose or consequences (both meanings are available in “eende”) of having the sword and keys. Additionally, the repetition of desiring words (“lust”; “desire”) combined with the pilgrim’s statement of why he wants them—to have the burning sword and to be the porter and usher of the passage to heaven—demonstrate the pilgrim’s failure to understand that these instruments should be desired to enact justice.

And so it is no surprise when Moses restricts the pilgrim’s use of these instruments: “...he sheped the þe faire swerd and bond/ faste þe keys.../...seying to me þat I lookede wel þat I vnbond not þe/ keys, ne þat I stired not þe swerd forto I hadde leeu” [he sheathed the fair sword and bound securely the keys, saying to me to look well that I did not unbind the keys, and that I not move the sword before I had leave.] (Henry *Vol. 1* 17, ll. 700-704). The pilgrim becomes embarrassed when he sees that he is treated differently from the priests, as none of them had their sword sheathed or keys bound, and the reader recognizes that the pilgrim has been denied the authority the priests have to judge spiritual matters. The pilgrim may not take up this authority until he has leave; Avril Henry explains that “the pilgrim receives bound sword and keys as a layman, who in case of necessity may hear confession” (Henry *Vol. 2* 387). In this moment, the pilgrim figure becomes associated with the layman, whose access to spiritual authority must be restricted and is clearly separated from the authority granted to the priests in this scene.

In this episode, the *Pilgrimage* clearly places the pilgrim in the position of a layman without authority, and I suggest that the *Pilgrimage* uses this episode to demarcate the potential roles of the reader. Readers who are members of the clergy have the authority to judge the content of the *Pilgrimage* for themselves, but lay readers must recognize that they have not been granted any authority and must reserve their judgment regarding the content of the *Pilgrimage* until they have leave. These lay readers have access to the *Pilgrimage* because it is written in the vernacular, and its status as a vernacular translation as well as a devotional text that aims to guide (or even dictate) its audience's experience makes it useful for thinking about what kind of audiences fifteenth-century English texts imagined and how those texts attempted to control those audiences. Examining the *Pilgrimage* as a translation is useful because its translation extends its reach to an audience even broader than that invited by its composition in Deguileville's original French, which opened its content to English audiences literate in the French vernacular. The *Pilgrimage*'s translation into English expands the potential audience to all levels of literacy in England so that the *Pilgrimage* becomes accessible to audiences with a wide spectrum of educational backgrounds, from those educated to read in Latin, French, and English to those having "pragmatic literacy" in English only. Malcolm Parkes' articulation of the types of literacy appearing in late medieval England makes clear the potential distance in educational background readers of English might have. He identifies "...three kinds of literacy: that of the professional reader, which is the literacy of the scholar or the professional man of letters; that of the cultivated reader, which is the literacy of recreation; and that of the pragmatic reader, which is the literacy of one who has to read or write in the course of transacting any kind of business" (Parkes

275). And so by its very translation into English the *Pilgrimage* makes itself available to all three types of readers, but the *Pilgrimage* most clearly identifies its audience with the pilgrim figure, who himself becomes identified as a layman in the episode with the sword and keys.

Lay readers were more likely to fall into the categories of cultivated or pragmatic readers because they often did not have the same educational opportunities as members of the clergy. Therefore, if the author of a text like the *Pilgrimage* wanted lay readers to understand the text in a specific way, then he or she had to pay special attention to construct the text in a way that led to the lay reader understanding the text in the desired manner. Andrew Taylor identifies this training occurring in texts that were constructed by the clergy for the laity through “...the apparatus, the compilation and the *ordinatio*” of the manuscripts, which “...all reflect[ed] efforts to inculcate specific habits of reading...” (Taylor 50). While codicological work on the *Pilgrimage* has indeed yielded fascinating results regarding the dating and circulation of the *Pilgrimage*,⁷ and the “apparatus, the compilation and the *ordinatio*” offer many compelling ways of thinking about and tracing types of interaction evidenced by marginalia and other signs of use, I argue that the *Pilgrimage* invites investigation of audience interaction in other ways as well. For example, the *Pilgrimage* uses its narrative structure to try to establish the terms of its own use as a devotional object, and as it dictates these terms it also illuminates ways that the audience might fail to meet the terms of use, especially since private devotion provided a space where heterodox beliefs could potentially be considered and put safely into

⁷ See in particular Avril Henry, *De Pilgrimage of be Lyfe of the Manhode*, and Kathryn Walls and Marguerite Stobo, eds., *The Pilgrime by William Baspoole*. Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Board of Regents for Arizona State University, 2008. Print.

practice. Matthew Groom notes that ownership of vernacular texts “might have created the right environment for a more personal and more scripture-based religion amongst such groups which bordered on the unorthodox” (Groom 390). The increase in literacy in fifteenth-century England⁸ made private devotional reading, and thus the potential for heterodox belief, increasingly possible. The *Pilgrimage* reacts to this specter of heterodoxy by attempting to construct an audience who practices the proper devotional reading the text establishes.

The *Pilgrimage*'s construction of its audience (as, for example, a layman) reveals a deeply imbricated relationship between a text's assertions of control over its reader and that reader's power over the text. Seth Lerer identifies the subjugated reader as an essential part of the fifteenth-century reader/writer figure due to the poetic and literary authority of Chaucer's legacy (Lerer *Chaucer and His Readers* 5). The *Pilgrimage*'s constructed audience, however, fails to remain distinct from the author figure and so its subjugation is incomplete. Lydgate's work on the *Pilgrimage* invites consideration of how the constructed audience of the *Pilgrimage* interacts with the subjugated reader Lerer has identified as characteristic of fifteenth-century writing. Lydgate inserts himself into the translation of the *Pilgrimage* in a way that asserts his authorial power, derived from translating the text, but he also places himself into the position of a reader of

⁸ For further reading about the rise of lay literacy in late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century England, see Jo Ann H. Moran Cruz, “England: Education and Society.” In *A Companion to Britain in the Later Middle Ages*. Ed. Rigby, S.H. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); Margaret Aston, “Devotional Literacy.” In *Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion* (London: The Hambleton Press, 1984); Seth Lerer, *Chaucer and His Readers: Imagining the Author in Late-Medieval England* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Douglas A. Kibbee, *For to Speke Frenche Trewely: The French Language in England, 1000-1600: Its Status, Description and Instruction* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1991). Cruz notes that “[b]y about 1350 grammatical exercises called *Vulgaria* or 'Latins' (colloquial sentences and dialogues used for translation exercises from English to Latin and vice-versa) were becoming popular—a testament to the growing exclusivity of English as the language of instruction” (Cruz 454).

Chaucer, blurring the division between the position of authority and the position of the subjugated reader in the *Pilgrimage*. The other uses for the constructed audience demonstrated in the *Pilgrimage*, like modeling proper reading or the consequences of poor decisions, suggest that the subjugated reader Lerer finds throughout fifteenth-century English texts might also result from concerns over readers newly granted access to texts by the increase in texts written in English in the fifteenth century (Bell 251-54).

The format of the first English translation of Deguileville's *Pilgrimage* clearly demonstrates its purpose as a document for private devotion. Of the copies of the anonymous prose Middle English translation of the *Pilgrimage*, completed in the first quarter of the fifteenth century (Henry *Vol. 1* lxxxiv),⁹ most manuscripts "show extensive annotations in various hands" and "contain only *De Pilgrimage of þe Lyfe of þe Manhode*" (Henry *Vol. 1* xxxi), the title belonging to this prose translation. The frequent markings of users of the text in addition to its solitary appearance (rather than in a miscellany) imply its use in private reading. A.S.G. Edwards notes that while the format of the text does not provide exhaustive information regarding the type of reader imagined for a text, at the same time a book like the Vernon manuscript, which has 382 surviving leaves, identifies itself by size as "a public book, one that could never have been envisaged as a means of private study but which would probably have to have remained set in a fixed position on a lectern, where it would be the focus of some form of collective

⁹ For more details about the Middle English anonymous prose translation in its historical context, see Kathryn Walls, "*The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode: The Prose Translation from Guillaume de Deguileville in its English Context*" (Ph.D. Diss., Toronto, 1975).

contemplation through being read aloud” (Edwards 95). The *Pilgrimage*, on the other hand, bound in smaller volumes,¹⁰ is viable as a text for private devotion.

Marginalia also indicate how late-medieval readers might have interacted with texts. Edwards explains the significance of the marginalia on one manuscript that contains evidence of family members adding lyrics, which survive only in that miscellany, by pointing out that it “suggest[s] forms of interplay between readers and the works they read that found expression in attempts at literary emulation” (Edwards 99). This practice of private or, in this instance, familial literary emulation suggests that authors of medieval texts could expect their texts to be interacted with and, as Edwards notes, emulated. Readerly glosses and marginalia in Bodleian Library Oxford MS Laud Misc. 740, a manuscript containing Lydgate’s translation of the *Pilgrimage*, provide pithy summaries of the adjacent text. The marginal gloss of “Fflattery. pryds supporter” (76v) puns on the textual description of the figure of Flattery, who carries the figure of Pride on her back, and also attends to the spiritual implication that the sin of flattery supports or encourages the sin of pride (“supporten, v.” MED). This gloss, with its accuracy in terms of literal and figurative summary of the allegorical figures of Flattery and Pride, indicates a reader engaged in the type of proper allegorical reading that the *Pilgrimage* encourages through modeling. The gloss next to the text describing the pilgrim’s encounter with a rock with a weeping eye in it helpfully explains the extended simile as well as the illustration on the previous page (107r): “*the harte of man compared to a rock*” (107v). Grace’s explanation of the weeping rock continually delays identifying what the rock

¹⁰ State Library of Victoria: Melbourne, MS *096 G94, which contains the prose translation as well as a set of thirty-seven illustrations, measures only 265 x 185mm, smaller than the average piece of notebook paper. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS. Laud Misc. 740, which also contains the prose translation and twenty illustrations, measures 257-261mm x 191mm, of similar size to the Melbourne manuscript.

signifies (the heart of man), and the gloss is placed next to the moment where Grace finally reveals the rock's meaning, as if in triumph (or perhaps relief) at finally grasping the figural meaning of the pilgrim's encounter with the rock. These glosses provide manuscript evidence of the ways readers of the *Pilgrimage* could interact with the text; the glossator of MS Laud 740 was certainly capable of conducting the kind of proper reading that the *Pilgrimage* modeled. Having established that the form of manuscripts of the *Pilgrimage* indicate that it was indeed intended for (and used in) private devotional use, we may turn to the ways that the *Pilgrimage* constructs its reader to manage the text's private devotional use.

The narrative of the *Pilgrimage* constructs a reader within the text—a reader subject to demands regarding where and when reading happens, and this constructed reader is a blend of the ideal reader and the actual reader of the *Pilgrimage* manuscript. As discussed above, the *Pilgrimage* frequently models behaviors for its pilgrim to mimic and the pilgrim figure becomes conflated with the reader figure. This modeling suggests the ideal reader who will read the allegory without any misunderstanding, but the behaviors modeled remain only suggestions. The *Pilgrimage* further constructs its reader when the allegorical narrative calls for the pilgrim/reader figure to read another text within the *Pilgrimage*. When characters in the *Pilgrimage* model behaviors for the ideal reader, they attempt to control the devotional practice of the text's readers, but the *Pilgrimage*'s contradictory attempts to establish authority and undermine readerly authority continually break down that control. The text conflates the reader with the pilgrim so that it might direct the reader's actions, but at other times it separates the reader from the author figure to maintain its spiritual authority. This section will track

how the conflation and separation of the reader, pilgrim, and author figure illumine the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to control its reader through constructing its own reader.

The *Pilgrimage* models the potential for receptive as well as unreceptive reading and, when the pilgrim engages in proper reading, the constructed reader receives these attributes as well because of the ongoing conflation of the pilgrim and reader figures within the text of the *Pilgrimage*. The first allegorical character that the pilgrim encounters outside of Grace's house, Rude Entendement, threatens him and tries to take the pilgrim's scrip and staff. Reason comes to the pilgrim's rescue and gets into an argument with Rude Entendement, who demands to see a document proving Reason's identity before he will believe that she is who she claims ["Shewe þi commissioun and at þe leste þi name I/ shal wite, and þe grete powere þat þou hast, þat bi semblaunt/ þou shewest me..." (Henry *Vol. 1* 68, ll. 2814-16). When Reason complies with his demand, the actual reader of the manuscript reads the same document the pilgrim reads within the narrative. This shared position of reading conflates the reading experience of the pilgrim and of the reader and thereby constructs the reader of the *Pilgrimage*. A moment of poor reading, which serves as a model of behavior for the ideal reader to avoid, follows closely after the moment constructing the reader. The close proximity of these moments appealing to the constructed reader and the ideal reader demonstrate how tangled these two readers are within the *Pilgrimage*. After the pilgrim has read the document confirming Reason's identity and power, Reason once again demands to know Rude Entendement's name: "'Who art þou?' quod þe cherl. 'Who/ am I?' quod Resoun, 'For Sent Germeyn, has þow not herd/ riht now what men han red heere? Thinkest þou on þi/ loues, oþer to take toures or castelles?'" ["Who are you?" said the churl. "Who am I?"

said Reason. “By Saint Germanus, have you not heard right now what (this) man has read here? Are you thinking on your loves or else to make¹¹ towers or castles?”] (Henry *Vol. 1* 69, ll. 2860-2863). Reason’s incredulous response to Rude Entendement’s repeated demand to know who *she* is suggests the constructed reader’s reaction as well: because the constructed reader has just read the document explaining who Reason is, his or her response is much more likely to align with Reason’s—incredulity that the churl still asks who Reason is—rather than with Rude Entendement’s. And so, by reading the document authorizing Reason, the reader has been constructed to inhabit the position of proper understanding (demonstrated by Reason) rather than the position of improper understanding (demonstrated by Rude Entendement). Wendy Steiner notes the importance of this episode to the *Pilgrimage*’s instruction in proper reading, and particularly proper reading of allegory. She asserts that “the pilgrim, by identifying Rude Understanding as a stubborn criminal and by accepting Reason for who she is, may finally make the critical leap from reading personification allegory correctly to reading scripture correctly” (Steiner 45). Because this moment has constructed the reader as having read Reason’s document, thus making it difficult for the reader to deny knowledge of the document as Rude Entendement does, the constructed reader is likely to accept Reason for who she says she is and thus learn to read allegory properly. However, Rude Entendement’s misunderstanding still reminds the constructed reader of the potential for misunderstanding, particularly since it turns out that Rude Entendement’s misunderstanding derives from stubbornness rather than an inability to understand. Rude

¹¹ Henry suggests that “take” should perhaps be “make” here, though she notes that “*t/m* confusion is uncommon” (Henry *Vol. 2* 440).

Entendement has chosen not to understand, which reminds the reader that this same choice is available to him or her.

The potential diversity in ways of understanding what is read, displayed in this incident with Rude Entendement, models the importance of proper understanding but does not entirely secure proper understanding in the constructed reader. The anxiety about a reader's power to interpret a devotional text and thus potentially to misunderstand spiritual matters—an anxiety appearing throughout the *Pilgrimage*—interacts with concerns about the use of the English vernacular in fifteenth-century England, inviting attention to how this vernacular devotional text imagines itself being used. Writing in the English vernacular made the text available to a larger group of readers, which made the spiritual instruction of the text more widely available, but it also made the text available to readers potentially unregulated by schooling in the Church. In late medieval England, “...it was what the vernacular enabled that was deemed politically controversial. The vernacular was unregulated...and in its association with an increasingly diverse readership/audience, raised issues about lay education and the potential redistribution of secular and spiritual authority” (Salter and Wicker 8). Vernacular devotional texts like the *Pilgrimage* have the potential to be read without oversight, and thus open themselves up to heterodox interpretations; the potential imbrication of the authors of texts that invite heterodox beliefs can explain the anxiety over readers' devotional practices frequently expressed in the *Pilgrimage*.

Both translations of the *Pilgrimage* use authorial interruptions in the pilgrimage allegory that blur the boundaries between the monk/dreamer/pilgrim characters; these interruptions remain unchanged in the first and second recensions of the text. Robert

Meyer-Lee notes that this blurring of character boundaries has already begun in late-fourteenth-century poetry, notably in Chaucer's texts, in which "...three subject positions—Chaucer the man, Chaucer the poet, and Chaucer the pilgrim...—are either kept isolated or in ambiguous play with one another. In the fifteenth century, in contrast, they are frequently conflated for the most central thematic purposes" (Meyer-Lee 3). While the fifteenth-century translations of *Pilgrimage* do, as noted, engage in this conflation of subject positions, these positions do in fact remain uneasily conflated, frequently separating and engaging in "ambiguous play" as the *Pilgrimage* struggles to attain the proper balance of proximity and distance needed to control its reader's devotional use of the text. Lerer also notes the prevalence of this type of blending of characters occurring in manuscript culture and argues that character blending, which we see in the *Pilgrimage*, encourages the reader to engage with the text. Indeed, Lerer sees this kind of engagement as a "...distinctive feature of pre-humanist manuscript culture[, which] permits a certain fluidity among the author, scribe, and reader" (Lerer *Chaucer and His Readers* 12). This fluidity appears throughout the *Pilgrimage* as the figures of the author, pilgrim, and reader constantly overlap one another.

The *Pilgrimage*'s conflation of the author figure and the pilgrim begins early in the prose translation with an author figure inviting an audience to listen: "Now cometh neer and gadereth yow/ togideres alle folk, and herkeneth wel..." (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, 8-9). By imploring the audience to gather and listen well ("herkeneth wel") the author figure identifies himself as the speaker of the narrative. In particular, he constructs an audience who is listening to him, an imaginary scenario in which he, as the oral storyteller, has complete narrative control over what the audience hears of the story. Once the author

figure has established himself as the person in control of the narrative of the *Pilgrimage*, he explains how the narrative will proceed and at the same time fleshes out his own character. “Now vnderstandeth þe swevene that bifelle me,” the author figure says, “in religioun at/ þe abbey of Chaalit, as I was in my bed” (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, 17-18). With these words the author figure reveals that what comes next will be a dream, and so will be separate from the living world in which he has asked the audience to listen to him. He also identifies himself as a monk of the abbey of Chaalis, and so the author figure and the monk figure become one in the frame portion of the narrative, where the author figure speaks outside of the context of the dream vision.¹² Then, in the next line, the author figure establishes the final aspect of the “I” figure in the prose translation: “Me thowte as I slepte þat I was a pilgrime and þat I was stired to go to þe citee of Jerusalem...” (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, 19-20). Although the word choice of “Me thoughte” and “as I slepte” indicates that the author figure is trying to make clear the distinction between himself, the author figure and the monk of Chaalis, and the pilgrim of the dream, a few factors undermine this attempt at separation of the two figures.

As the pilgrimage narrative begins, the text splits the “I” character into two separate figures, one extradiegetic (the author figure) and one intradiegetic (the pilgrim), but the author figure undermines this effort right away in the moment when the author figure/dreamer wakes from his dream of the Heavenly Jerusalem. At the beginning of the *Pilgrimage*, after a relatively brief dream vision of the heavenly Jerusalem, the monk

¹² Acknowledging the awkwardness of these multiple titles along with the text’s emphatic distinctions between these figures, Stephanie Kamath uses the umbrella term “first-person narrator-protagonist” to describe this figure (Kamath 4). However, since her focus is on the *Pilgrimage*’s constructions of authorial identity and I am more interested in how the *Pilgrimage* fragments that identity, I will refer to the first-person figure based on the identities he wears (author figure, monk, pilgrim) at the textual moment under discussion.

who dreams he is a pilgrim wakes and reestablishes himself as the author figure: “Now haue I seid yow shortlych inowh of þe faire citee,/ how in þe faire mirour I aperceyued it, and þefore to go I/ meeved me, for þider I wolde be a pilgrime...” [Now I have told you briefly enough of the fair city,/ how I perceived it in the fair mirror, and therefore moved myself to go, for I would be a pilgrim there] (*Henry Vol. 1* 3, 103-105). This portion of the text, which concludes the text’s narration of the dream vision of the heavenly Jerusalem, also technically concludes the dream vision as a whole. The narrative moment in which the author says that it seemed he was a pilgrim (“Me thowte...I was a pilgrime”) has ended. Indeed, the author figure seems to end the narrative of the extradiegetic storyteller as the action moves into the experience of the storyteller. The author figure says that he has told the audience “inowh” of his dream; now he explains that he decided to go on a pilgrimage outside of the dream vision framework, turning him into an intradiegetic figure who will speak and interact with the allegorical figures encountered on the pilgrimage.

The author figure’s use of subject as well as reflexive pronouns in conjunction with the verb “move” makes explicit this shift. The author figure, who is associated with the pronoun “I” at this point as both the storyteller and the dreamer, identifies himself as the subject and the object of “meeved,” demonstrating his shift from the position of the subject enacting the narrative’s progression to the position of the recipient of the narrative’s progression. This change from subject to object position reveals an attempt to create a pilgrim figure—which becomes conflated with the reader, as I will show below—who is acted on by the narrative, not one who enacts the narrative. The text places within the same narrative space figures from outside the dream vision and outside

the allegorical narrative and figures from within the allegorical narrative. When these figures become part of the same narrative—the allegorical pilgrimage—the boundaries of authority become blurred. The *Pilgrimage* begins with an extradiegetic author figure who holds a position of authority over the story he tells, but when the author figure moves into the position of the pilgrim, that authority all but disappears. The pilgrim seems to hold no narrative authority as he is constantly told what to do and think by the allegorical vices and virtues he encounters; these allegorical figures seem to be determining the course the story takes. And so, when the author figure becomes conflated with the pilgrim, he loses the authority he had established when he demanded that his audience “herkeneth wel”.

The author figure completes his transition into the pilgrim when he expresses his desire to become a pilgrim through a present tense verb of existence: “I wolde *be* a pilgrime” (emphasis mine). The verb of existence states how things are, in contrast to the verb “become,” which might more accurately express the process of shifting from a monk to a pilgrim. However, the author figure notably does not say “I wolde become a pilgrime,” indicating that there is no process of transformation, but that he would rather “be” a pilgrim, making an exchange of his current existence for that existence. This change, where the “I” figure changes from the author figure into the pilgrim, makes visible the possibility of a name or title (in this case, “I”) to signify more than one thing, preparing the reader for the type of allegorical reading the text will require.

At times, the author figure will break back out of the pilgrim identity and interrupt the pilgrimage narrative to request time to rest; I suggest that these interruptions separate the pilgrim from the author figure to try to establish authority in the author figure, but these efforts fail as they draw the reader’s attention to his or her own body which, like the

author figure's body, may become tired with reading. In the prose translation of the first recension of the *Pilgrimage*, the author figure divides the text into parts, and uses these divisions to address the audience directly in a way that demonstrates both the contrast and the connection between the author figure and the pilgrim. In the first part of the *Pilgrimage*, the pilgrim has had his dream of the Heavenly Jerusalem, decided to go on a pilgrimage, and has met Grace. Most of the first part consists of the pilgrim learning about church practices through his visit to Grace's house. As he moves forward in his journey, however, Grace departs from him and the pilgrim must make his own way. At this point, the author figure steps away from the pilgrim identity for a moment and addresses the reader directly, shifting back into the extradiegetic role the storyteller figure had inhabited. In the text, the pilgrim sees a dangerous area he must pass through to move forward in his journey and pauses the movement through the pilgrimage narrative as he says, "...Swich/ thing as I fond whan I passede þerbi [as] I wole telle yow" (Henry *Vol. I* 116, 4842-3). The pilgrim's use of "I" here is not unusual; throughout the pilgrimage portion of the text the pilgrim uses that "I" pronoun to refer to himself. However, the pilgrim's use of "you" is jarring at this moment. In general, the pilgrim has only used the word "you" to refer to the allegorical figures with which he has interacted. At this point, though, all of those figures have left, as it is now the pilgrim's job to figure out where to go and what to do based on the instructions he received from Grace. Any moment of confusion the reader might have about the referent of the "you" is quickly dispatched, however, as the pilgrim continues:

"...but

bifore þat I sey yow more heerof, to þat ende þat it enoye yow

nouht I wole heere yive yow good niht, and heere I wole make a

restinge. Tomorwe if ye wole, come ayen [and] þanne ye shule
heere þe remenaunt: ynowe I wole telle yow of mischeeves and
encumbraunces þat I fond—pitee ye shule haue þerof, as I
trowe, and taketh keep eche as ayens himself, for of þe
mischef of anooper ech [maketh] a mirrowr for himself.” (Henry
Vol. 1 116, 4843-4850)

The pilgrim reveals here that the “you” refers to the audience of the story—the same audience the author figure addresses at the very beginning of the text. So here, the pilgrim reverts to the monk/author/storyteller figure and steps back into the frame story surrounding the allegorical pilgrimage, rupturing the conflation of the pilgrim’s and reader’s identities. This passage asserts the separation through overemphasizing the reader’s identity, particularly through reference to the reader’s reading practice. Not only is the “yow” the object of the author figure’s “I sey,” but the author also expresses concern that the author’s storytelling may create trouble for the reader (Henry *Vol. 2* 528), explaining that he is pausing his story “þat it enoye yow/ nouht.” The author figure reinforces his own status as separate from the reader both by refusing to tell more of the story—telling the reader he or she will “heere þe remenaunt” if they return—and by asserting his need to “make a/ restinge.” These actions remind the reader that the author figure knows the story, but the reader will know the story only if the author figure chooses to continue telling it. This moment of transition in the *Pilgrimage* separates the pilgrim and author figure, as well as the author figure and the reader, but it also establishes a relationship not only through the direct address of the “you,” but also through the shared position of the extradiegetic author figure and the extradiegetic reader.

In this moment of rupture the author figure also invokes the image of the text as a mirror in order to persuade the reader to place him- or herself into the text, at the same time referencing the tradition of figuring devotional documents as mirrors. The author figure entreats the reader to “taketh keep eche as ayens himself, for of þe/ mischef of anooper ech [maketh] a mirrowr for himself.”¹³ [pay attention (to) each mischief as is appropriate to himself, for of the mischief of another each makes a mirror for himself]. This request urges the reader to learn from the pilgrim’s mistakes and also advertises the *Pilgrimage* as a devotional document useful for spiritual improvement. Devotional documents in Latin as well as vernaculars relied on the word “mirror” to impart the nature of these documents: they assisted readers in seeing themselves and, through introspection, improving their spiritual condition. Jennifer Bryan identifies the mirror trope as a way to encourage readers to look at themselves in order to accomplish their spiritual improvement because devotional texts “allowed readers to engage in the project of seeing and shaping their own reflections.” (Bryan 3). Bryan attributes agency to the reader in devotional texts relying on the figure of the mirror, saying that when readers see their own reflections they can shape what they see, but as we have seen in the pilgrim’s encounter with Rude Entendement, not everyone can interpret correctly what they see, even with the agency to do so. Rude Entendement sees the pilgrim’s staff and scrip and thinks that the pilgrim is violating the scriptural exhortation to shun worldly possessions; he sees the document Reason produces to prove her identity but cannot read it; and he

¹³ Henry’s glosses of the words in these lines provide a clearer picture of the meaning behind “and taketh keep eche as ayens himself,” which has unclear meaning if translated simply as “take and keep each [instance of mischief and encumbrance] as against himself.” Consulting Henry’s glossary for the *Pilgrimage* yields a clearer translation of “pay attention to each [instance of mischief and encumbrance] as is appropriate to himself.” See the entries for “keep, n.” (p. 543), “as, rel. pron.” (p. 512) in volume 2.

hears the document read aloud to him, but cannot understand it. Suzanne Conklin Akbari has also traced the trope of the mirror in medieval literature and notes how the mirror can be put to use for two conflicting purposes, as “the good mirror which makes visible what could otherwise never be perceived, and the bad mirror which inverts the true image before it” (Akbari 7). The potential for inversion of truth abounds in the *Pilgrimage*, as the pilgrim frequently does not understand what is represented by the figures he encounters, and those figures do not always feel compelled to tell the pilgrim the truth. When the pilgrim encounters Idleness, her beauty and noble bearing make him believe that she is good, but following her path leads him completely astray. When the pilgrim encounters Tribulation, she has documents from both God and Satan; her working for both of them makes the truth of her signification particularly difficult for the pilgrim to decipher. And so even as the *Pilgrimage* employs the mirror trope to encourage devotional use of the text, the image of the mirror also points to the concern over proper reading of signs that permeates the text. The invocation of the mirror in this moment of authorial interruption also encourages the reader to see him- or herself as a reader, thereby reinforcing the reader’s identity as separate from the pilgrim and the author figure. Each time the author figure interrupts the allegory to speak directly to the reader, the reader must recognize him- or herself in the act of reading. The mirror imagery in the author’s interruption also serves to disrupt the connection between reader and author by reminding the reader of the spiritual guidance of the text and positioning the author figure as having the authority to give that guidance and the reader figure as in need of that guidance.

However, in the next section transition, between the third and the fourth parts, the author figure's demands to rest collapse the space and time of the narrative world and the reader's world even as it tries to separate them. The author figure has interrupted the narrative at a moment of choice, leaving the reader wondering what happens next. The pilgrim/author figure reflects on the next part of his journey and reminds the reader that he holds the power in their relationship because he knows what will happen next, but the reader does not. The author figure asserts his ability to control what the reader knows by saying "[t]o þe way I sette me soone/ ynowh, but I dide not my iorney, for I fond empechement. If/ ye wole heere how, cometh ayen anooper day, for heere I wole/ make a restinge" [I set myself to the way (I chose a path) soon enough, but I did not (set out on) my journey (quickly), for I found hindrance. If you will hear how, come again another day, for here I will make a resting] (Henry *Vol. 1* 147, 6129-6132). We have seen above how the author figure's use of the imperative separates the reader from the pilgrim/author figure identities; here, the form of the imperative evokes distance in space and time between the pilgrim/author figure and the reader. The author figure insists that the reader "cometh ayen anooper day," which creates a future event in which the reader arrives at the location of the author figure. This command operates on multiple levels, working with changes in space and time and also with changes in extradiegetic position. In terms of space, the reader can only arrive if he or she has departed from the author figure; since the author figure exists in the extradiegetic space of the text, the reader's departure is figured as part of this extradiegetic space. The reader, though, remains outside of the text and outside of any textual control in spite of the many ways the reader has been drawn into the text. In this moment where the author figure asserts his identity as separate from

that of the pilgrim and, in doing so, separates the pilgrim from the text, the worlds of the text and the physical world outside the text collapse into one another. The movement of time expressed in the reference to “anooper day” also collapses these two worlds by asserting the passage of time in what is, to the reader, a world that stops its movement when the reader stops reading it: the story does not progress when the reader is not reading the story. Though this moment models the behavior an ideal reader would have, ending the devotion for the day and returning later, the ideal reader and constructed reader exist only within the narrative of the *Pilgrimage*, and so they cannot leave the narrative. Only the reader who exists outside the text can walk away from the book and pick it up on another day, so the author’s imperative here seems particularly to point out the text’s inability to control its readers’ devotional practice, and it also illustrates how much power the reader actually has. The text cannot force the reader to pause when it says to pause, nor can it ensure that the reader sets the text down and does not pick it up again until “anooper day.” A reader could very easily read the imperative, simply ignore it, and continue reading.

The collapse of the world of the reader into the world of the text continues through the confusion of what the narrative “I” signifies in this passage: though the authorial interruption seems to separate the reader from the narrative, the multiplicity of subject positions that can lay claim to the “I” figure instead merges all three figures: author, pilgrim, and reader. The moments referring to “pe way,” “my iorney,” and “empechement” clearly refer to the pilgrim’s journey and the difficulties he encounters. However, the same first-person pronouns used by the pilgrim figure to refer to his journey and the difficulties he encounters appear also to describe aspects of the

storytelling frame in the following lines. The author figure speaks directly to the reader, telling him or her to depart so that he can rest. “I wole/ make a restinge” uses the first-person pronoun to describe aspects of the act of storytelling, including the need for the author figure to rest and take breaks in the midst of the storytelling. The completely different uses of the “I” pronoun within these few lines create confusion in the reader as the reader tries to keep track of the “I” figure within the pilgrimage narrative, the “I” figure of the frame story, and his or her own “I” figure as a reader whom the author figure directly addresses in these interruptions of the narrative.

The references to resting in these interruptions call attention to the physical body—though it is a textually constructed physical body—and to the relationship between labor and the text. The text’s construction of this physical aspect of the author figure in the context of his need to rest draws attention to writing as labor. The author figure’s writing represents the labor he undertakes to construct the devotional document the reader is reading—a devotional document meant to aid the reader through showing the pilgrim’s mistakes, as the pilgrim/author figure stated in the “mirror” example above, and also to aid the reader through instruction. The author figure states at the beginning of the prose translation that the book was written so that “þerinne may [ic]he wight lerne whiche wey men shulden/ taken and which forsake and leue: and þat is thing þat miche/ nedeth to þilke þat in pilgrimage gon in þis wyilde world” [Therein may each man learn which way men should take and which abandon and leave: and that is a thing that those that those gone on pilgrimage in this wild world greatly need] (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, 14-16). The *Pilgrimage* positions itself as a guide for the reader’s use of itself as a vernacular devotional text, but this explanation of its purpose also reveals a concern in the text with

the movement and travel, and the dangers accompanying them, inherent in pilgrimage. The attention to the weakness of bodies displayed in these authorial interruptions, as bodies constantly requiring rest, reminds the reader that the journey within the pages of the *Pilgrimage* provides spiritual instruction without taxing or endangering the reader's body in the way a literal pilgrimage would. At the same time, the authorial interruptions insist that the reader also rest, recognizing reading as labor as well. Though infrequent—they occur just three times within the *Pilgrimage*—the authorial interruptions distill the complex relationships at play within the pilgrimage by pointing to the multiple subjects signified by the narrative “I” and the collapsed worlds of the text and the physical world of the reader. These moments allow the relationship between the text and its reader to mirror allegory itself in that one signifier can signal more than one signified and the literal and figural can coexist.

John Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage* treats in depth the ways unknown readers might use the text of the *Pilgrimage*; the opening of Deguileville's second recension of the *Pèlerinage* contains a section in which the author figure meditates on the movement and wandering of texts—his text in particular. This section will focus on Lydgate's *Pilgrimage* to identify how the anxieties of textual circulation along with anxieties of the pilgrim's access to Grace that appear in the text come together to reveal a concern over potential uses of vernacular religious texts. These anxieties are revealed in moments that attempt to circumscribe the reader's devotional experience and to contain those experiences within boundaries established by the text. John Lydgate's choice to translate Deguileville's second recension results in Lydgate's translation being much more about circulation and translation than the prose version, both because of the opening

section on circulation that Deguileville adds to the second recension and also because Lydgate adds sections attributed to the “translator.” While his addition of this rubric is typical in his works, in the context of the *Pilgrimage*, Lydgate’s announcement of his role as translator of the *Pèlerinage* draws attention to issues of circulation.

Deguileville makes various changes to the text in the second recension, but of particular interest is the author figure’s lament that opens the second recension, which articulates fears about what happens to a text when it circulates beyond an author’s control, wandering into unknown areas. This lament is spoken in the extradiegetic “I” voice of the *Pilgrimage* text, and so the speaker is the author figure most closely linked to Deguileville, not the translator figure, which Lydgate identifies as himself. This lament, spoken in the “I” voice of the author figure, highlights the *Pilgrimage*’s fears over its own textual circulation by depicting an author figure who has experienced his work escaping and circulating before he is ready:¹⁴ “al the wrytyng that I wrote/ Was me be- raffte, and how I not/ Dyscured thurgh the world a brode” (Lydgate 7, 231-33), the author figure explains. The diction (“be-raffte”) makes clear the author’s sense of loss over his text circulating without his knowledge or consent (“how I not”), but I would like to direct our attention to the reasons the author figure states for his sorrow at this unauthorized textual circulation. He explains the ramifications of this circulation, saying

...and thus yt stood
Where-of I hadde as tho no shame,
ffor al I hald yt but a game;

¹⁴ Not only does the author’s lament about others taking his text seem striking when that lament appears in a translation, but its placement after 182 lines of Lydgate’s “Prolog of the Translator, John Lydgate” seems to flaunt this translation’s status as one of the versions of the text that has been “Dyscured thurgh the world a brode.”

ffor to that tyme fredam I hadde
To putte away, and eke to adde,
What that me lyst, lyk as I wende.
ffor ther was myche thyng to mende... (Lydgate 7 234-240)

The author figure's personal stake in the story circulating without his permission becomes clear through his imagination of what people must think of him—he appears “as tho” he had “no shame,” or that he “hald yt but a game.” He expresses fear that he appears insufficiently serious about the composition of the text. Because the author figure has claimed that the dream vision he recounts has come from God and that he was charged with telling others what he saw, any lack of seriousness on his part might be construed by his readers as disobedience to God. The author figure's fretful language in the passage above grounds these concerns in his earthly concerns, however, since he says he wishes to add or take away “[w]hat that me *lyst*” (emphasis mine), or that which pleases him, the author figure, to add to or take away from the text. He expresses additional desire for authorial control that he can extend throughout the narrative—adding and taking away “lyk he wende.” Even if we take “wende” in the meaning of “to continue a narrative” (“wende,” v., 2a, MED), the word carries with it the various aspects of going, wandering, and traveling that “wende” can signify. And so the author figure identifies his lamentation as a thwarted desire to have ongoing control of his text, allowing him to add and take away from it according to his desires before he releases the text to circulate and “wende”.

The author figure further explains the reasons undergirding his desire to keep his text close to him, to be handed out only in his presence, and also expresses a desire to manipulate and revise his text, in terms that extend his desire for control over the

circulation of his text into a wider, less personally specific, arena. He goes on to explain that he wants to make these changes “ffor ther was myche thyng to mende,/ To ordeyne, & to correcte,/ And bet in order to directe” (Lydgate 7, 241-43). In these lines, the author figure reveals the purpose of writing down the dream that he had: “to directe.” Most of these dream visions, and certainly devotional texts, have didactic purposes, and so that assertion is not surprising. However, the diction used as the author figure describes why “there was myche thyng to mende,” or many things to fix, reveals how the *Pilgrimage* expands the author figure’s personal anxieties about the circulation of his text into an anxiety about the circulation of incorrect doctrine, which must be corrected. Lydgate uses the words “to ordeyne” to explain why the text needed to be mended, and the relationship between “ordeyne,” the orders that the pilgrim sees priests receive in Grace’s house as well as the emphasis on order and rule in monastic life cannot be overlooked. Read in the context of the text’s consideration of these types of order, “ordeyne” gestures beyond the text and identifies the need of the monk/author figure—doubly a monk in that both the original author and the translator were monks—to correct and better what is amiss in the text so that it may “directe.” The participation of the author figure in the larger structure of the order of the church implies that the type of mending, betterment, and correction needed will ensure that the text instructs correctly in church doctrine as it is used in private devotion so that the dangers of its circulation are lessened.

These anxieties about private devotion and circulation of devotional texts appear explicitly as above in the author figure’s lament, but they also appear within the text’s allegorical pilgrimage in the form of the pilgrim’s concerns over access to the allegorical figure of Grace. The pilgrim of the allegorical narrative experiences anxiety about

sharing his access to the allegorical figure of Grace, a response that articulates not just concerns over private devotion, but also the same anxiety about the sharing and circulation of texts that we saw in the author's lament. For example, after the pilgrim has entered the House of Grace, been baptized by her, and learned about church practices like marriage and tonsuring from her, the pilgrim becomes possessive over Grace and wants her to stay close to him, reminding the reader of the author figure's fears of circulation of his text and desire to have control over the movement of the text:

'Allas, now, what shal I do?
Grace Dieu, I ha lost al,
ffor I se how Thoffycyial
Hath yowen hyre fro me away
On thys sylue same day,
Vn-to thys hornyd folk in sothe,
And with hem, fro me she goth...' (Lydgate 61-62, 2298-2304)

Even on a literal level, the pilgrim's reaction to one person (Thoffycyial) telling another person's guide (Grace) to walk over to another group of people ("hem") seems overly dramatic. His language of loss and separation, claiming when Grace moves across the room, "I ha lost *al*," recalls the author figure's lament, where "*al* the wrytyng" was taken from him (both emphases mine). Additionally, here someone else has given ("yowen") Grace away from the pilgrim—the diction here does not indicate that Grace has moved away from the pilgrim of her own volition, but that she was moved away from the pilgrim through a third party ("Thoffycyial"). This intervention between the pilgrim and what he holds dear also echoes the way the author figure's text was published ("Dyscured") without his permission. The passive construction of "Hath yowen" and

“Was...Dyscured” identify outside intervention as the source of both the author figure’s and the pilgrim’s ills, figuring outside, public areas as potentially dangerous—as the place where beloved things (the text; Grace) become lost. Both the author figure and pilgrim figure express a desire to keep their beloved things in close proximity to themselves, and the similar language and behaviors of the two figures encourage the reader to see the text’s and Grace’s circulation coming together in the circulating religious text. At the same time, evoking the image of the circulating religious text points to the pilgrim’s desire to have private access to Grace as at odds with the author’s fears of how unknown readers will understand his text.

This dissonance between the author figure and pilgrim’s desire deepens in Grace’s response to the pilgrim’s lament, illustrating that the similar language the pilgrim and author figure employ in their laments cannot completely obscure the disparate goals the *Pilgrimage* expresses for textual circulation (restricted access) and access to Grace (community access). With anxiety reminiscent of the author figure’s anxiety about his text leaving him, the pilgrim confronts Grace directly about what he perceives as her abandonment of him, ““I am falle in gret dysesse,/ And dyscomforted in myn herte,/ Whan I consydre and aduerte,/ That Moses gaff yow a-way”” (Lydgate 62, 2326-29), and while the pilgrim lays the blame at Moses’s feet, his displeasure and discomfort at Grace being given away elicit a sharp response from Grace:

‘What wenystow me to possede
Thy sylff allone, quyt & clene?
Thow art a fool, yiff thow yt wene!
The comoun profyt, fer & ner,
Ys more than profyt synguler

To be preferryed, as I the telle.
...at a commoun welle, of rhyt
May fette water euery whyt
Her thrust to staunchen & apese,
And drawe yt at her owne ese
Wheras, a welle cloos aboute,
Wych for-barreth folk with-oute,
That no man neyd dar no ner,
Lyst they fellyn in daunger.’ (Lydgate 63, 2344-2360)

Grace shames the pilgrim for thinking that his singular profit from her is preferable to “comoun profyt.” Calling him a fool confirms the negative picture she paints of him as her sole possessor, which contrasts to the benefits she ascribes to the “comoun profyt.” Grace uses an analogy of a well to explain how it is better for her to be shared amongst the community than hoarded privately, saying that a common well “may fetch water [for] every soul” (“May fette water euery whyt”) whenever someone thirsts. The “common well” also puns on “commonweal,” pointing out the way that access to Grace’s spiritual guidance is good for the community, a point which seems to promote the circulation of spiritual instruction in a way that undermines the *Pilgrimage*’s desire to regulate its readership. The text has Grace clarify this point, though, by outlining the drawbacks to a private well: a well that keeps people out (“Wych for-barreth folk with-oute”) is one “that no man dare approach near/ Lest they fall in danger.” Here Grace associates the private well with danger, and since this analogy is comparing access to Grace to access to a well, the text asserts here that private access to Grace is dangerous and that community access to Grace is, in her words, “To be preferryed, as I the telle.” Though Grace’s parable

refers to a largely abstract community, the scene in which she and the pilgrim have this conversation contains a more concrete community. The group of people Grace visits, causing the pilgrim such distress, are the “hornyd folk” whom Moses has just anointed and given the sword and keys (unbound, unlike the pilgrim’s). The community amongst which Grace is circulating in this episode actually possesses more spiritual authority than the pilgrim, and so Grace’s assertion that the “common well” or “commonweal” is safer than the private well/individual devotion points to the benefits of community regulation in spiritual matters—particularly when that community consists of ordained clergy members. Community access to Grace is easier to regulate than individual access to Grace, when, for example, individual access to Grace might arise from a layman reading a devotional text while beyond the watchful eyes of the community.

At the same time, though, in order for the *Pilgrimage* to reach a community, it must circulate widely; the less it circulates, the more likely it is to remain an object of individual study, and individual experiences allow unsupervised interpretation of the text. The form of the *Pilgrimage*, a first-person allegory, already encourages its readers to interpret: every time a character speaks, the pilgrim and the reader must try to determine who is speaking. As we have seen in the interactions between the author figure and the pilgrim, this determination can be difficult to make. Stephanie Kamath identifies this difficulty as part of “the art of the voice” appearing in the *Pilgrimage* and derived from the style and structure of *The Romance of the Rose*; this art “lies in making the identification of the voice a product of interpretation, so each reading of the allegory asks for new investigation of the representational connections of this voice to extradiegetic author and reader roles” (Kamath 6). The reader’s extradiegetic position, shared at times

with allegorical characters (like the author figure, for example) encourages the reader “to perceive their reflection in the text...[which] figure[s] communal as well as individual experience” (Kamath 4). The *Pilgrimage* asserts the audience’s need to see themselves reflected in the text, as identified explicitly through the “mirror” example above and implicitly through the text’s conflation of the reader with the pilgrim, but I suggest that the text remains uneasy about the relationship between the “communal” and “individual” experiences readers may have with the *Pilgrimage*.

Strangely, this exchange between the pilgrim and Grace manages to express both anxieties over private access to Grace—analogue to private devotional practice—and anxieties over the circulation of texts, even though we have seen how the two seem to contradict one another through conflicting desires for public access (to Grace, to the text). The same anxiety the pilgrim exhibits above regarding Grace’s departure appears in the words of the author figure as he frets over the circulation of his text, and so the *Pilgrimage* makes explicit the connection between anxieties of circulation and anxieties over access to Grace. In the episode above, the pilgrim’s distress derives from Grace’s movement away from his location. He wants her close by his side, and even her standing across the room creates too much distance between them for the pilgrim to handle. Because his text has been circulated without his permission, the author figure desires to keep the new version of the text (the second recension) close to his body—close enough to see and keep track of. The physical proximity the author figure desires with his text appears in the pilgrim’s desire to maintain physical proximity to Grace as well. The author figure explains how he will make sure that the text circulates only where he wants it to, saying:

[b]y a lace I schal yt were

And a-bowte my nekke yt bere,
Send yt forth to euery contre,
Wher-as to-fforn that yt hath be,
A-geyn my wyl & my plesaunce... (Lydgate 8, 269-273)

In this moment the author figure plans to tie the text to his body so that he can maintain a physical connection with it at all times, and he will circulate the text by carrying it on his person and traveling to “euery contre.” This way, the text cannot be misinterpreted or misunderstood, because the author figure will be there with the text anywhere it goes. The need for the author figure to have his text close by and the need of the pilgrim to have Grace close by draw a parallel between the text and individual access to Grace, and so the author figure’s desire to remain close to his book also articulates the text’s anxiety about private devotion that might occur without a clergy member close by.

Finally, the *Pilgrimage* connects Grace to the potentially-circulating text when the pilgrim is in desperate need of Grace’s help; that help appears in the form of a written document. What the dove brings, a “bylle” or piece of paper, reflects back to the reader what the reader is holding, a document.¹⁵ Extending the self-reflexivity of the moment, the pilgrim, narrating the discovery of his salvation from his predicament, explains,

And whyl I lay thus compleynyng,
And knewh non helpe nor respyt,
A-noon ther kam A dowe whyt
Towardys me, by goddys wyllle,
And brouhte me a lytel bylle,

¹⁵ Due to the waters rising around the pilgrim, the dove returning with an object of hope evokes the dove returning over the flood waters with an olive branch in the story of Noah. See Genesis chapter 6.

And yndyde yt in my syht,
And affter that she took hyr flyht,
And fro me gan passe away.
And I, with-oute mor delay,
Gan the bylle to vnfolde,
And ther-in I gan beholde,
How Grace dieu, to myn avayl,
In that bylle gaff me counsayl... (Lydgate 526, 19,726-38)

The pilgrim's moment of reading has fully reflected the reader's position; the pilgrim has received spiritual instruction in the form of text. The text contains a prayer to the Virgin, and this prayer is an ABC poem, with each line beginning with consecutive letters of the alphabet. This format lends the prayer to memorization, one of the purposes noted above for writing vernacular devotional documents in verse, and yet another connection between the pilgrim and the reader in this moment. This passage asserts a sense of unfolding action by opening with "whyl," indicating present action progressing along with the narrative, repeating "And" to reinforce that progress through the moment, and concluding with "affter" to re-establish the pilgrim's movements in relation to the movement of the dove; the pilgrim begins to open the paper after the dove "took hyr flyht." Even the pilgrim's use of "Gan" indicates that this is a moment of translation of spiritual instruction from the pilgrim to the reader. Taken with these words of progression, the word "Gan" [began] with the infinitive, "to vnfolde," indicates that the reader is experiencing the action as it unfolds, emphasized by the infinitive word choice of "vnfolde" and also by the words "with-oute mor delay."

Lydgate, however, does delay, interrupting this moment of reader reflexivity to add another message from “the translator,” which instigates another moment that disrupts and solidifies the connections between the text and the reader. We will have to interrupt our own consideration of the moment of reader reflexivity to recognize how Lydgate’s interruption affects the *Pilgrimage*’s project of conflation between the author figure, pilgrim, and reader. On the one hand, the insertion of another figure, the translator, into the already busy mix of characters, including the author figure, dreamer, and pilgrim, introduces another character that is “other” to the reader, thus disrupting the merging of the reader and the author figure/dreamer/reader the *Pilgrimage* has enacted. However, at the same time Lydgate’s insistent self-identification as translator identifies him as another reader of the *Pilgrimage*. Lydgate’s message from “the translator” is marked with a rubric, and this rubric appears where the reader has seen other titles for “the Pylgryme,” “Grace Dieu,” and any other character speaking in the allegory, including vices like “Heresye” (Lydgate 505). These rubrics identify the translator as yet another character in the text, but as a character who exists in the narrative somewhere similar to the author figure of the opening frame of the allegory. However, because the rubric places the translator in the company of allegorical figures like Grace and Reason, who also receive rubrics, the translator’s place relative to the author figure in the frame of the allegory remains uneasy. Lydgate’s insertion of “the translator” rubric blurs the boundaries between the fictional realm of the allegory and the reader’s lived world that includes the material object of the text, collapsing these worlds; the similar collapse demonstrated in the authorial interruptions of the prose translation points to the translator and the reader as inhabiting

similar liminal positions in that they are both concurrently figured as within and without the text of the *Pilgrimage*.

Finally, the translator's tribute to Chaucer inserts itself between the text's depiction of the pilgrim unfolding the paper (a moment of anticipation of the reflexivity of the reader reading about the pilgrim reading) and the actual moment when the pilgrim begins to read the prayer. By inserting another author's translation of the *Pilgrimage* into his own translation of the *Pilgrimage*, Lydgate has revealed himself as a reader of a translation of the *Pilgrimage*—the same position in which readers of Lydgate's version of the *Pilgrimage* find themselves. Lydgate's revelation of his own readerly identity comes at a moment when the *Pilgrimage* is about to reflect the reader's role in the pilgrim's action, which could serve to solidify the conflation between the reader and the pilgrim, but Lydgate's interruption inserts another identity into the already confused mix of figures signified by "I" in the narrative. Lydgate, as the translator, and the reader share an extradiegetic position in this interruption, and so once again the reader becomes distanced from the intradiegetic pilgrim. The timing of Lydgate's insertion of an additional translator's interjection—between the "bylle" delivered to the pilgrim and the actual reading of the bill—disrupts the easy reification of the reader as the pilgrim that this scene offers. Lydgate's insertion of more commentary from the translator in this moment draws attention to how the *Pilgrimage* both attempts to conflate the pilgrim and the reader—here by showing the pilgrim as a reader—and disrupts that conflation. The assertiveness of Lydgate's interruption of this moment of the reader seeing his or her own reading practice reflected back to him or her through the pilgrim's reading of the bill points out a pattern of confusion regarding what the narrative "I" signifies in the allegory.

Gesturing to this pattern of confusion encourages the reader to recognize the porousness of the boundary dividing the allegorical, intradiegetic realm of the text from the reader's lived, extradiegetic world in which the *Pilgrimage* text is a material object.

The rubrics appearing in Lydgate's translation further encourage crossing these porous boundaries when they are used to identify characters both within and outside of the allegory. Jessica Brantley tracks ways that texts encourage readers to imaginatively inhabit the roles of multiple characters in the texts they read. In particular, she points out that the texts and images in Additional 3749, a Middle English miscellany containing devotional texts and images produced in the late fifteenth century, evoke the form of theatrical texts by assigning certain speech acts to one character and then another, encouraging the private reader to inhabit and imagine multiple characters at once (Brantley 6). In using the form of theatrical texts, the *Pilgrimage* encourages the reader not only to inhabit these multiple characters, but also to imagine the performance of those speeches. Because the reader engaging with the *Pilgrimage* in private devotion does not have others performing these multiple speech acts for him or her, the reader must perform these speech acts for him- or herself. This encouragement of private performative reading, whether imaginative or spoken, allows the reader control over the text in a way that reflects the author figure's power over the text. However, the rubrics in the Lydgate version of the *Pilgrimage* are simply another method of instructing the reader regarding how to understand the text of the *Pilgrimage*: they tell the reader to understand which words are spoken by good and wise figures, like Grace and Reason, which are spoken by figures that need instruction, like the pilgrim, and which are spoken by dangerous figures like Idleness and Pride. Lydgate's version, through the addition of the rubrics that do not

appear in the prose translation, changes the way a reader will experience the allegory of the *Pilgrimage*. No longer does the delayed identification of the allegorical figures (who reveal their names only after an extensive description of what they do) challenge the reader to solve the puzzle of the figures' identities. The rubrics serve as clearly demarcated labels that identify how the reader should understand the allegorical characters' speeches and thus regulate the reader's understanding of the allegorical figures.

The rubrics in the *Pilgrimage* also develop the voice of the characters while at the same time contributing to the instability of the "I" figure, and I suggest that these rubrics help the *Pilgrimage* construct a reader; Lydgate's choice to adopt a rubricated form (differing from the prose translation of the *Pilgrimage*) highlights the importance of these constructed identities. As discussed above, Lydgate includes himself with the label of "translator" in these rubrics, which not only blurs the line between the allegory and the world outside the text, but also reflects to the reader Lydgate's own status as a reader of the *Pilgrimage* since he must have read the *Pilgrimage* in order to translate it.

In Lydgate's translator's preface and in his translator's aside appearing at Chaucer's translation of the ABC prayer, which Lydgate includes in his translation of the *Pilgrimage*, he places the reader in the role of translator as he or she interprets the very acts of translation and interpretation with which Lydgate has presented the reader. For example, instead of opening with Deguileville's words, Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage* begins with the translator's prologue he has composed; Deguileville's words do not appear until line 185. Lydgate establishes here his primacy as the translator of the text by displaying his words to the reader before the reader encounters any of

Deguileville's words. Lydgate begins imperatively, stating the text's didactic purpose as teaching the reader how to lead a godly life, and in doing so he places the reader parallel to the pilgrim. The opening speaker, the translator John Lydgate, tells the text's audience, "Trusteth ther-for, ye folk of every age,/ That yowre lyff her ys but a pylgrymage;/ ffor lyk pylgrymes ye pass to & fro..." (Lydgate 2, 45-47). The phrase "ye folk of every age," in combination with his reminder that death comes for all pilgrims (49-51), addresses a universal audience, pointing out that the allegory applies to everyone because "folk of every age" are on the path towards the grave ("the cours...doth to hys boundys drawe").¹⁶ This universalized address requires all audience members to interpret the forthcoming allegorical pilgrimage as representative of their lives, passing from birth to death. These instructions to interpret the *Pilgrimage* come early in the reader's encounter with the text and, by requiring the reader to interpret throughout the text in order to understand the allegorical pilgrimage, they draw the reader near to Lydgate's author identity as an interpretive translator.

The confusion of this reader/author position complicates the reader's attempts to locate the authority figure, and so the text encourages the reader to identify doctrinal authority within him- or herself. As James Simpson notes, "Reading late medieval/early modern dream poetry involves trying to identify the authority figure from within the dream. Of course sophisticated poets like Chaucer will frustrate this attempt, but the frustration wouldn't exist if the invitation hadn't been made in the first place" (Simpson 194). The confused signification of the narrative "I" figure frustrates the reader's attempt

¹⁶ Note the pun on "cors" as a homonym for "cours," signifying a body (corpse) drawing near to the boundaries of its mortal life. This pun furthers the universalizing reach of this moment by pointing out the shared mortality of all humans on the mortal journey that Lydgate calls a pilgrimage.

to locate a clear authority figure, and the rubrics that invite performative reading encourage the reader to look to him- or herself as a source of authority over the text. The type of performative reading incited by these rubrics and detailed above means that “...instead of establishing (or contesting) the identity of a group through shared practice, as dramatic acts do, performative private reading shapes the individual identity of each reader in relationship with God” (Brantley 14). The author figure’s assertions of control conflict with the text’s conflation of the pilgrim and the reader and end up creating a space in which the reader, like the translator figure, can interpret the *Pilgrimage*’s religious instruction individually, away from a regulating community.

To regulate the performative reading that the rubrics invite, Lydgate narrates the act of reading and interpretation, modeling proper reading and interpretive practices. Lydgate revealed his own readerly identity through his inclusion of the ABC prayer, which models proper reading and interpretive practice because it is Chaucer’s translation of the ABC prayer that appeared in Deguileville’s first recension of the *Pilgrimage*. By using Chaucer’s translation and setting it amongst his own words which have been identified with the rubric of the “translator,” Lydgate demonstrates what he has done with his own devotional reading: he has used his devotional reading of Chaucer’s ABC poem to add to the spiritual instruction of readers of his translation of the *Pilgrimage*. Furthermore, in including Chaucer’s translation of the ABC instead of his own, Lydgate has relinquished his authorial control, encouraging readers identifying him as a model reader to similarly relinquish control over the text. Kamath identifies the first-person voice of the *Pilgrimage* as essential to this modeling of reading and interpretive practice, asserting that “[t]he voice of the translator acts as a guide to interpretation” (Kamath

143). I suggest that, because of the confusion the *Pilgrimage* creates over the identity of this first-person voice, the instruction on reading and interpretive practices the reader receives through these translator's sections remains unstable. Because the reader has seen Lydgate interpret as part of his translation, the reader recognizes the need for both translation and interpretation of the allegorical text in order to receive understanding.

One moment in the *Pilgrimage* regulates the reader's ability to interpret in a way that clearly demarcates acceptable and unacceptable types of reading available to readers not educated in Latin. In Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage*, before the pilgrim leaves Grace's house, Grace provides him with various types of preparations for his journey, including his pilgrim's scrip and bordoun (his satchel and staff) as well as his armor. Grace also provides him with guidance in the form of texts as she hands him some documents regarding church doctrine. These documents include "The Articles of the Creed"; "A Latin Poem on God in Trinity"; another with the same title, but in Latin rather than English—"De Sancta Trinitate"; and "A Latin Hymn to the Virgin Mary." The choice of texts that Grace provides the pilgrim demonstrates further the text's anxiety over potential misuse of devotional documents by including texts on aspects of doctrine historically under debate, such as the nature of the Trinity. The fact that Grace provides the pilgrim with this information in text form rather than through verbal instruction, which has comprised the majority of her instruction to the pilgrim in the *Pilgrimage*, identifies the text as authoritative. This attention to the written word as a location of spiritual authority combined with the documents' composition in Latin draws attention to the possibilities for restriction that the written word offers. The written word can only be accessed by someone educated to read, which limits the potential audience of

the text, and writing in Latin further limits the audience to those educated to read in Latin. The doubly-restricted documents that Grace hands the pilgrim call to mind the wandering texts that the author figure lost and his fears of their misuse; even if Grace's documents are lost or "Dyscured thurgh the world a brode," only readers educated in Latin could read them, thus reducing the number of people who might misuse the texts. Indeed, Grace's words attempt to caution the reader against reading without the proper credentials:

And thanne she took a wryt also
Out of hyr huchche, & rauht yt me.
'In thys wryt, thow mays,' quod she,
'Be-holde the descrypcioun,
The maner hool, and the fasoun
Off the skryppe that I the took;
And offte cast ther-on they look
ffro day to day, the bet to spede;
And offte sythe that thow yt rede,
The cope pleyedly, & scripture,
The wych ys mad (I the ensure)
In latyn only, off entent
To yive to the entedement,
And to clerkys that kan lettrure,
And vnderstonde hem in Scripture,
That they may, both hili & lowe,
The maner off thy Skryppe knowe,
To folwe the ffeyth off crystys sect;

To hem thys latyn I dyrecte.’ (Lydgate 184, 7018-7036)

The latter part of the text quoted above reinforces this anxiety by asserting that the text is in Latin. We will return to Grace’s opening words about writing, but first we must note how Grace explains the fact that the texts she has given the pilgrim are written in Latin. They are “In latyn only” purposefully, in order “To yive to thè entendement,/ And to clerkys that kan lettrure,/ And vnderstonde hem in Scripture.” Grace creates a moment of exclusion that restricts what lay readers are allowed to know; though the rest of the allegory is available to them, these documents on the Creed, the Trinity, and the Virgin are only available to readers of Latin. The documents are never translated into English within the *Pilgrimage*, interrupting the poetic as well as linguistic form the *Pilgrimage* has taken up to this point since the documents are in prose rather than Lydgate’s poetic meter and in Latin rather than English. This is an unusual moment where the pilgrim is marked by his monastic identity and differentiated from any portion from the vernacular readers to whom the *Pilgrimage* addresses itself. Here the pilgrim is clearly one of the “clerkys that kan lettrure,” and Grace offers him further information about his scrip that will not be revealed to the lay reader. Her offer of this information about the allegory, hidden from the lay reader, informs the reader that there are still aspects of the allegory that have not been revealed in the English portion of the text.

The exclusionary language of this passage paints the documents as potentially dangerous because they should not be disseminated amongst those who do *not* understand them, according to Grace in the *Pilgrimage*, presumably because the consequences of misunderstanding the Creed or the Trinity are dire. The documents Grace has given the pilgrim indicate that Grace has a very specific audience in mind for the documents she hands to the pilgrim; she asserts that they are for “clerkys that lettrure,” or clerks that

know their (Latin) letters, because only these clerks “vnderstonde hem in Scripture.” I say “only” purposefully here because the passage above includes several exclusionary phrases. The repetition of “and” following the phrase “off entent/ To yive to thè entendement” links the “thè” pronoun referring to the pilgrim (and, problematically, the reader) with the clerks who know their Latin and can understand Scripture enough to “folwe the ffeyth off crystys sect” [follow the faith of Christ’s sect], providing two potential readings of this moment. Grace defines the audience of these documents as those who know Latin and as “clerkys” who understand scripture; however, any reader educated in Latin will be able to read these Latin documents included in the *Pilgrimage* and so any reader of Latin finds him- or herself included with the clerks along with the pilgrim, and this moment reinforces the conflation of the pilgrim and reader. To a reader educated only in English, however, this moment becomes a moment of separation from the pilgrim and from the authority of the text of the *Pilgrimage*, as the English reader is excluded from the Latin documents that Grace gives the pilgrim and must skip over the lines of the *Pilgrimage* written in Latin.

Grace’s introduction of these Latin documents to the pilgrim at the beginning of the above passage reinforces the anxieties over misinterpretation that this passage exhibits and places Grace between the supposedly authorized clerks and the devotional documents. The passage emphasizes the materiality of the document through the repetition of the word “wryt,” and so Grace’s gift of the document(s) to the pilgrim appears as a physical transfer of the devotional and doctrinal documents from Grace to the pilgrim. This physical transfer emphasizes Grace’s intercession between the divine origin of the documents and the pilgrim’s receipt of the documents. Grace’s language

further demonstrates the potential for the pilgrim to misunderstand what she has given him when she simply tells the pilgrim that he is capable of reading the documents, not that he will. “Thow mayes...be-holde the descrypcioun,” she says of the documents, demonstrating that the pilgrim has the potential to behold these texts since he, as a monk, has met the educational requirements discussed above. However, the verb “behold” implies vision and seeing, but not necessarily understanding. Additionally, her use of the word “descrypcioun” to describe what the documents say about the pilgrim’s scrip align Grace’s documents with the allegory of the *Pilgrimage* as a whole, since it, too, describes the pilgrim’s scrip and its purpose. Somehow, this presentation of documents that explain the meaning of parts of the allegory like the pilgrim’s scrip mirrors the allegorical form of the *Pilgrimage*; Grace’s emphasis on these documents being in Latin and available only to those who know their letters figures the difficulty of reading the allegory properly as similar to the difficulty of reading Latin: both require proper education. Fortunately for its readers, the *Pilgrimage* offers many moments of instruction in reading allegory properly.

Chapter 2: Figuring the Body as Text: Instruction in Allegorical Reading

One of the pilgrim's encounters with the allegorical figures of the *Pilgrimage* takes up noticeably more space than the other figures: Reason's instruction on how the pilgrim should understand his body and soul. Spanning 405 lines in the prose translation and focusing more on the pilgrim's body than his soul, Reason's explanation is long-ranging and thorough. Throughout the encounter she asks the pilgrim if he understands what she has told him, and each time the pilgrim confesses that he does not understand, she reframes the explanation for him, trying different examples until he finally understands. The extreme didacticism of this encounter presents the pilgrim's body as something that can be understood and learned—something that can be read. The *Pilgrimage* figures all of the allegorical bodies within the narrative as texts to be read; as the pilgrim learns to read these bodies, he also learns to become a better reader of allegory. Throughout the *Pilgrimage*, allegorical figures like Reason and Grace provide interpretive guidelines to aid the pilgrim (and the reader) in reading the allegory properly.

While an allegory asking for its allegorical figures to be read is not unusual, in the *Pilgrimage* the connection between the allegorical body and the text is explicit. Early in Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage*, the author figure compares the book that was taken from him to a pilgrim; this comparison comes just after Lydgate has warned the audience about the transitory nature of all earthly things. Lydgate's reminder about the impermanence of earthly things comes to seem like a taunt when, less than three hundred lines of poetry later, the author figure compares his lost book to a wayward pilgrim; the reminder not to get attached to earthly, material things seems directed at Deguileville and presented as Lydgate's excuse for translating the *Pilgrimage* (and thus circulating it far

beyond Deguileville's control): mankind cannot expect earthly things to stay the same; the earthly will always change. The comparison can of course be made between the circulating text and the circulating pilgrim, as discussed in the previous chapter, but the emphasis on "al ertly thing" as impermanent finds another analog in the *Pilgrimage* in its discussions of the relationship between the pilgrim's body and his soul. The interaction between the body and soul constituted a major source of debate in medieval Christian doctrine, and I suggest that negotiating the relationship between the body and the soul centrally concerned devotional literature that had the potential to be used in lay private devotion. Part of the debate over the interactions between the body and the soul derives from the body's earthliness and the soul's spiritual nature, a source of confusion that Isidore of Seville finds necessary to address in order to define "human beings":

"Incorrectly, the whole human is named from this term [*humus* - soil - God made man from the earth], that is, the whole human being consisting of both substances, the association of soul and body. But strictly speaking, 'human being' is from 'soil'" ("Human beings" Seville 231). Both the allegorical characters of the *Pilgrimage* and the pilgrim's own struggles in his journey assert the dangers of the body in its earthly and corruptible form, but as a whole the text struggles to reconcile its depiction of the corruptible body with the body's spiritual value. This struggle appears in Isidore's reluctance to allow *humus*, the word for soil, to signify the entirety of a human being, who should instead be "the association of soul and body." The *Pilgrimage's* treatment of the pilgrim as more than simply the earthly encourages the *Pilgrimage's* audience to conduct allegorical reading on the allegorical bodies that appear in the narrative. At the same time, the denigration of the pilgrim's body—he is the victim of both verbal and

physical abuse of his body—prevents this type of reading from granting the audience too much interpretive power over the text.

The allegorical reading that the *Pilgrimage*'s treatment of the body encourages offers guidance to audiences using the *Pilgrimage* as part of a private devotion, and in particular offers a map for lay audiences to read the religious allegory since they may be less familiar than clerical audiences with religious allegoresis. Lay devotion offered a way for secular members of the Church to develop their spiritual lives when clergy members were not available, and Jennifer Garrison even notes that “[t]he Franciscans in particular encouraged lay affective devotion through writings and teachings that suggested that people could bypass complex theology and Latin learning through personal identification with the wounded, suffering Christ” (Garrison 906). Bypassing complex theology and the learning of Latin it often requires certainly opens up spiritual practice to a larger group of people, but I suggest that it also opens the door to potential boundary-crossing in lay devotion. For example, the affective piety which Garrison addresses becomes suspicious in Margery Kempe’s devotional practice, as well as in her record of those practices; her *Book of Margery Kempe* depicts an interview by Archbishop Thomas Arundel in 1413—the same man who would write the *Constitutions* that restricted English vernacular religious writing (Bose 47).¹⁷ Because lay devotional practice and texts could come under scrutiny, English texts produced in the early fifteenth century in England would profit by ensuring the text’s audience did not misuse the text, and the *Pilgrimage* manages its lay audience through constructing an ideal audience, as

¹⁷ For a classic and in-depth examination of the effects of Archbishop Arundel’s *Constitutions* on English vernacular religious literature, see Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change” as well as a recent response to Watson’s article: *After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England*. Eds. Vincent Gillespie and Kantik Ghosh. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011.

we have seen, and also by providing instructions for allegorical reading. Both fifteenth-century translations of the *Pilgrimage*—the anonymous prose translation as well as John Lydgate’s 1426 poetic translation—figure the relationship between the soul and the body as a metaphor for reading a text allegorically, as having both inner and outer portions. The *Pilgrimage*’s treatment of this relationship between the body and the soul reveals further anxieties about the *Pilgrimage*’s relationship with its readers in terms of its inability to control its audience’s devotional reading; because it cannot control its own circulation, the *Pilgrimage* remains vulnerable to potential misuse in the hands of the English readers for whom it is written.

Because the language in Lydgate’s translator’s preface relies on language similar to that in Deguileville’s lament over his lost text, the opening section of the *Pilgrimage* connects the text and body as objects capable of circulation and wandering. The pilgrim’s inability to control his body consistently within the pilgrimage narrative recalls the author figure’s lament over his text, which has circulated beyond his control, and so once again the pilgrim is conflated with the author figure, and this time the body is also conflated with the text. This chapter will detail how the *Pilgrimage* presents the pilgrim’s body as a text to be read and, in doing so, tries to model proper reading of its allegorical figures. Characters such as Reason and Grace provide interpretations of some of these characters as part of this modeling process, and their interpretations help curtail improper allegoresis the audience might conduct. Rita Copeland and Stephen Melville identify these types of attempt at control as “...certain moments of auto-exegesis in narrative allegory, where the interpretive voice must also be inserted in disguise” (Copeland and Melville 175). The *Pilgrimage*’s treatment of the pilgrim’s body and soul provides a particularly clear

example of this practice: Reason spends a great amount of time teaching the pilgrim how to read his own body correctly so that the pilgrim and the audience can apply that proper reading of the body to other allegorical bodies encountered.

Early in Lydgate's translation, the author figure personifies the book, comparing its behavior to a pilgrim's proper behavior. The author gives the book attributes of a lost beloved person, saying,

Go fforth thow dreme, I sende the

By all the placys wher thow has be,...

And took of me no maner leve.

ffor wych I call yt (thys the ffyn,)

No verray weye of pylgrym. (Lydgate 8, ll. 273-74 and 284-90)

In this send-off, the author figure reminds the reader of the text's beginnings, his dream of the Heavenly Jerusalem, and he begins his personification of the text by addressing it directly. When the author figure chides the text for not taking leave of him, the author ascribes to the book human courtesies, but then strangely shifts the text's lack of courtesy into a moral judgment as the author asserts that behaving in such a manner is "No verray weye of pylgrym." The connection between the circulation of the book and the lack of proper pilgrim behavior not only connects Deguileville's lost, circulating book to the pilgrim, but also foreshadows that the pilgrim may not remain on the "verray weye" throughout his journey. Though here the *Pilgrimage* connects the book to the pilgrim figure in general, the pilgrim himself appears as a dual figure, composed of both body and soul. As the pilgrim learns to read through his obscuring body, he will learn to read more correctly the bodies of the allegorical figures he encounters who, like the pilgrim, are dual figures. The author figure's lament, which figures the book as a pilgrim, reminds

the *Pilgrimage*'s audience that just as the pilgrim is a dual figure, consisting of both body and soul (the material and the immaterial), the text of the *Pilgrimage* is also dual: the allegorical bodies of the figures the pilgrim encounters rely on the material aspects of their bodies in order to signify their immaterial aspects as vices and virtues.

The *Pilgrimage*'s depiction of the pilgrim's body and soul corresponds to its larger goal of directing its audience's devotional practice, particularly in relation to how the audience uses the *Pilgrimage* as part of that devotion. The *Pilgrimage*'s allegorical form allows conflation of the pilgrim figure and the audience, in addition to the conflation already discussed in Chapter 1, because of the porous boundaries allegory creates between external figuration (the material forms that the allegorical figures take) and internal signification (the vices and virtues these allegorical figures signify).

Lydgate's send-off of the "dreme" in the opening of the *Pilgrimage* identifies the author figure's dream as the author figure's book, connecting the immaterial (the dream) with the material (the circulating book). In light of the author figure's anxiety over the circulation of his text, discussed in the previous chapter, it is not entirely surprising that the body (corresponding with the circulating book) becomes another site of desired control. The education the pilgrim receives about his body identify it as separate from his soul, something that clouds his spiritual sight and veils his understanding, and this veiling is connected to the pilgrim's inability to read correctly the allegorical figures he encounters.

The image of a veil interfering with understanding appears in Paul's letter to the Corinthians¹⁸ as he discusses reading the old testament as a Christian; he explains that:

¹⁸ References to constructions of the body in Pauline terms appear throughout the *Pilgrimage*, though the text does not attribute them to Paul by name. However, as Patricia Dailey points out, "...medieval mystics

“...until this present day, the selfsame veil, in the reading of the old testament, remaineth not taken away (because in Christ it is made void). But even until this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart. But when they shall be converted to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away” (Corinthians 3:13-14, *Douay-Rheims* 205). In this configuration, reading and understanding are predicated upon proper belief, and so “when they shall be converted...the veil shall be taken away.” Patricia Dailey notes that differentiating the self into inner and outer portions has a long history in Christianity and that often the connection between these portions is figured as writing, in which the effect of spiritual “illumination of the human heart, or inner person...manifests itself through the life or the works of the outer body and is read like a text” (Dailey 10).¹⁹ The allegorical figures the pilgrim encounters similarly manifest their “inner person” (the vice or virtue they represent) in or on their bodies, for example in Grace’s perfect beauty and Avarice’s six grasping hands. The instruction in allegorical reading that the *Pilgrimage* attempts to provide also offers, then, a way of reading the spiritual understanding written on the human heart, and the *Pilgrimage*’s didacticism becomes useful not only in reading the allegorical narrative properly, but also in reading one’s heart properly—in being able to conduct proper self-reflection.

In the figuration of spiritual understanding as lying beyond the veil and as that which is written in the heart, reaching understanding requires penetrating beyond the

did not need to read Paul or Augustine, as they were cited and incorporated into the traditions that oriented exegesis, monastic life, and medieval spirituality in general” (Dailey 71). Deguileville, as a monk, would have of course been familiar with the traditions that “oriented...monastic life,” though the monastic status of the anonymous translator of the Middle English prose version, cited here, is unknown.

¹⁹ The Douay-Rheims version of this verse and its context reads as follows: “You are our epistle, written in our hearts, which is known and read by all men: Being manifested, that you are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart” (2 Corinthians 3:2-3 *Douay-Rheims* 204).

outer into the inner; it asks for the same reading practices as allegory. The reference to veiling in the Corinthians passage that asserts this need for moving from inner to outer certainly also recalls medieval conversations of reading *sub integumentum*, but at this point in the narrative the *Pilgrimage* has not yet made that reference clear, and so the connection between the body and the text remains, for the moment, rooted in its circulation.

In the example from the *Pilgrimage* above, in which the pilgrim is the circulating book, the *Pilgrimage* participates in this tradition of figuring the person as a book to be read, but it also participates in a tradition of figuring the body as temporary and transitory. Reason articulates the transitory aspect of the pilgrim's earthly body when she explains to the pilgrim that his two parts were created by an earthly as well as by a divine father: “‘Pi bodi ([pat] is þin enemy) þat þou hast of him [your earthly father],/ of him it came þee: he bigat it as kynde ordeyned him...’” (Henry *Vol. 1* 78, ll. 3228-29). Reason's use of the phrase “bigat it as kynde ordeyned him” indicates that this reproduction of the body happens all the time, and the pilgrim's body could have been created by any man of “kynde.” Lydgate's translation, which follows Deguileville's second recension in positioning the discussion of the pilgrim's body and soul as occurring between Grace and the pilgrim rather than Reason and the pilgrim, makes the impermanence of the body explicit, as Grace reminds the pilgrim that “And in the body wher thow art now,/ He the putte (as I dar telle),/ There for a whyle for to dwelle...” (Lydgate p. 262 ll. 9498-9500). Once again the *Pilgrimage* refers to the idea of the pilgrim's body being simply a receptacle for his soul; God put the pilgrim “[t]here for a whyle for to dwelle.” The “there” indicates that the pilgrim exists outside of that location and the “whyle” makes

clear that the pilgrim's residence in that spot is not permanent.

In his voice as the translator, John Lydgate opens his translation of the *Pilgrimage* with an additional warning to the audience, reminding them that all life is but a pilgrimage and that it is fleeting. He elaborates on this theme of the transitory nature of life, reminding the reader that

ffor schortly here yovre poseessyon [sic]
ys yove to yow | but for a schort sesoun,
Nor the tresovre wych that ye possede
ys but thyng lent | ho so kan take hede,
ffor clerkys seyn | how that al erthly thyng
Stowndemel, and by vnwar chaungyng,
Whan folk lest wene | & noon hede ne take,
Her mayster olde sodeynly for-sake.
Thyng myn today | a-nother hath to-morwe... (Lydgate 1, ll. 5-
13)²⁰

Although Lydgate begins with the expected sentiment about earthly possessions and treasures being fleeting, at line 8 he suddenly appears to be speaking of some kind of exchange between two parties. Once again, it is easy enough for the reader to assume that Lydgate refers to the fact that humans live by the grace of God, and so their earthly life is “lent” to them. However, a few lines further down Lydgate starts speaking of suddenly forsaking masters, and then moves away from the generalized use of the “yow” pronoun

²⁰ All references to Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage* come from the following edition: John Lydgate, *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man*, 1426. Eds. Furnivall, F.J. and Katharine B. Locock. London: Early English Text Society, 1904. In-text citations follow the format of page number(s) followed by line numbers.

alone and includes himself, identifying what is his today as someone else's tomorrow. At this point, it becomes difficult to maintain the thread of spiritual instruction regarding life as a pilgrimage with which Lydgate opened his translation. Lydgate's apparent meandering off topic at this point fails to appear purposeful until the reader encounters Deguileville's prologue to the second recension of the *Pilgrimage*, in which he laments the loss of his text. Deguileville opines that "...he that bar my dreme a-way,/ ffull lytel thouhte (yt ys no nay)/ On my profyt in any wyse..." (Lydgate 7, ll. 249-51). When the reader encounters Deguileville's complaint about "he who bore my dream away," the passage reaches back to Lydgate's strange slippage between a discussion of the transitory nature of earthly life and things that change possession between "myn today" and "another...to-morwe." The word "profyt" in Deguileville's lament even echoes Lydgate's reference to "tresovre." Lydgate seems to have been foreshadowing Deguileville's complaint about his lost and wandering book as part of his reminder to the audience of the transience of all earthly things: Deguileville's text is just one more earthly "poseessyon" that, though Deguileville's today, is Lydgate's tomorrow. This conversation connects the book with the earthly existence from the beginning of Lydgate's translation, and the text continues to equate earthly experience with the body throughout the narrative of the allegorical pilgrimage. The language of transience that Lydgate employs here will appear again in Grace's description of the earthly and decaying body, making explicit a connection between the material book that departed from Deguileville and the material body that must rot as food for worms. In the passage above, Lydgate explains that possessions and "al erthly thyng" are here today and gone tomorrow; when Grace explains the nature of the pilgrim's body to him, she associates it

primarily with the earth as well, describing it as “[o]ff woormys that in erthe krece... And [which] in-to wormys he shal tourne,/And ...[i]n the erthe putrefye” (Lydgate 253, ll. 9151-9162). The *Pilgrimage*’s recurring use of the earth to describe all that is transitory, moveable, and potentially lost connects the textual object and the representation of the body in the pilgrimage narrative.

This body, however, appears in the *Pilgrimage* as that which will hinder the pilgrim whenever he tries to improve his spiritual life; the text’s denigration of the body rests uneasily between its work asserting its audience’s spiritual knowledge as inferior to the knowledge found within the *Pilgrimage* and the text’s own conflation of itself as material object with the body the *Pilgrimage* depicts. The prose translation relies on images of worms to denigrate the body, and Lydgate’s translation maintains this imagery, though perhaps without as much vigor as the fourteenth-century translation. In this translation, Reason seems to take great delight in describing the loathsomeness of the body, crowing,

“By itself

it may not remeeve ne nothing doo ne laboure, for he is
impotent and contract, deaf and blynd and countrefeted. It is
a worm diuerse and cruelle, þat was bore in þe eerþe of
wormes: an herte withinne him breedinge wormes, and
norishinge wurmes withinne it—a worm þat in þe laste eende
shal be mete to wormes and shal rote.”(Henry *Vol. 1* 76, ll. 3146-
52)

The repetition of “worms” in this passage allows the image of the worm to serve multiple functions. The “worm” of the body was born of worms, breeds worms, and nourishes

worms; these images not only establish the body as a worm, but also imagines the body penetrated with worms and creating worms; having worms inside and outside of itself, the body will eventually become the inside of a worm as well when it “shal be mete to wormes and shal rote.” The parasitic imagery of the worm in this example aligns with Isidore of Seville’s definition of the word, in which he defines it by what it eats: “*Vermin* (vermis) are animals that are generated for the most part from flesh or wood or some earthy substance...[t]here are vermin of the earth, the water, the air, flesh, leaves, wood, and clothing” (“Vermin” Seville 258).²¹ Each of the types of worms that Isidore recounts aligns these worms with the earthly, not spiritual, world.

This passage ties the image of the worm to procreation and reminds the audience of the connection between the pilgrim and the author figure’s lost book, which is his creation. The repetition indicates that the figure of the worm is important to understanding the way the *Pilgrimage* constructs the body, and according to this passage, the body has no redeeming characteristics. The characteristics Reason ascribes to the body, “bore in þe eerþe of/wormes,” “bredinge wormes,” and “norishinge wurmes,” all align the body with acts of procreation, and the term “bredinge” evokes animal reproduction through its definition as “hatching, incubation; gestation; propagation” (“bredinge, (ger.(2)),” MED). These terms, especially “hatching,” draw in types of animal procreation to the appearance of “bredinge” here, pointing to the animalistic aspects of human procreation and distancing the human body from the divine portion of human beings, figured in the *Pilgrimage* as the soul.²² This emphasis on the animal

²¹ Though the entry is translated as “Vermin,” note 13 on page 258 reminds the reader that “*Vermis* can mean ‘vermin’, or more specifically, ‘worm.’”

²² Henry also glosses forms of the verb “brode” as “incubate;” see *De Pilgrimage of þe Lyfe of þe Manhode*, vol. 2, ed. Avril Henry, (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 517.

aspects of procreation creates a sense of distance between these earthly acts and the soul's capacity for reason that separates humans from animals, even though humans should "have dominion over the...beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:26 *Douay-Rheims* 6). The attribution of these animal attributes to the pilgrim's body demonstrates an incorrect alignment between man and animals that disrupts the order established by Genesis. This disrupted hierarchy identifies the body as something that can drag the soul down to the level of animals—something that can pull the soul to earth rather than letting it rise to heaven.

The repetition of the word "worm" in the above passage also identifies some ways that the *Pilgrimage* thinks about the body as earthly and fallen. The figure of the worm calls forth not only images of the earth because it "was bore in þe eerþe", but also images of containment within the earth through the passage's repetition of the words "in" and "withinne." Those images of the earth, though emphatically negative in this passage, are complicated by the biblical passage in Genesis that describes man as being formed from the earth: "And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Genesis 2:7 *Douay-Rheims* 6). However, alluding to the Genesis creation account remains problematic because, even though the earth imagery associated with the figure of the worm in the passage above recalls the creation of Adam from the earth, the reader must grapple with the second meaning evoked by the repetition of "worm": the serpent instrumental to man's fall. And so the worm signifies not only the body's earthly composition, but also its fallen state. The *Pilgrimage* is not alone in failing to provide a consistent treatment of the value of the body; although the conception of the body as corrupt finds ample representation in both

scripture and in medieval dream visions, Albert Hogeterp notes how the *Apocalypse of Paul* also treats the body as potentially not only corrupt, using different words to denote the body depending on the way it has been used: “The body of the righteous and of the sinner is consistently addressed as...*corpus* and *caro*...in the Long Latin versio[n]. This distinction between the two terms for the body denotes the moral concept of the body as holy and defiled through sin respectively, and can also be discerned in Paul’s letters” (Hogeterp 120). Specifically, Paul identifies the role of the body in sin rather differently from the *Pilgrimage*’s characterization of it as that which interferes with the soul’s spiritual goals. Paul, in contrast, places the responsibility for sin outside the body, unless the sin is fornication: “...Every sin that a man doth, is without the body; but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body... [for] your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you, whom you have from God: and you are not your own...” (1 Corinthians 6:18-19 *Douay-Rheims* 191). Paul’s conception of the relationship between sin and the body reduces the body’s role in sin, removing the body’s responsibility in sin in a manner strikingly different from the depiction of the body in the *Pilgrimage* as an evil tempter who lures the soul to sin, an idea that the *Pilgrimage* develops beyond the “earthly” aspects of the body detailed above. Paul’s assertion that most sins are committed “without the body” allows his readers to accept his later explanation that “your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost” more easily than readers of the *Pilgrimage* can accept Reason’s later assertions of the body’s necessity to the soul’s arrival in heaven, which leaves the *Pilgrimage*’s audience confused about how to reconcile the body’s tendency to mislead with its comparison to a text to be read. If the *Pilgrimage* implies that a text may mislead the audience like the body does, then the

audience should not accept the *Pilgrimage*'s authority to provide spiritual instruction.

To make clear its authority, the *Pilgrimage* locates that authority *within* itself, asking the reader to distinguish between outer seeming and inner meaning as the text prepares its audience to read allegorically. Once again the *Pilgrimage* uses the pilgrim's body to explain how the audience should understand the text of the *Pilgrimage*: as a text to be read allegorically. When Reason analogizes the relationship between the body and the soul as the relationship between a body and the clothing it wears, she emphasizes the two as separate entities. She instructs the pilgrim that:

“...þi cloþinge and þin habite, it conteeneth þee, and þou
art withinne: þow woldest make gret wundringe if I seyde it
bere þee or gouerned þee in any wyse.’ ‘Is it þus
Lady?’ quod I. ‘Ye,’ quod she, ‘but þis in difference I
sette þee, þat þe soule bereth and is born. She principally
bereth þe body, but he bi accident bereth him, and in
resorting him to his vertu is entendaunt.” (Henry *Vol. I* 79-80, ll. 3309-3316)

Though “cloþinge” might appear straightforward in this comparison, signifying the clothing one wears for protection from the elements and for propriety's sake, the word has further denotations that associate clothing with the characteristics of a person.

“Cloþinge” can refer to guild livery (2.a) as well as “spiritual garb” like chastity and compassion (4.a) (“clothing,” ger., MED). These three aspects of the word “cloþinge,” literal clothing, signifier of rank, and signifier of spiritual attributes, actually undermines Reason's explanation of the relationship between the pilgrim's body and soul and suggests a less clear distinction between the internal and external parts of the text. Even though in this passage Reason separates the soul and the body, the word choice

undermines any clear separation by referring to both internal and external aspects of the pilgrim. Once again the *Pilgrimage* uses language found in Paul's letters that distinguishes between inner and outer aspects of humans: "For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven. For in this also we groan, desiring to be clothed upon with our habitation that is from heaven" (2 Corinthians 5:1-2 *Douay-Rheims* 206). Reason uses "habite" in conjunction with "clopinge," which implies that "habite" signifies something different from "clopinge" even though "clothing" is certainly one meaning of "habite." The appearance of "clopinge" and "habite" together encourages the reader to consider how the word "habite" might add meaning not contained in "clopinge": "habite" also refers to "outward form, appearance, or guise" (2) and "bodily condition" (3.a) ("habit," n., MED). Reason's explanation of the relationship between the body and soul continues to confuse the issue as she chooses words like "clopinge" and "habite" to characterize the body as external even though those words can shift between referring to the internal and the external aspects of a person, particularly when considering the verb form of "habit" evoked when Reason uses the noun form.

The permutations of the word "habit" evoke a spiritual practice that can become ingrained through attention and repetition; Breen points out that "[t]hough virtue in general is willed, the habitually virtuous man—like the master craftsman—need not and cannot think about each step of the process as he works." (Breen 4). So Reason's use of the word "habite" also implies that the pilgrim's body is a tool for his spiritual betterment in that he can ingrain habits in it in order to become a "habitually virtuous man." The passage above aligns "habite" with the clothing that represents the body in this example,

and just as the clothing a person wears contains the person but does not dictate the person's actions, "habite" of the body can become habitual virtue of the body through the spiritual practice the *Pilgrimage* offers as its didactic purpose. The problem, of course, is that the person *inside* these clothes and habits may still determine the person's actions, just as the audience may still disregard or misunderstand the spiritual instruction the *Pilgrimage* offers.

This idea of the internal soul and external body in this clothing analogy, combined with the *Pilgrimage*'s figuration of the text as a body, reminds the audience to read the text of the *Pilgrimage* as both internal and external, where the internal meaning of the *Pilgrimage* is hidden behind the veil of the allegory and clothed in the signifier of the text. The content of the text of the *Pilgrimage* should, like the analogized soul, dictate the actions of that which is external to it. At the same time, though, because in Reason's analogy the body is on both sides of the comparison (the relationship between the soul and its body is the same as that between clothing and its body), Reason figures the body as inhabiting both external and internal space. This dual position of the body makes its position unclear since Reason's explanation has identified the internal position as the position of power as she insists that the soul controls the body.

Reason's use of the verb "resorting" can help resolve this unclear position in that it describes the function the body can serve in the soul's spiritual betterment. "[R]esorting" implies a shift in location, in the sense of "to return" ("resorten," v. MED), and allows the body to move between the internal and external positions brought forth the clothing analogy. Reason explains that the soul returns the body from its fallen state to its recoverable virtue, but the confusion created by Reason's use of the same pronouns in

both subject and object form (“he,” “him”), can easily encourage the audience to think that the body is diligent in restoring the soul to its virtue (“he...in/ resorting him to his vertu is entendaunt”). This particular misunderstanding of the relationship between the body and the soul is, of course, exactly what Reason has been trying to dispel, but her use of the specific pronoun “she” in reference to the soul followed by her use of the non-specific pronoun versions of “he” to refer both to the soul and the body simply reinforce the pilgrim’s earlier uncertainty about how his body and soul relate to one another, communicating to the audience the idea that the text of the *Pilgrimage* cannot clarify this complicated relationship for the reader. I suggest that this refusal to clarify the relationship allows the *Pilgrimage* to encourage the audience to consult a clergy member to muddle through the confusion the text creates, and thus prevents its readers from misunderstanding the relationship between the body and the soul. This moment also indicates that the audience might fail in reading the allegorical narrative, in spite of the instruction the *Pilgrimage* provides. The *Pilgrimage*’s suggestion that its audience might need assistance in reading the allegory properly seems to reflect a sentiment that appeared in Arundel’s *Constitutions*, discussed earlier, when Arundel notes (somewhat wryly, it seems), that “...as saith blessed St. Hugh of the sacraments, ‘That which oftentimes is well spoken, is not well understood’” (Townsend 246). So the pilgrim’s failure to understand Reason’s explanation of the relationship between the body and soul does not indicate that it was not “well spoken.” In fact, the failure of understanding which is invited by Reason’s explanation can even serve as an example for the necessity of regulations like Arundel’s, which distinguishes between religious writing that may be read widely (and thus may be written in English) and what should be filtered through a

religious authority (and thus should be written in Latin).

Reason further muddies her explanation of the relationship between the body and the soul by using the same verb to function in several different ways. When she concedes that “þe soule bereth and is born,” she acknowledges the paradox she has presented and implies that she will explain it. Her explanation of this paradox, however, clarifies less than it emphasizes the way that language can fail to signify clearly. Her use of the verb “beren” with the soul as the subject identifies the active nature of the soul’s carrying, but the juxtaposition of the passive use of the participle “born” immediately contradicts that active construction. The verb “beren” can have assorted meanings in Middle English (“beren,” v. 1 MED), including “to carry,” “to wear,” and “to hold up” (and all of these meanings fit into Reason’s five uses of forms of the word), so Reason’s heavy reliance on it to explain a concept about which the pilgrim is already confused seems counterintuitive, unless Reason is trying *not* to elucidate the concept for the pilgrim, but rather keep him reliant on her. The pilgrim has already seen Reason explain doctrinal matters to vicars in Grace’s house, and so he recognizes her as a representative of the church who can correct him on potentially confusing matters of doctrine.

This passage, though in a somewhat roundabout manner, reasserts the primacy of the soul, discussed above, by explaining that the soul “bereth” the body “principally”, or “pre-eminently” (“principally,” adv. OED) whereas the body bears the soul “bi accident”, or “incidentally” (“accident,” n. MED). The language in this passage of the *Pilgrimage* also reflects Pauline language on the relationship between the body and the soul. The *Pilgrimage*’s language of bearing, evoked both through the metaphor of clothing and through the text’s word choice in the above example, echoes the words Paul uses as he

explains what happens to the body after death, worth quoting at length for its extended treatment of the relationship between the body and the soul:

All flesh is not the same flesh: but one is the flesh of men, another of beasts, another of birds, another of fishes. And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial: but, one is the glory of the celestial, and another of the terrestrial... It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. If there be a natural body, there is also a spiritual body, as it is written: The first man Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit. Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly. Such as is the earthly, such also are the earthly: and such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly. Therefore as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly. (1 Corinth. 15:39-49 *Douay-Rheims* 201)

The passage above relies on binary contrasts to categorize, and the contrasts primarily occur between the natural or earthly and the spiritual or heavenly. Paul uses the words “natural,” “terrestrial”, and “earthly” to refer to that which is non-heavenly, characterized by corruption, Adam’s sin, and “flesh and blood.” He uses the words “spiritual” and “heavenly” to refer to the opposite of the natural, terrestrial, and earthly. After reiterating this contrast in the passage above, Paul uses forms of the verb “to bear” to explain how the self—identified rather non-specifically as “we” in this passage—relates to the natural/earthly and the spiritual/heavenly. The *Pilgrimage* asserts this relationship between the body and soul by explaining that just because the body is on the outside and

the soul is on the inside does not mean that the body carries the soul; rather, their relationship is like clothing to the body, where what is inside (the body, in this example) carries what is outside (the clothing).

In the earlier passage from the *Pilgrimage*, Reason figured the body in a way that moved it between internal and external positions (as clothing and as what bears the clothing), and I suggest that this movement between positions of power derives from the text's inability to reconcile the denigrated body with the vessel that will eventually enter heaven. The above passage from Corinthians indicates that the earthly body will become the heavenly body, but Reason's description of the earthly body seems to indicate that there is nothing good about the earthly body—it is only food for worms. However, when her denigration of the body causes the pilgrim to desire to slay his own body, Reason informs him that the body “is to þee taken to lede/ to þe hauene of lyf and of saluacioun” [is given to you to lead to the haven²³ of life and of salvation] (Henry *Vol. 1* 76, ll. 3176-77). The collection of prepositions, pronouns, and articles in this phrase allows for the reading that the body is given to the soul for the soul to lead it to heaven, but it also allows for the reading that the body is given to the soul for the body to lead it to heaven. Both senses of the phrase, however, indicate that the body will move from heaven to earth, in spite of its earthly composition. Reason's admission suggests that, as in the above passage from Corinthians, the earthly body will become a spiritual body.

These positive figurations of the body might redeem the body's role in spiritual improvement, but they also make the body more difficult to read because it does not stay

²³ Though “hauene” usually signifies the verb “to have,” the definite article that precedes it here suggests that it functions as a noun—and a known noun, for that matter. The MED entry for “haven, n. (1),” definition 1(b) concurs and notes it can also mean “eternal life” or “Christ.”

in one position—it moves from earthly to heavenly. The passage in Corinthians also figures the body as moving, though this time through pairs of words that create a sense of movement through time. Paul explains that “[i]t is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body” (emphasis mine), suggesting the body’s movement through time, indicated by the move from the present tense to the future tense. Interestingly, the movement through time corresponds with a change in the body from “natural” to “spiritual,” which Paul defines as “earthly” and “heavenly,” respectively. The combination of the movement through time and the transformation of the body from “earthly” to “heavenly” suggests that the body can change from the heavy and thick obstacle that obscures spiritual sight into something that is “heavenly” in nature. Further emphasizing the movement through time, Paul also uses the words “First” and “then”, which also establish the order of events. And so the figuration of the body as changing from earthly to heavenly, which appears both in the *Pilgrimage* and in Corinthians, relies on the movement of the body through time and space.

As we have seen, though, the circulating body (like the circulating text) is difficult to regulate and, I suggest, difficult to read. Though Reason’s explanation of the body eventually comes in line with Pauline figurations of the body as valuable (I have my doubts, though, that Reason would call the pilgrim’s body a temple), it does not clarify the pilgrim’s understanding of the relationship between his body and soul. Instead, it serves as an example of the dangers of allegorical reading, in which the allegorical bodies to be read do not remain clearly in external positions; rather, their external form comes to be a part of their internal meaning. The convoluted explanation of the Eucharist in Lydgate’s translation provides the pilgrim and audience with an example of these shifting

positions, as Grace explains that ““Thys releff [the Eucharist]...Ys pleynly nother wyn nor bred,/ But the flessh” [This relief is plainly neither wine nor bread, but the flesh] (Lydgate 140, ll. 5341-43), but shortly after making this sharp distinction between the bread and the flesh, she seems to change her mind:

“Thow mayst also call yt bred,
Thys same releff (with-oute stryff,)
The verray sothfast bred off lyff
Wych susteneth (I the ensure,)
Al the world with hys pasture,
...And ek also...
I calle yt bred, & name yt so.” (Lydgate 140, ll. 5352-5362)

As Grace reassures the pilgrim by explaining that he can still call the bread that he sees bread—even though it is flesh—she points to the ambiguity of naming something that functions metaphorically. Even though the bread has become flesh, it is, in some ways, still bread because it is the bread of life (“bred off lyff”) that sustains all the world (“Wych susteneth...Al the world”). Grace teaches the pilgrim how to read allegorically what he sees before him when she acknowledges that the outer seeming (the bread) is not entirely separate from the inner meaning; the bread of the sacrament appears to be bread because Christ’s flesh is the bread of life. In the same way, the allegorical figures the pilgrim encounters will take forms appropriate to their signification, and so as this conversation with Grace teaches both the pilgrim and the audience about the Eucharist, it also teaches them how to understand the allegorical figures they will encounter in the narrative.

Inculcating proper allegorical reading in its audience may allow for some

regulation in the reception of a circulating text. Regulating vernacular texts became particularly important in fifteenth-century England, when the two translations of the *Pilgrimage* first appeared. Arundel's *Constitutions* of 1409 had been in place seventeen years by the time Lydgate completed his translation of the *Pilgrimage*, and the anxieties about its readership revealed by the attention to proper allegorical reading in the *Pilgrimage* reflects an anxiety common in fifteenth century England. As Deguileville has discovered from the unauthorized circulation of the first recension of his text, a vernacular text has the potential to be read by audiences perhaps not equipped to understand this kind of spiritual instruction. One particular portion of the *Constitutions* can help elucidate the difficult historical context surrounding the *Pilgrimage*'s translation and circulation in fifteenth-century England:

It is a dangerous thing, as witnesseth blessed St. Jerome, to translate the text of the holy Scripture out of the tongue into another; for in the translation the same sense is not always easily kept, as the same St. Jerome confesseth, that although he were inspired, yet oftentimes in this he erred: we therefore decree and ordain, that no man, hereafter, by his own authority translate any text of the Scripture into English or any other tongue, by way of a book, libel, or treatise; and that no man read any such book, libel or treatise, now lately set forth in the time of John Wickliff, or since, or hereafter to be set forth, in part or in whole, privily or apertly, upon pain of greater excommunication, until the said translation be allowed by the ordinary of the place, or, if the case so require, by the council provincial. He that shall do contrary to this, shall likewise be punished as a favourer of error and heresy.

(Townsend 245)

This portion of Arundel's *Constitutions* makes clear that the danger of writing spiritual matters in the English vernacular lies in the potential "erring" in translation, in which "the same sense is not easily kept." However, the latter part of this passage adds stipulations about the relationship between authority and what spiritual writing is and is not permissible: "no man...[may] by his own authority translate." If, however, the translation is approved by the proper authorities, then that vernacular text is permitted. The perceived danger addressed here lies not in the act of translation itself, but rather in unauthorized translation. Grace's assertions of authority—her own as well as clerical authority—remind the *Pilgrimage's* audience of the dangers of unauthorized translation as she attempts to regulate the audience's application of the allegorical reading practices the text has modeled.

Reason's explanation of the relationship between the pilgrim's body and soul also provides an example of the need for allegorical reading by forcing the pilgrim and the audience to recognize that what is outside—the body, the text, the allegorical bodies—operates differently from what is inside—the soul, the meaning, the vices and virtues. Because the pilgrim does not understand himself to be of a dual nature, though, he does not recognize how his own body can send him from the proper path, and so he reads improperly. In order for the *Pilgrimage* to instruct its audience, it must teach the audience how to read these allegorical figures correctly, and it attempts this instruction through Reason's explanation of the pilgrim's dual nature as both body and soul, which began with Reason's emphasis on the earthly nature of the pilgrim's body.

Once she has explained to the pilgrim the way his body hinders his soul, Reason demonstrates the insidiousness of the body, testing the pilgrim by asking:

“...if þou
were in a place þere þou haddest þine mirthes—good mete,
softe bed, white cloþes, ioye, reste and gret disport, and þi
willes boþe day and niht--þat I mowe wite sooth if þou woldest
make þer any taryng and abidinge.” “Serteynliche,” quod I [the
pilgrim]:

“ye!” “Aha,” quod she: “what hast þou seid? Þanne þou
woldest leue þi pilgrimage and þi viage!” “Ladi,” quod I:
“Þat shulde I nouht, for al bitymes afterward I shulde go.”

(Henry *Vol. 1* 76-77, ll. 3185-3192)

The pilgrim seems to have no chance to pass the test Reason gives him (and Reason seems delighted to be able to say “Aha!” at the pilgrim’s failure), but this moment does point out the complexity of the relationship between the body and the soul that the *Pilgrimage* presents. Even though later we will see the pilgrim’s body assaulted by Penitence and the vices he encounters due to his inability to take his tender body through the prickly hedge of penitence, here the pilgrim’s body fails him in ways that seem innocuous, demonstrating that even when the pilgrim has been informed of his dual nature, he may still not read correctly and may fail to recognize, or see clearly, what the soul inside his body desires; his body’s desires for good meat, a soft bed, joy, rest, and entertainment obscure his soul’s desire to continue on the pilgrimage. The pilgrim’s soul has been tricked into thinking that he (and his body) will continue on the pilgrimage “al bitymes afterward”, but Reason assures him that “Þer nis man in þe world/ lyvinge þat euere may come bitimes...” (Henry *Vol. 1* 77, ll. 3193-4). The pilgrim has failed to read the good meat and soft bed that Reason offers as representations of worldly temptation

that can lead him from the right path, and this misreading does not bode well for his interpretation of other representations, like the allegorical figures he will encounter.

Reason's test appeals to the pilgrim's bodily senses by offering good meat to eat and soft beds and clothing, and it seems as if the body lies behind the pilgrim's failure to read. However, Grace's instruction regarding the Eucharist explained that the external aspects and bodies of the figures the pilgrim encounters are not easily separated from the vices and virtues they signify, just as the name "bread" is not easily separated from its internal aspect as the flesh of Christ. Grace's explanation of the relationship between naming and signification complicates a distinct separation between the body and the soul; the pilgrim's interactions with Penitence, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, will demonstrate how important the body is for the pilgrim's spiritual work. Patricia Dailey sees a long tradition in mystical writing that refuses to identify the body solely with the flesh, and she proposes that mystical writing identifies an inner body, which has senses similar to the body's senses; this inner body is "...linked to the soul's powers and desires...[and] involves the ability to read and interpret scripture," but the complexity of the relationship between the inner and outer body contains "the potential for misunderstandings of the language of embodiment" (Dailey 16). The allegory of the *Pilgrimage* foregrounds this struggle through its treatment of the body and the soul in the pilgrim's journey. The allegory grounds its descriptions of the vices and virtues that the pilgrim meets in their physicality, focusing on how they use their bodies and what their bodies look like, and the pilgrim must "read" these bodies to receive the spiritual instruction about vices and virtues that the *Pilgrimage* offers.

Soon after the pilgrim fails Reason's test, she sends him off on his own and he

once again fails to read properly; the pilgrim reads the allegorical figures he encounters in terms of what his body desires rather than in terms of what their bodies can tell him about their signification. When the pilgrim encounters a sharp hedge that divides his path in two, he must choose which path to take. Having no idea, he asks a netmaker who is sitting by one path (a gentlewoman toying with a glove sits by the other path):

“...Sey me now I pray þee
frend, which of þese weyes is þe bettere? I wente neuere
heerbi. Teche me bi which I shal go.” “Whider”, quod he,
“woldest þou rihtliche go?” “Go?” quod I: “I wule ouer see
into þe citee of Jerusalem, of whiche þe bisshop is born of a
maide.” “Come”, quod he to me, “[heer, for] I am rihtliche in
þe wey. Right bi me þe wey of innocence, and þe euene wey,
biginneth. Þis is þe wey bi whiche þou miht go to þe citee of
biyounde see.” (Henry *Vol. 1* 85, ll. 3531-3539)

The netmaker’s repetition of the word “right” (“rihtliche” twice and “right” once) should suggest to the pilgrim that there is a correct and an incorrect path, and the netmaker’s response to the pilgrim’s question about which way to go—in which the netmaker asks the pilgrim which way would “properly” [rihtliche] go—indicates the pilgrim should consider which way he *should properly* desire to go, even if his body might desire to go another way. The netmaker’s claim that “Right bi me þe wey of innocence...biginneth” plays on the dual meanings of “right” as directly next to him and as “correct” (MED “right, adj.”). Once again the pilgrim is being asked to read both the industrious body of the netmaker and his speech, and this time no one tries to trick the pilgrim—the netmaker explains that the way by him is the way of innocence and the path that leads to the city

beyond the sea that the pilgrim is trying to reach. And yet again, the pilgrim fails to read correctly; again it is his body that leads him astray.

The pilgrim decides not to follow the netmaker's instructions because he has seen the netmaker making his nets and then immediately unmaking them, only to repeat the process, and the pilgrim does not want to work so hard for what seems to be no reason. The netmaker tells the pilgrim he does his work to "ocupy me" ["occupy myself"] (Henry vol. 1 p. 85 l.3558), but the pilgrim thinks the netmaker is foolish not to rest when he can:

“...I see in
þee but folye and cokardy, þat preyest more þe
laboreres þan þe idel folk. I wot neuere who hath tauht þe
þis, ne who hath maad þee sey it neiþer, for wel I wot þat
rest is michel bettere þan labour, and were bettere for
oon holde him in ese þan eiþer werche or diche...” (Henry *Vol. 1* 86, ll. 3565-
3570)

The pilgrim's response to the netmaker is almost shocking as he wonders who taught the netmaker that labor is better than rest. Just a few hundred lines previously Reason chided the pilgrim for wanting to rest, showing him that the rest and idleness his body desired would lead him from the path of his pilgrimage. The pilgrim does not choose the "right" way by the netmaker (Occupation) and instead chooses the path by the gentlewoman (Idleness). The pilgrim's choice of the incorrect path of Idleness is essential for the *Pilgrimage's* didactic purpose, of course, because it enables the pilgrim to meet the allegorical vices, who explain with glee the ways they damage humans' spiritual states. I argue, however, that the pilgrim's encounter with the netmaker, in which he lets his body

stand in the way of his allegorical reading, suggests a larger concern with the role of the body in devotion and the *Pilgrimage*'s ability (or lack thereof) to affect that body. The text's frequent references to resting, appearing here in the pilgrim's encounter with Occupation and Idleness, but also in the authorial intrusions that insist on rest for both the author figure and the audience, draw attention to the laboriousness of spiritual work. Here, the pilgrim thinks Occupation is working too hard because he makes no visible progress, simply making, unmaking, and remaking the same net. In the authorial interruptions, the author figure draws attention to the tiring work of providing spiritual instruction for the audience; he also reminds the audience to take breaks from reading the *Pilgrimage*, indicating that engaging in devotion for spiritual improvement is also tiring. Occupation's lack of visible progress points to the invisibility of spiritual work, but the authorial interruptions suggest that this work has a clear effect on the body—it can make the body tired and in need of rest.

These moments in the *Pilgrimage* connect reading with the body and contribute to the narrative's figuration of the pilgrim's body as a text, encouraging its audience to internalize that figuration both through its conflation of the pilgrim and audience and through internalization that occurs through the devotional use of a text. For example, Jennifer Bryan notes that vernacular writing in particular allows an internalization of what is read, claiming that it becomes "...the means by which...sisters may internalize [a] service, thus weaving corporate experience, vernacular reading, and private devotions inextricably together" (Bryan 88). The *Pilgrimage*, as a document of vernacular devotion like the ones Bryan examines, allows the reader to internalize the words on the page that appear in a vernacular more likely to correspond with the reader's language of thought

than would Latin. Because the allegorical portion of the *Pilgrimage* consists largely of the pilgrim's conversations with virtues and vices he encounters, the internalized text of the *Pilgrimage* becomes an internalized body as the audience imagines the bodies that the pilgrim encounters on his pilgrimage. Because the *Pilgrimage* is a first-person allegory, the audience encounters the allegorical vices and virtues through the pilgrim's experience of them. Guillemette Bolens reads this type of audience experience as a form of gesture because it is "corporeal data 'uttered' textually and meant to communicate information about the plot and characters" (Bolens 27). Bodily movement is a form of communication, and because the *Pilgrimage*, as an allegorical narrative, relies so heavily on embodied allegorical figures, the bodily interactions between the pilgrim and these figures become lessons for the audience in reading bodies as texts. Sarah Kay identifies this connection between reading, the sensing body, and cognition in the work of medieval didactic poets as part of a larger conversation in medieval thought, in which "didacticism operates against a background of contemporary concern with the relation between (sensible) perception and (intellectual) cognition. ... This background informs the poets' own experiments with configurations of bodies and ideas as they seek to mold, form, or coerce the thinking of their readers" (Kay 8). The *Pilgrimage* connects sensory, bodily information to cognition by asking its readers to read the allegorical bodies within the narrative as a way to understand the spiritual instruction the *Pilgrimage* offers.

Imagining the sensations these allegorical bodies experience grants the audience a measure of control over them because their bodily experiences are filtered through the audience's bodily experiences. In some ways, the audience's power over the narrative is particularly inherent to allegory because "...the figurative structure of allegory..., by

complicating the process of creating meaning through language, dramatizes the interaction between authors and readers” (Kamath 9). The allegorical narrative requires the audience to search out the meaning of the allegorical figures encountered, and so power over the narrative does not lie entirely with the author. Thus if the reader imagines control over these allegorical characters, then the reader can imagine control over the author figure whose voice inhabits these characters. As seen in the authorial interruptions above, when the author figure demands that the audience go away so that he can rest, the author figure has no power to enforce that demand. Rather, the audience can choose to obey the author figure or to continue reading. The audience cannot take demands from intradiegetic figures at face value, though, and so the audience’s power to choose to obey (or not) the extradiegetic author figure becomes combined with the audience’s power to interpret the allegorical figures. The audience, to an extent, must create the meaning for these intradiegetic figures, particularly when their names are revealed typically only after a lengthy conversation with the pilgrim. This power to create meaning exposes “the interaction between authors and readers” within the *Pilgrimage* as one in which they share power over the narrative. This shared power, though inherent in the allegorical form, dramatizes the larger concerns over the audience’s understanding of the text that appear throughout the *Pilgrimage*. The *Pilgrimage*’s attention to the relationship between the body and the soul also points to the connection between sensation and cognition, between the material and the immaterial. In order for the *Pilgrimage* to have any effect on its audience, it must move from a material object external to the audience to an internalized memory—the audience’s understanding of the words on the page, the allegory the words construct, and the proper meaning of that allegory. The *Pilgrimage*’s

structure as an allegory, and particularly an allegory which has conflated the allegory's protagonist (the pilgrim) with the audience, specifically encourages the audience's internalization of the narrative, as the audience must construct the meaning of the figures the pilgrim encounters. Throughout the *Pilgrimage*, the allegorical figures he encounters withhold their names and describe themselves only through actions. Thus the audience and the pilgrim are encouraged to supply the names for these figures through analysis of the figures' bodies and attributes well before the figure reveals a name like Avarice or Penitence. When the audience internalizes the text of the *Pilgrimage*, it may also gain control over the text and potentially misunderstand or mis-remember it.

This audience, who has the power to modify the text as he or she reads it, presents a threat to the *Pilgrimage*'s orthodox status; if the audience interprets the text in an unexpected way, the *Pilgrimage* may appear to encourage heterodox beliefs. Seth Lerer sees this modification appearing in both literary and actual late-medieval readers, pointing out that "...reading is an act of separation and dismantling: letters are taken out of context, poems broken down for use as private centos, narrative personae cobbled out of literary allusions, scraps and shards of manuscripts pasted together to form personal anthologies" (Lerer *Courtly Letters* 32). The *Pilgrimage*'s attention to instructing its audience in proper allegorical reading, as well as its uncontrolled physical circulation detailed by the author figure's lament, demonstrates how a text might attempt to regulate the modifications its audience can enact on it. The authority an audience gains through the creation of meaning detailed above could endanger the text's circulation.²⁴ If the

²⁴ The author figure's lament expresses fear over his text circulating beyond his control, but his desire to keep it with him "by a lace" so that he could wear it "a-bowte my nekke" (Lydgate p. 8 ll. 269-270) makes clear that the author figure is concerned mostly by the text's circulation away from him. I contend that the

audience felt it had the authority to manipulate the text, the *Pilgrimage* might be used, for instance, as John Ball used the text of *Piers Plowman*: “Even as he derived authority from *Piers Plowman*, Ball asserted authority over it, assimilating its language and imagery to a practical purpose already conceived and undertaken” (Justice 118). Justice’s phrase, “practical purpose already conceived and undertaken,” highlights the very lack of control that the *Pilgrimage* tries to regulate as it instructs its audience in proper reading, a task made all the more difficult by the audience interpretation required in reading allegory. The *Pilgrimage*’s allegorical form allows the audience to interpret the text according to an agenda or purpose that the audience already had before reading the *Pilgrimage* because all figures require the audience’s interpretation and re-writing as the audience internalizes the characteristics of the allegorical figures and reproduces a signifier, like Idolatry, for those characteristics.

I suggest that the *Pilgrimage*’s treatment of the relationship between the body and the soul within the allegorical pilgrimage addresses the way in which the text becomes a part of the reader’s body, and, through its attention to regulating the pilgrim’s body, it attempts to regulate the audience’s internalization of the text. Because the allegorical pilgrimage asks its readers to imagine the pilgrim figure interacting with abstract virtues and vices in physical ways, it asks the reader to create these figures, though the *Pilgrimage* tries to curtail the reader’s creative liberties as much as possible by providing incredibly detailed descriptions of the figures. When the pilgrim first encounters Grace, for instance, Lydgate’s description of her is incredibly detailed as the pilgrim praises her: not only is she clearly of the most noble stock, but she also radiates beams of light and

didactic nature of the *Pilgrimage* indicates an expectation of circulation so that the text can provide spiritual instruction.

out of her bosom comes a snow-white dove that flies playfully around her (Lydgate 18-19, ll. 674-698). I suggest that this blazon functions as the text's attempt at controlling how exactly the reader imagines the allegorical figure of Grace, an attempt made difficult by the text's conflicting need to assert Grace's otherworldliness, a requirement of her spiritual authority. In refusing the audience imaginative control over the appearance of the allegorical characters, the *Pilgrimage* prevents the audience from asserting control over the text itself, which could potentially allow the pilgrim to exert control over those figures, including figures like Grace. Grace in particular serves as an excellent example of the problem with allowing the pilgrim control over the allegorical figures: while it might be beneficial for the reader's spiritual life to imagine controlling Charity or Penitence (perhaps spurring the pilgrim to enact behavior embodying these virtues), allowing the reader to imagine control over Grace risks communicating to the reader that he or she does not need grace for salvation. This process of the reader imagining him- or herself controlling these allegorical characters involves the private devotional reader imagining their voices internally, but complicating my discussion of the reader's "internalization" of the text of the *Pilgrimage* is the text's own construction of the soul and body as internal and external, respectively. As we have seen above, the *Pilgrimage* establishes a connection between the text, the body, and the reader, extending the internal aspect of reading, interacting, and imagining to the external, bodily portions of the reader, making the *Pilgrimage*'s construction of the internal soul and external body far from stable.

We have seen how the body plays an integral role in the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to regulate its audience: the allegorical bodies become texts to be read, and the audience's

bodies incorporate the text of the *Pilgrimage*. This intertwined relationship between the body and the text within the narrative of the *Pilgrimage*, however, becomes an obstacle to ensuring proper allegorical reading, both in terms of the way it inhibits spiritual understanding and in terms of the audience's ability, as materially bodied persons, to walk away from the text of the *Pilgrimage* and refuse its instruction. Thus the audience's material bodies become obstacles to the *Pilgrimage*'s ability to regulate the audience's understanding of the text, and the *Pilgrimage*'s frequent attention to bodies within the text reveal anxiety over that lack of control. The *Pilgrimage* contends with the obstacle of the body in the extended conversation between Reason and the pilgrim that focuses much of the text's explicit concern with the body. In this episode, the *Pilgrimage* takes active control over the pilgrim's body to demonstrate how the body "veils" the pilgrim's spiritual understanding. Reason²⁵ helps the pilgrim eject himself from his body so that he (the pilgrim) may see himself as a being made of two separate parts (the body and the soul), in spite of Reason's recent admission that the body is necessary for the soul's arrival in heaven. The *Pilgrimage* goes to great lengths to convince its audience that the body and soul are separate entities by enacting a literal separation of the two. When Reason confuses the pilgrim with her explanations of his soul as both an instigator of sin and also as a vehicle to paradise, her frustration at his confusion is nearly palpable. The pilgrim seems to be proving her very point through his misunderstanding, and she exasperatedly tells him "I trowe riht wel þat/ litel þou vnderstondest me—and wost þou

²⁵ In the prose translation, it is Reason who ejects the pilgrim from his body, but in Lydgate's poetic translation, it is Grace. The change makes logistical sense in Lydgate's translation because of changes Deguileville made to the order of events in the second recension, which places the pilgrim's instruction regarding the relationship between his body and soul earlier in the narrative, before Grace has departed from the pilgrim.

whi? It is for þe/ bodi maketh an obstacle bifore, gret and thikke” (Henry *Vol. I* 80, ll. 3336-38). Reason identifies the body as an obstacle to the pilgrim’s understanding not just because of its tendency to distract him with desires, but also because of its physicality, its bodied-ness. It is “gret and thikke,” and seemingly creates a barrier of flesh between the pilgrim and the wisdom with which Reason tries to provide him. This same barrier, of course, stands between the text of the *Pilgrimage* and its audience, preventing it from controlling its audience’s devotion and ensuring proper reading of its allegory.

To traverse this barrier within the allegorical pilgrimage, Reason decides that, with the pilgrim’s help, she will separate him from his body. I say “him” to refer to what becomes separated from his body because the pilgrim continues speaking in the first-person “I” voice after the separation, whereas the body becomes the looked-upon object: “She drowh and I shof. So miche we/ dide, she and I, þat þe contracte was ouerthrowe fro me and I/ uncharged” (Henry *Vol. I* 80, ll. 3349-3351). At this moment, the *Pilgrimage*’s depiction of the relationship between the body and the soul literalizes the conflict between the power of the *Pilgrimage* over its audience and the audience’s power over the *Pilgrimage*. Though the *Pilgrimage* can instruct its audience and attempt to control its devotional practice, in the end the audience has the power to choose to read the text or not read the text, and when audience of the *Pilgrimage* read privately, they have unsupervised power to interpret and misinterpret spiritual matters represented in the text. The text’s inability to control the audience because of the reader’s material self—a body autonomous from the text—underlies the *Pilgrimage*’s great attention to the bodies of its characters, especially to the body of the pilgrim. The *Pilgrimage* needs to disembody its

readers in order to bring them into the text, into the purview of its control, and the pulling and shoving depicted in the passage above enacts that separation on the pilgrim, a figure continually conflated with the audience, as we have seen in the previous chapter. After Reason has successfully separated the pilgrim from his body, the pilgrim explains the rising of his soul above his body in terms alluding to Paul's visionary experience in Corinthians, which we saw above, offering an enticing visionary experience as the reward for separating the body from the soul in an attempt to convince the audience to relinquish his or her body. The pilgrim remarks with wonder,

Whan untrussed þus I was, I was rauished into þe
eyr an hygh. Me thouht I fleih, and þat nothing I weyede. At
my wille oueral I wente, and up and down, and fer I seyh.
Nothing in þe world (as me thouhte) was heled ne hid fro me.
(Henry *Vol. I* 80-81, ll. 3351-54)

The pilgrim describes multiple benefits to his being liberated from his body, including flying, weightlessness, going wherever he desires, and far and clear sight. Of course, these come with the caveat, "me thouht," which casts doubt about whether the pilgrim is actually flying or understanding in the way he believes; this doubt undermines the pilgrim's claims to understanding, and when the pilgrim says that "Nothing in þe world (as me thouhte) was heled ne hid fro me," the reader gets the sense that many, many things are indeed hidden from the pilgrim. The contradiction between what the text has the characters say about the body and the way the text places those words in conversation with the action of the text reveals a pilgrim who is incapable of understanding the doctrinal instruction he receives, even when the "gret and thikke" obstacle of his body is removed.

The *Pilgrimage*'s construction of the body as an obstacle to understanding, elaborated upon through contrast with the pilgrim's "fer," disembodied sight above, becomes connected to the figurative veiling created through the allegorical form as Reason leaves the pilgrim and he reflects on her absence. Reason literalizes the things hidden from the pilgrim when, after she instructs him regarding the relationship between his body and his soul, she must leave the pilgrim. She explains that even though she may appear to be gone from him, in actuality, she is only hidden from him:

"I telle þee wel þat bitwixe us tweye shal be sumtime cloudes
oþer vaproures arisen, oþer mistes oþer smokes, thoruh [sic] whiche I
shal be hid fro þee. Sumtime þou shalt see me thikkeliche and
derkeliche, and sumtime neiþer more ne lasse þou shalt se me, ne
litel ne michel; and sumtime cleerlich þou shalt see me wel
apertliche." (Henry *Vol. 1* 85, ll. 3489-3494)

Reason's use of "derkeliche" to describe the way the pilgrim will see her recalls Paul's claim in his first letter to the Corinthians that, as humans on earth "We see now through a glass in a dark manner" (1 Corinthians 13:12 *Douay-Rheims* 198), connecting the pilgrim's inability to see Reason with clouded spiritual sight. For once, even the pilgrim seems to understand his inability to see, and he attributes this failure to his body, saying "Þe cloude hidde hire from me, þat þe bodi made bitwixe us/ tweyne" (Henry *Vol. 1* 84, ll. 3503-4). The pilgrim's suggestion that his body stands between himself and Reason finds agreement in the other adjective Reason uses to describe how the pilgrim will see her, "thikkeliche," the same root descriptor she gives to the pilgrim's "gret and thikke" body when she describes it as an obstacle to his understanding. Here at last the *Pilgrimage* connects the veil of reading allegory (and reading allegorically) to the

pilgrim's body, solidifying the *Pilgrimage*'s construction of allegorical bodies, like the pilgrim's, as texts to be read. Copeland and Melville identify this veiling as a common appearance in medieval allegoresis, explaining that the word used to describe the texts being read using allegoresis, *integumentum*, was "used...to describe the poetic fictions of ancient authors (especially pagan myths)[;] it points to a veil, and is usually taken to suggest a covering under which ancient poets and philosophers chose to conceal moral and scientific truths... 'Bernardus' thus describes Virgil as a philosopher writing *sub integumento* [in the Aeneid]..." (Copeland and Melville 169). Even as the *Pilgrimage* invokes this veiling in the bodies of its allegorical figures, though, it asserts the authority to dictate the *way* those bodies should be read.

Lydgate's translation of this episode separating the pilgrim's soul from his body highlights Grace's authority over the pilgrim—both his body and soul—and, as she is the source of the majority of the pilgrim's spiritual instruction just as the text of the *Pilgrimage* is the source of the audience's spiritual instruction, her authority supports the text's authority. In this version of the separation of the pilgrim's soul from his body, we no longer see the pulling and shoving we saw in the anonymous fourteenth-century translation of the first recension of the *Pilgrimage*, which focuses on the concern over the power of the pilgrim and the audience that this episode evinces. Here the pilgrim has been removed completely from any active participation in the process of separating his soul from his body, and instead he must remain a passive observer while Grace (Lydgate has replaced Reason with Grace in the section of the *Pilgrimage*) takes control not just of his body, but of his soul as well as she removes the body, the obstacle to the pilgrim's understanding, from the pilgrim's soul. The words she uses to offer her services to the

pilgrim seem sinister, as if acknowledging the strangeness of a figure taking over a person's body and soul to change them in some way. Grace offers to help the pilgrim with his confusion about his relationship to his body by saying "I schal assayen & provyde,/ Thy body for to leyn asyde,/ ffro the take yt, yiff I kan..." (Lydgate 270-71, ll. 9837-39). Grace articulates the separation in terms of her acting alone, in contrast to the joint pulling and shoving that the pilgrim and Reason do together to separate his body and soul in the prose translation. Instead, in this version the episode becomes a moment asserting Grace's power over the pilgrim's body, and as she is a figure of spiritual authority, this episode asserts the power of spiritual authorities over the English vernacular religious text. The language of taking here also calls to mind Lydgate's taking of Deguileville's lost text, which becomes associated with transitory body in this translation. Grace's explanation that she is doing this "fo to leyn asyde" the pilgrim's body creates an image of a completely inert body that Grace has cast aside. The narrative further exposes the pilgrim's passivity:

And Grace dieu a-noon me took,
 (I not, wher that I slepte or wook,)
 & made (for short conclusion,)
 My body for to falle a-doun.
 And affter that, a-noon ryht
 Me sempte that I took my flyht,
 And was ravished in-to the hayr,
 A place delytable & ffayr. (Lydgate 271, ll. 9849-56)

Grace does the acting in this episode while the pilgrim becomes the object: "Grace...me took," and the pilgrim's body does exactly what Grace desires as it falls "a-doun." The

pilgrim's use of the word "ravisshed" also emphasizes his lack of agency in this episode, undermining the pilgrim's brief attempt at agency when he says "I took my flyht," the "I" pronoun moving him back into the position of subject. Of course, the doubt about what the pilgrim sees and experiences in this separated state remains consistent between the prose and poetic translations of the *Pilgrimage*, identifying how important it is to the text's regulation of its audience that the pilgrim be uncertain of his understanding of what has happened. The overt assertion of Grace acting on the passive pilgrim's soul and body that appears here in Lydgate's translation coalesces with that doubt to reveal an idealized didactic situation, in which the instructor may step in and completely take control of its audience's spiritual state. It also reveals, though, the *Pilgrimage's* inability to render its readers passive and compliant.

Lydgate's translation of the *Pilgrimage* evokes the power dynamic between the body and the soul using politically and religiously charged language, and its substitution of Grace for Reason as the instructor asserts the importance of an authority figure providing spiritual instruction. Although the substitution also appears in Deguileville's French second recension of the *Pèlerinage*, Lydgate's source for his translation, Grace's status as the premier figure of authority within the pilgrimage narrative invites consideration of the way spiritual authority intervenes in the power dynamic the text establishes between the body and the soul. The *Pilgrimage* establishes Grace as an authority figure throughout the narrative: she is the first allegorical character the pilgrim meets, as well as the owner of the house that contains all of the officials of the church like Reason and Penitence to Moses and assorted vicars. Additionally, throughout the text Grace will provide the pilgrim with written prayers, the Creed, and assorted doctrinal

items, which casts her character as the source of all official church doctrine in the pilgrimage narrative. So when Lydgate substitutes Grace for Reason as the figure explaining to the pilgrim the relationship between the body and the soul, he substitutes a figure allegorically symbolizing a gift from God that can never be understood, replacing a figure allegorically symbolizing the importance of the use of the mind's capacity for reason. Grace announces:

...thou hast an aduersayre,
And On ek off thy moste foon,
Whom that thow off yor agon
Has yhad in gouernaunce...
He was ordeyned for to be
Soget & seruaunt vn-to the
And tabyde in thy servyse.
But now ys tournyd al that guyse...
ffor he hath now the souereynte,
Lordshepe & domynacioun
That ffyrst was in subieccioun. (Lydgate 249, ll. 8994-97; 9011-17)

Grace asserts the soul's primacy over the body as she chooses multiple words that represent types of authority. When Grace explains the soul's relationship to the body as one in which the soul has been placed in "gouernaunce," she of course refers to the soul having charge of the body, but the associations of "gouernaunce" with both secular and clerical authority ("gouernaunce," n. MED) are impossible to ignore, particularly in light of her use of "ordeyned" and "souereynte," which conjure associations with authority like

that of Grace's official, a vicar of Moses, who Grace refers to as "a special sergeaunt of myne þat of God is official" (Henry *Vol. I* 7, l. 257). This official has the authority to baptize, cross, and anoint the pilgrim, making his alignment with clerical authority clear. This vicar even goes on to instruct two clerics and "ordeyn[e] here/ oynementes" (Henry *Vol. I* 8, ll. 310-11), and so the word "ordeyne" recalls the scene in which, early in his journey, the pilgrim witnesses the vicar of Moses perform the sacraments. Grace follows this collection of words of authority with "Lordshepe & domynacioun." Although Grace uses some of these words of authority to demonstrate the *inversion* of power that the foolish pilgrim has allowed by letting his body have control of the pilgrim's actions, the overabundance of these types of words reveals the importance of a hierarchical relationship between the body and soul: in no way should the reader consider the soul subject to the body. She indicates the inversion of power through the pairing of "yhad" and "But now" to establish the contrast between the way things were formerly and are now and "tournyd" to demonstrate the misalignment. This lamentation over the way things have changed now from the way they were echoes the author figure's lament over his loss of his text as well, reminding the audience that the potential for inversion in the relationship between the body and the soul poses a threat similar to that posed by the circulating text. In both instances, that which should be subject to an authority—the body and the text—may evade that authority and, unregulated, may damage a person's spiritual education. The body may distract from the correct spiritual path, as the pilgrim's body did in his encounter with Occupation, and the text may be misinterpreted and misused, as *Piers Plowman* was by John Ball.²⁶

²⁶ I refer here simply to the assumption that John Ball's citation of *Piers Plowman* in his letters was a "misuse" of the text. Though Ball certainly invokes *Piers* in his letter, we cannot, of course, know that this

These similar anxieties over the pilgrim's inability to regulate his body and the author figure's anxieties over his inability to control the circulation and use of his text point to the danger of unregulated persons. The importance of regulation was very much in conversation in fifteenth-century England, when these two translations of the *Pilgrimage* appeared as Arundel's *Constitutions* "attempted no less than a wholesale transformation of the religious culture of his day" (Watson 830), and an unregulated audience of the *Pilgrimage* might fail to adhere to the new religious culture. The result of Arundel's attempted transformation was a much more ambiguous position of English vernacular writing on religious subjects, and I suggest that this ambiguous position informs much of the regulatory mechanisms that appear throughout the *Pilgrimage*, as the text attempts to set clear parameters on the type of vernacular religious text it is.

Because the pilgrim's unruly body becomes figured in the *Pilgrimage* as an obstacle to the pilgrim's correct reading of the allegorical figures he encounters, the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to exert control over the pilgrim's body reveal its larger goals of ensuring the audience reads the *Pilgrimage* correctly. Through the treatment of the pilgrim as having a body that its soul wears like clothing and that obscures clear spiritual sight, the *Pilgrimage* has figured the pilgrim as a text to be read, modeling the type of allegorical reading the pilgrimage narrative asks for, in which the allegorical bodies within the narrative become obstacles to good reading. As the pilgrim receives instruction on how to read his and other allegorical bodies, the audience receives instruction to look beyond the surface, both of the allegorical bodies and of the text of the *Pilgrimage* itself. In this way, the *Pilgrimage* asks its audience to conduct allegoresis: the audience must

invocation was a "misuse," only that it was likely a use of the text unexpected by Langland when Ball writes "lat peres þe plowman my broþur. duelle at home and dyzt vs corne" (Justice 118).

read the *Pilgrimage* both as the allegorical narrative that it is—in which Grace represents grace and so on—and also as a text that offers further instruction for lay readers of religious texts, even though reading instruction does not present itself as part of the allegorical narrative of the pilgrimage. Copeland and Melville explain that “...allegoresis proposes to save the text by pre-empting it and substituting itself as a dynamic intentionality which acts not on the text but through it” (Copeland and Melville 172)—in the instance of the *Pilgrimage*, the text instigates allegoresis that inculcates proper reading practice in its lay audience. At the same time, though, the *Pilgrimage* would become vulnerable to an audience practicing this kind of intentionality, and so even as it asks the audience to read the bodies of the text allegorically, it indicates concern over that allegorical reading becoming the audience’s own unsupervised allegoresis, in which the audience asserts intentionality on the *Pilgrimage* potentially contrary to the type of reading it hopes for.

Chapter 3: The Senses: Gateways to Regulation

The *Pilgrimage*'s great attention to the body and soul raises the question of how these two aspects of the pilgrim relate to one another. If the pilgrim's body and soul can be separated and the body is an obscuring veil, then how does any information get past the obstacle-body to reach the soul? The previous two chapters have shown us how the *Pilgrimage* conflates its audience with figures within the text—both intra- and extradiegetic characters—and how it figures the body as a site for allegorical reading, teaching its audience to read beyond the veil of the body. However, the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to regulate the type of reading its audience conducts will fail if the audience chooses to stop reading, and so the text's larger concern with regulating its audience's devotional use of the *Pilgrimage* requires bridging the separation between the text and its materially embodied audience. The audience has closed the gap between the text and itself as it internalizes the voices of the allegorical figures, as we saw in Chapter 2, but this internalization can also serve the *Pilgrimage*'s regulatory tendencies. This chapter will demonstrate how the *Pilgrimage* employs sensory perception to bridge the separation between itself and its audiences, regulating the audience's bodily experiences by provoking reactions to sensory stimuli. The *Pilgrimage*'s use of the senses to create sensory stimuli in its audience pushes back against the audience's power to walk away from the text. Mark Amsler has demonstrated how affective reading, “[a]s a potentially unruly practice,” demonstrates ways in which a text can evoke a physical response from its readers. For example, in one case audiences wore away paint on the page through repeated kissing of Christ's wounds, an act that “foregrounds the hinge of reading which opens and closes a gap between reader and text, between the skin of the page and the

reading body” (Amsler 84). Though the *Pilgrimage* does not, for the most part, attempt to evoke affective reading, the detailed descriptions of the allegorical bodies—what they look like, what they are doing—does evoke a sensory response that works similarly to the affective reading Amsler describes. The *Pilgrimage* asserts reading as a “hinge” connecting itself to its audience through the sensations it creates, which are shared between the allegorical bodies and the audience’s spiritual senses.

Within the *Pilgrimage*, the senses are closely tied to movement as well as to the restriction of movement. Because the text first addresses the bodily senses by figuring them as gates, which either allow or restrict movement between the pilgrim’s outer self and inner self, the *Pilgrimage* establishes the senses as a way to penetrate the pilgrim figure, with whom, we have seen, the audience is frequently conflated. Sensory information becomes the thing capable of movement between the pilgrim’s outer self and inner self, and this chapter will demonstrate how the *Pilgrimage*’s figuration of inner and outer senses attempts to activate its audience’s inner senses in the way the audience’s physical self normally would. This activation would bridge the separation between the text of the *Pilgrimage* and the material reality of its audience and allow the text to regulate its audience’s use of the *Pilgrimage* more fully. The movement between the space within the narrative, which produces the sensory stimuli, and the space outside of the narrative, which houses the audience, is reproduced throughout the *Pilgrimage* in the proliferation of figures signified by the narrative “I” of the text, which conflates figures both within and without the narrative. When the audience must imagine the space the intradiegetic pilgrim inhabits, only to have that space disrupted by the extradiegetic author figure, the audience’s attention moves between imaginative spaces. Furthermore,

the ways that the *Pilgrimage* has conflated the pilgrim figure with the audience—through direct address as well as the shared position of receiving spiritual instruction—causes the audience’s attention to move between the imaginative space of the *Pilgrimage* (both intra- and extradiegetic spaces) and the audience’s own material space in which the text is an object of study. The movement between the world of the *Pilgrimage*’s narrative and the world of the audience provides an opportunity for the *Pilgrimage* to regulate its audience’s response to the text, particularly in terms of the audience’s understanding of the allegorical bodies it encounters. Because the pilgrim’s encounters with these allegorical figures are largely shaped by his sensory perception of them, the *Pilgrimage*’s assertion of control over the audience’s sensory experience of the allegorical figures is an assertion of control over the audience’s understanding of those figures.

In the previous chapter, we saw how the *Pilgrimage* attempted to curtail any power the audience might gain through conducting allegorical reading on the text by denigrating the body as earthly, thick, and an impediment to spiritual understanding. This chapter will demonstrate how inculcating this disregard for the body (and touting the benefits of separation from the body) encourages the audience to disregard the physical sensations they may feel, clearing the way for the *Pilgrimage* to substitute spiritual senses for physical senses. After all, in medieval mystical visionary thought, that which is experienced by the spiritual senses, or the inner senses, during devotion “mak[e] possible the guiding and scripting of the flesh or outer body by spiritual principles. The outer body becomes an instrument of the inner...” (Dailey 17). Privileging the spiritual senses prevents submission to the body’s whims and desires; had the pilgrim privileged his spiritual senses, he could have resisted the allure of Idleness’s path. The separation of the

spiritual body from the obscuring physical body is also encouraged by the fact that the *Pilgrimage* opens as a dream vision. This framework invites its audience to the type of visionary experience that expects some kind of separation of the body; after all, "... the mind in trance is also 'alienated,' that is, separated from the bodily senses" (Newman 9). The *Pilgrimage* relies on the audience's readiness to identify as having two bodies and to allow alienation of their senses so that it can substitute the sensory experiences it wants the audience to have. This substitution will free the audience from the obscuring veil created by the physical body and will provide the lay audience with proper "guiding and scripting of the flesh" that Patricia Dailey attributes to the inner senses. Although the conception of two bodies, one physical and one spiritual, has a long history from which the *Pilgrimage* can draw, what is interesting here is that the *Pilgrimage* does not merely encourage the audience to turn away from the obscuring body and focus on the inner body, which houses the spiritual senses; rather, it attempts to substitute the sensory experience detailed within the *Pilgrimage* for the audience's own spiritual senses. Substituting its own sensory experience for the audience's sensory experience would allow, if successful, the *Pilgrimage* to construct a regulated, known audience that does not threaten misreading and misunderstanding like the unknown lay audience. However, the constant references to the senses that the audience *should* have end up reminding the audience of the senses they *do* have. Sarah Stanbury identifies late fourteenth-century English poems as paying great attention to visual perception and how to understand it, and she connects this interest to private piety that includes "[a] recognition and celebration of the role of the senses in leading to spiritual 'vision'" as an integral part of individual devotional experience (Stanbury *Seeing the Gawain-Poet* 128). The

Pilgrimage responds to this aspect of late-medieval devotion through its attempt to dictate the audience's sensory experiences and thus the "spiritual vision" to which these experiences lead.

Early in both the anonymous prose translation and Lydgate's poetic translation of the *Pilgrimage*, they figure the senses in terms of movement into and out of the pilgrim, as well as in terms of the spiritual effect of these senses. While the pilgrim is in Grace's house (one of his first stops on his pilgrimage), he meets Penitence, a figure at which he "wundrede miche" (Henry *Vol. I* 27, l. 1095) and, like most of the allegorical figures the pilgrim encounters, she explains to him what she does and how her appearance relates to her tasks. In explaining why she carries a broom in her mouth, Penitence says that she uses it to clean the house where she is a chamberer because there are gates that admit filth into the house. Penitence's description of the gates maintains the denigration of the body we witnessed Reason conducting in the previous chapter, identifying the senses as the five gates through which foul things enter the house where she lives. Though the descriptions are similar in the two versions, we will first look at Lydgate's version because it focuses more on how the senses allow foul things to move into the chamber:

"But wher that I am chaumberere,
...ther be vj Gatys large,
Wych to kepe, ys a gret charge,
As I shal to yow descryue.
And off the syxe, there be fyve
By wych al maner vnclennesse,
ffylthe, ordure, and wrechchydnese
Entreth in, erly & late." (Lydgate 115-16, ll. 4383-4393)

In this translation, Penitence names the filth that enters through the gates of the senses in four different ways: “uncleynesse,/ ffylthe, ordure, and wrechchydnesse,” leaving no doubt in the audience’s mind that the gates of the senses correspond to the body that Reason compared to a worm, and that they, like the denigrated body, pose a danger to the pilgrim’s spiritual progress. Penitence’s description of the senses here also creates a sense of these gates as constantly open and thus constantly receiving this foulness, evoking a sense of movement at all times, both “erly & late.” She goes on to name these five gates with the expected names of smelling, hearing, touch, taste, and sight. The prose translation of Deguileville’s first recension offers a similar description, focusing more on the singular direction than on the constancy of the movement through these gates: “Bi þese v yates, drede nouht, þer entereth ofte filthe/ ynowh, but bi hem mown nouht ysen ne comen out ayen þilke/ filthes” (Henry *Vol. 1* 30, ll. 1213-15). Though the filth can enter these five gates of the senses often, they may not leave [ysen] or come out again of those gates (“ysen v.” Henry *Vol. 2* 542). The singular direction of movement in this construction of the gates renders the chamber—the body of sinners—passive, able only to receive; once the chamber has received filth through these five gates of the senses, the filth cannot leave through those gates again. Most interesting in Penitence’s description of the house where she is chamberer, though, is her addition of a sixth gate, which she separates from the five senses but lists as another gate to her chamber:

“The syxte gate I stonde & kepe,
 And with my bysme faste swepe,
 Do my peyne & besynesse
 Tavoyde away al vnclennesse
 ffor thys syxte gate, in soth,

Gret helthe & gret profyt doth;
ffor yt maketh purgacioun
Off al maner corrupcioun,
And al fylthes round aboute,
By that gate men putten oute
Who that wyl with-Inne be
Clene off al dishoneste,
To purge hym clene, as he best kan
Thys gate ys callyd ‘the mouth off man’ ...” (Lydgate 116, ll.
4407-4420)

All the filth and corruption that entered through the five gates of the senses may exit through the mouth of man. This parallel construction, in which the confessing, penitent mouth of man is just one of six gates that allows access to the self, places what appear to be the physical senses in the same narrative space as a spiritual act. Based on the *Pilgrimage*'s construction of the pilgrim as having a thick, obscuring body that clothes his soul, the physical senses and the spiritual act of confession should not share the same space, and the fact that they do share this space grants a bodily aspect to the spiritual act of confession, and a spiritual aspect to the senses represented by the other five gates. In this construction, the inner body is not entirely different from the outer body that houses the senses Penitence has just described. This position allows a movement between inner and outer bodies and places the *Pilgrimage* in a tradition of thinking about the senses being comprised of inner, spiritual senses, and outer, physical senses. C.M. Woolgar tracks this development as arising from an “[e]arly medieval philosophy [that] had supplied a single common sense to receive the information from the external senses,

but...[b]y the thirteenth century, the internal senses were commonly described as containing, in the first ventricle of the brain, the common sense, the function of which was to receive sense impressions directly from the bodily senses” (Woolgar 19). Though the “common sense” in Aristotle’s conception of the senses functions as one sense and receives all sensory information,²⁷ in the example from the *Pilgrimage* each of these sensory gates, positioned as both bodily (outer) and spiritual (inner) receives the filth that comes through the five senses; there is not a single gate that leads to all five senses. At the same time, the five gates differ from the sixth gate in terms of the motions they allow. In the prose translation, Penitence emphasizes that the five gates of the senses go one direction only:

“That ooþer yate þat is þe sexte, whiche is needeful to
saluacioun, is þe yate of filthe, bi which eche wiht
purgeth him and cureth him, bi whiche eche wiht putteth
out al if he wole not leue foul: þis is þe mouth of
sinneres, whiche of þe yates is þe beste for she putteth
out alle þe misdedes in þe fourme þei ben doon, and seith
hem to his confessour in waymentinge and in weeping.” (Henry
Vol. I 30, ll. 1217-1223)

This articulation of the gates emphasizes the inward movement allowed by the outer, bodily senses that receive filth from the world. Once again the prose translation’s version of this gate also focuses on the singular direction of the sixth gate, though in direct

²⁷ Beth Williamson concisely sums up Aristotle’s conception of the *sensus communis* and its medieval reception, in which an “...overall medieval theory of cognition and neuropsychology [was] based on the psychology of Aristotle and refined through the anatomical theories of Galen. This theory proposed that sensory information, delivered via the senses of sight, hearing, smell, and so forth, was processed in a number of different, successively arranged ventricles in the brain, with an overall power of perception known as *sensus communis* (common sense) processing that information” (Williamson 3).

contrast to the five gates of the senses, this gate allows only exit. Penitence's description repeats words of exiting, saying that this gate "purgeth" and twice that it "putteth oute." Even "waymentinge" and "weepinge" involve projections, of tears and of sounds, from inside the body to outside the body. Once again, though, the construction of the gate of the confessing mouth of man as part of the same chamber as the five bodily senses places the spiritual act of confession in the same position as the bodily senses, a conflation only reinforced by the outward expressions of spiritual repentance expressed by the lamentation and weeping. Here Penitence tells the pilgrim that this sixth gate is "needeful to/ saluation" and that it "cureth him" of the foulness that arrived through the other gates, explicitly tying this gate to the realm of the spiritual. The oppositional directions of the movement and the reciprocal relationship of the five gates of the senses and the sixth gate of confession invites seeing these gates as essential to one another, creating a cyclical movement between the inside and outside of the chamber, which I suggest represents the pilgrim's self in this episode.

To fully understand the relationship that Penitence posits between these five gates of the senses and the gate of the confessing mouth, we must identify the chamber that Penitence cleans. She says that she is a chamberer "in þe hous...of whiche Grace Dieu is þe/ maistresse" (Henry *Vol. I* 29, ll. 1207-1209), but the allegory has filled this house with many figures and events, making the signification of the allegorical house difficult to ascertain. Within this house, the pilgrim meets Grace's vicars, witnesses sacraments including ordination and marriage, and receives the Eucharist; he also witnesses arguments over transubstantiation and explanations of the purposes of the sacraments he sees. This house is quite large, but if we look to the beginning of the text, we see that

before the pilgrim is allowed to enter the house, he has to be baptized: “þer was a water bifore it [Grace’s house]/ and þat needes I muste passe it if I wolde entre into/ þe hous” (Henry *Vol. 1* 6, ll. 217-219). Additionally, Grace says that she had “founded þilke hous and masowned it, as she seyde, xiii C/ yer and xxx bifore þat time” (Henry *Vol. 1* 6, ll. 210-211) in which the pilgrim encountered her, identifying the house with the beginning of Christianity, which had counted 1330 years since the birth of Christ.²⁸ The text of the *Pilgrimage*, then, constructs Grace’s house as Christianity as a whole, with the diverse actions and events the pilgrim witnesses—its sacraments, its members serving different functions such as administering and receiving sacraments—identifying this as the house founded in the birth of Christ.

Even though the *Pilgrimage* establishes Grace’s house as the inclusive body of Christianity, Penitence’s description of her duties as chamberer of that house greatly shrinks the scale of it, constructing the chamber she cleans in terms of the individual. Each of the five bodily senses is described individually, as is the sixth gate, for which Penitence employs the definite article to describe as “the mouth off man.” Furthermore, the confessor who receives the penitence from the mouth of man is described in the prose translation as “his confessour,” a construction that not only uses the singular possessive pronoun “his,” but that also invokes the privacy of confession, a relationship between the individual sinner and his confessor.

At the same time that this tighter focus allows the chamber containing these six gates to provide a sense of individual experience, the allegorical natures of the chamber,

²⁸ Deguileville dates the first recension of his text to 1331 in other parts of the *Pilgrimage*; regardless, Grace’s statement of when she founded her house should be read as a reference to the “current” year, locating the pilgrim’s journey and his encounter with Grace and her house in the present time of the text.

Penitence, and the pilgrim himself serve a larger didactic purpose: reminding the audience that “yowre lyff her ys but a pylgrymage” (Lydgate 2 l. 46) and teaching them how to navigate that pilgrimage. The allegorical form instructs because it generalizes experiences; the pilgrim represents every hapless human making his or her way through mortal life. The “allegorical representations of the ‘inner man’ imply the possibility of generalization” and “the symbolic landscape [of allegory]...represents not experiences peculiar to an individual,” but those universalizing experiences that connect the audience (Spearing 31). And so this focusing and individualization does not serve the creation of an individual’s experience, but rather, I suggest, serves the *Pilgrimage*’s purposes by generalizing these individual sensory experiences, allowing what seem to be discrete gates of discrete sensory experiences leading to one chamber to stand in for the sensory experiences of all individuals, replacing individual experience with the generalized experience in this example.

As demonstrated above, this example of the six gates also links the outer, bodily senses and inner, spiritual self through housing them in the same chamber and through the cycle of movement they create together. This linking allows the *Pilgrimage* to connect its presentation of the bodily senses to spiritual work, which is part of its efforts to create a regulated lay reader. This substitution of non-bodily experience for bodily experience appears in other forms of regulation through habituation; Katherine Breen explains that both figurative and literal habituating circumstances were employed in late medieval England. Crusading allowed laymen to become subject to monastic discipline, providing them with a kind of spiritual regulation not usually available to laymen. Crusading offered a journey towards Jerusalem under the guidance of spiritual authority;

even when undertaken metaphorically, the pilgrimage aspect of crusading offered a spiritual journey, “providing penitents with a metaphor with which to structure their efforts at virtuous repetition and variation whether they were setting out for Jerusalem, walking the perimeter of a prison cell, or following a written text [like *Piers Plowman*] *passus* by *passus*” (Breen 217). The *Pilgrimage*, appearing after William Langland’s *Piers Plowman*, employs the figurative pilgrimage to act out the movements, which, conducted literally, place members of the laity under “ecclesiastical law and...monastic discipline” (Breen 217). The ability of an imagined action, like journeying along a metaphorical pilgrimage, to create spiritual effects similar to that of a literal action, like journeying on a literal pilgrimage, demonstrates that the *Pilgrimage*’s frequent attempts to substitute the experiences it provides for its audience’s actual experiences fits into a larger tradition of didactic literature. I suggest that the aspect of movement involved in pilgrimage, in which the participant must follow the course set out, whether a literal or narrative course, is especially important to the structure and discipline enacted through pilgrimage. The movement towards Jerusalem guides the pilgrim’s steps and provides a common goal for all pilgrims, and it is continuing on that path that keeps the pilgrim regulated. If, like the protagonist pilgrim of the *Pilgrimage*, a pilgrim leaves the path, he or she steps aside from the expectations and rules set in place for a successful journey. In terms of the *Pilgrimage*, audience members who fail to follow the text’s instructions, such as when and how to read, or when to stop reading, no longer follow the path expected and needed by the *Pilgrimage*, and they become audience members that the text can no longer predict. This inability to predict its audience lies behind the *Pilgrimage*’s concern with its lay audience; because their educational background is unknown, their

responses to the text will be similarly hard to predict. This unpredictability makes the *Pilgrimage's* substitution of the sensations it describes for the audience's actual sensations particularly useful because it both makes an aspect of the audience known and asserts the text's power over its audience.

The *Pilgrimage* does not often refer to authorities—patristic or biblical—by name in the allegory, even though this would be an easy way to boost its own authority, and so the *Pilgrimage's* inclusion of the character of Aristotle in the allegory deserves mention, particularly in light of the text's attention to the senses. In the same place where the pilgrim encounters Penitence and learns about the gates of the senses (in Grace's house), he encounters Aristotle, brought in by Nature to argue against the occurrence of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. Up until this point, most of the characters the pilgrim meets are named for abstract ideas, like Grace and Reason; the only other named figure is Moses. And so when the pilgrim encounters Aristotle, this named figure becomes associated with Moses as the only other named figure, granting Aristotle some of the spiritual authority of Moses.²⁹ These two named figures with whom the pilgrim shares narrative space invite consideration of how their presence might be important to the *Pilgrimage*, and I suggest that the *Pilgrimage* draws on Aristotle's conceptions of the natural and spiritual senses to further its attempted substitution of the sensory experiences it constructs for the audience's own sensory experiences, thereby regulating its potentially unruly audience. Furthermore, evoking Aristotle within the text gestures to the *Pilgrimage's* participation in an ongoing conversation about cognition and the senses,

²⁹ Other named figures in the text are Saint Augustine, Saint Benedict, and Saint Francis, though the pilgrim does not actually "encounter" them: he sees them in his dream vision of the Heavenly Jerusalem, which occurs before he embarks on his pilgrimage.

which was informed by the “availability of the full range of Aristotle’s works, from c. 1260-80, present in authoritative Latin translations from the original Greek” and these texts’ relevance to medieval understanding of perception and the senses (Woolgar 18). The *Pilgrimage*, though, preserves its authority in instructing the pilgrim in spiritual matters by having Grace first introduce the pilgrim to the role of the senses in his spiritual life, dismissing Aristotle to a lurking presence to whom the *Pilgrimage* gestures but does not engage. This move positions the *Pilgrimage* as aware of scientific discussion of the senses but as still retaining superior authority in spiritual matters in and of itself, particularly since Aristotle fails to succeed in the debate he is brought in to argue.

The *Pilgrimage* once again expresses an interest in regulating the senses when the pilgrim attempts to wear the spiritual armor given to him by Grace; many of the pieces of this armor serve to restrain the pilgrim. The pilgrim’s enclosure in this armor evokes anchoritic enclosure and the private devotion that goes along with it, but it also evokes the chamber with the five gates leading in and only one leading out. Before the pilgrim actually leaves Grace’s house to begin his journey, Grace provides him with armor to protect him, saying that “þe/ purpoynt were shape for þe ariht if þow were ariht shape” (Henry *Vol. I* 51, ll. 2136-37). The armor provides the model for the correct shape of the pilgrim’s body, and if the pilgrim does not fit that model shape, then he is the incorrect shape and should mold himself to the armor. However, because this armor is the armor of Patience, the pilgrim’s ill-shape is spiritual as well as physical, and the reshaping that the armor requires must also be spiritual. This reshaping corresponds to the *Pilgrimage*’s larger goals to shape its lay readers, and just as the armor models the proper shape for the

pilgrim, the pilgrim's need to allow the armor to reshape him provides a model for the audience to allow the *Pilgrimage* to shape them.

The reshaping offered by Grace's spiritual armor is even more explicit in Lydgate's translation of the text, as Grace tells the pilgrim that he must reform himself to fit the armor, and that doing so will reform the pilgrim spiritually as well:

“But, thyn errour to reforme,
Thow must thy-selff mekly confourme.
To thys garnement, truste me,
And nat the garnement vn-to the,
And put away the gret outrage,
The ffaatnesse and the surplusage
That ys in the, and the gretnesse,
And the confourme by meknesse
To thys purpoynt, that yt may be
Accordynde & egal vn-to the,
In euery party wel syttyng.” (Lydgate 208-9, ll. 7441-7451)

Although the audience of the *Pilgrimage* can tell that the armor is not “[i]n euery party wel syttyng” for the pilgrim, the opening and closing lines of this passage make clear the true purpose of the armor. The armor of Patience, though of course representative of the ability to withstand all sorts of annoyances and difficulties, appears in this allegory as a rigid set of boundaries to which the pilgrim must conform. Grace gives the pilgrim the armor so that he may reform his error, and if he “confourme[th] by mekenesse,” then he will find that the armor will be perfectly suited to him. In order for the pilgrim to receive the spiritual protection the armor offers, he must reshape himself to the model Grace

provides. Grace's emphasis on the pilgrim's great size—his "ffaatenesse," "surplusage," and his "gretnesse"—make clear that when the pilgrim does put on the armor, it will fit him very tightly, and this tight fit will restrict the pilgrim's movement. Though the armor seems meant to restrict undesirable sensory information from penetrating the pilgrim's five gates, it would also restrict his movement along his journey to the New Jerusalem. When the pilgrim removes the armor and refuses to wear it, the *Pilgrimage* then is no longer responsible for impeding the pilgrim's spiritual journey in any way, such as by restricting his movement along the path. Additionally, any bodily threats the pilgrim encounters are now entirely his responsibility, since he rejected Grace's armor.

The *Pilgrimage* identifies the rest of the spiritual armor as elements of faith, and the primary purposes of the various pieces of armor restrict the pilgrim in some way, making the spiritual shaping seen above specific and explicit. Grace provides the pilgrim with armor including the Doublet of Patience, the Habergeon of Fortitude, and the Sword of Justice. However, the armor that truly restricts the pilgrim's movement (and thus is most likely the armor that he complains does not fit his shape) is also the armor that restricts his senses: the Helmet of Temperance. This armor works by binding the senses, reasserting the *Pilgrimage's* power over the audience most clearly through the helmet, which:

“is Attemperaunce of þe sighte, of þe heeringe and
of þe smelling: thinges þat mown greeve þee, for for riht as
þe helme keuereth and refreyneth his wittes, and restreyneth,
riht so Attemperaunce serueth to keepe þe eye þat it be not
to open and to miche abaundoned to folye and to vanitees.
For if þe viseer ne were streyt þer miht entre in swich

arwe þat euen to þe herte it miht go, and withoute
remedye wounde it to þe deth. To heere also murmurynge,
bakbitinge, fool speches þilke helme stoppeth so holliche
þat to þe herte ne to þe thouht no dart may misdo..." (Henry *Vol.*
l 54, ll. 2230-2240)

By offering the pilgrim this helmet, Grace attempts to restrain his "wittes"—his senses. The use of the word "wittes," though, evokes more than just the bodily senses; it also calls to mind the inward wits, such as those in *Piers Plowman* and *Everyman*, which represent spiritual senses. By spiritual senses, I refer to Aristotle's construction of internal senses, in which "sensation is produced in the soul through the medium of the body" (Aristotle 217, I). The pilgrim's physical senses, bound by Grace's armor, produce sensation within the audience and so correspond to the audience's spiritual senses. Though the armor binds the pilgrim's physical senses, the audience is to interpret the armor's restrictiveness as the moral virtue of temperance, as indicated by the helmet's name. Thus the allegorical purpose of the regulation of the pilgrim's physical senses creates an equivalence between them and the audience's spiritual state. Though the senses depicted in these other allegories and in the *Pilgrimage* represent physical senses in that they address the way a person's body experiences the world around it, they also depict imagined senses because the audience reading the text is not experiencing physically the sensations described. Beth Williamson points out how a van Eyck painting, by including figures looking at something invisible to the audience, "suggests a differentiation between looking at earthly 'reality,' which is of only limited spiritual consequence, and seeing what is actually important, above and beyond earthly reality" (Williamson 28). The *Pilgrimage* employs the physical senses in this way in the example

of Penitence's chamber: this episode in the text directs the pilgrim, and the audience, to look beyond what the senses tell him so that he may perceive the filth-filled chamber that Penitence attempts to clean. Through this conflation of inner and outer senses, the *Pilgrimage* suggests that the spiritual armor Grace offers has the ability to restrain the outer senses for the benefit of the pilgrim's inner, spiritual self, and by establishing direct correlation between the inner and outer senses, the *Pilgrimage* also offers the spiritual armor to the audience so that they can use the text of the *Pilgrimage* to restrain their senses. The proliferation of words of restraint, "keuereth," "refreyneth," and "restreyneth" makes clear that the helmet, like the armor enclosing the great size of the pilgrim above, will enclose the pilgrim's senses. However, Grace also claims that this armor will protect the pilgrim's heart from dangerous sounds, and when it turns out that these dangerous sounds consist of "murmurynge,/ bakbitinge, [and] fool speches," it becomes clear that the dangerous sounds offer danger to the pilgrim's heart in the spiritual sense—words can hurt.

The *Pilgrimage*, I suggest, uses Grace's armor in addition to the gates of the senses to model movement between the inner and outer portions of the pilgrim in order to show the ways that something external to the audience's body could affect the inner self. Lydgate's description of the helmet, like the prose translation, focuses on the enclosing aspects of the helm, and indeed focuses on this aspect of the helmet even more than it focuses on the ways that it protects the senses:

"Thyn helm ys callyd 'Attempraunce,'
 By wych afor thow shalt wel se,
 Herkne and smel, at lyberte,
 Thynges to-forn or that they falle,

And cast a-forn, meschevys alle,
 That no thyng vnwarly greue
 ffor Attempraunce (who lyst preue)
 Haueth thys condycioun,
 Only off high dyscrecyoun
 Kepeth theye cloose and secre
 That yt haue no lyberte
 To opne, (who-so lyst to lere,)..." (Lydgate 213-14, ll. 7636-
 7647)

The enclosing aspects of this helm, which keep that which the pilgrim may see, hear, and smell "cloose and secre," block the pilgrim's bodily senses from operating "at lyberte" and instead turns them inward. The senses that do not open (because of the helmet) recalls the five senses/gates of the chamber, which cannot open to let anything out, though here the movement has been reversed and the helm does not let anything in, complementing the chamber example by offering to stop the flow of filth through the gates. In the passage above from the prose translation, though the focus remains on the bodily senses, we see a turn to the ways in which sounds can hurt the pilgrim, and that hurt primarily comes from the intention of the sound rather than the sound itself; the backbitings and murmurings have the potential to hurt the pilgrim's heart or spirit. The portion of the *Pilgrimage* dealing with the armor is much expanded in the second recension, which Lydgate translated, and one area Lydgate expands is its consideration of the danger of hurtful words; Lydgate's translation connects these words to a vice the pilgrim will encounter along his journey:

"Ffor yiff thys helm be mad a-rhyt,

Yt shal nat haue to large a syht,
 Lyst som Arwe, sharpe y-grounde,
 Entre myghte, & gyue a wounde
 And at the Erys ek also
 Thow mustest taken hed therto,
 That yt be nat to large off space,
 Lyst that by the same place
 Entrede (by collusoun)
 Som noyse off false detraccioun...
 ffor thys helm, surer than Stel,
 Stoppeth the Erys ay so wel
 By prudent cyrcumspeccoun
 That Dartys off Detraccoun
 (Grounde and fyled for to smerte)
 Haue noon entre to the herte..." (Lydgate 214, ll. 7651-7668)

In this instance, Grace identifies the helmet as denying entry to the pilgrim's heart, and the very reason that the pilgrim should attend so closely to the helmet and ensure that it is not too loose and leaving too much space is that the pilgrim will not be vulnerable to the "Dartys off Detraccoun"; though the tight-fitting armor encloses the pilgrim's great body too tightly, its purpose remains spiritual protection. The need for the physical closeness of the helmet that Grace describes—that it "nat haue to large a syht" or "to large off space"—in order to protect his heart points out an opportunity for movement between the bodily, external senses and the inner heart. This moment offers an example not only of the dangers of the senses, but also the potential benefits of the type of devotional reading audiences of the *Pilgrimage* are conducting. Although here the danger

is that the darts of Detraction will penetrate the pilgrim's heart because he has left himself vulnerable to the things he sees and hears with his bodily senses, this same movement between the inner and the outer portions of the pilgrim offers an opportunity for beneficial penetration of the outer to the inner. Dailey sees this beneficial influence, from things outside acting on things inside, within visionary experiences, in which "[t]he vision will perform how the outer *should* conform to the inner according to the measure of the divine, affecting the whole human person, in body and soul" (Dailey 65).

The *Pilgrimage* offers its audience substituted sensory stimulation because it recognizes the power of the senses to affect the audience's spiritual experience—that which is ugly or smells bad is morally bad—and that providing the audience with sensory stimulation can help the *Pilgrimage* regulate that audience. The *Pilgrimage*'s recognition of the power of the senses to modify its audience was, of course, not unusual. Matthew Milner notes that the importance of the senses to late-medieval religious practice informed reformers' complaints; they "viewed late-medieval religion as excessively sensual because its images, incense, candles, vestments, music and, above all, its Eucharistic doctrine were used to protect, transform, and condition churchgoers through sensible religious experiences" (Milner 3). The *Pilgrimage* relies on this power and seeks to appropriate it in order to "transform" and "condition" its audience even when they are not within the confines of the church. And although later reformers might point to this assertion of power as an inherent problem with late medieval devotion, Milner rightly reminds us that "...reformers' opponents also saw *them* as sensual...both reformers and their opponents feared the power of the senses and their misuse, which is why they tarred each other with the same brush" (Milner 2). So the *Pilgrimage* participates in a tradition

of thinking through the senses' role in devotion not as an exemplar of how sensory experience relates to devotion, but rather as a statement about who should control the power granted through sensory experience in devotion: authority figures or the individual. Because the *Pilgrimage* comes down on the side of authoritative control over this power, it must then grapple with the location of sensation within individual experience, and it relies on images of binding and movement of the senses, expressed by the sensory information moving in through the gates of the senses in Penitence's chamber, to try to intervene in the individually-situated sensory experiences of its audience, as we saw in its depictions of the pilgrim's spiritual armor.

The *Pilgrimage's* emphasis on regulating the senses through Grace's spiritual armor becomes even more marked when compared to the biblical analogue to the *Pilgrimage's* spiritual armor. In this portion of Paul's letter to the Ephesians, the armor does not relate to the senses at all, though the reference to protection from "darts"—appearing in the prose translation, Lydgate's translation, and in Paul's letter—reinforces the perception of outward influences having the power to create spiritual wounds.

Therefore take unto you the armour of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect. Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of justice, And your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace: In all things taking the shield of faith, wherewith you may be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one. And take unto you the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit (which is the word of God).

(Ephesians 6:13-17, *Douay-Rheims* 222-23)

Paul's description of the armor of God is much less detailed than even that appearing in the prose translation of the *Pilgrimage*, and the *Pilgrimage*'s expansion of the purpose of the armor and, in particular, its attention to the armor's restriction of the senses stand in marked contrast to the Pauline armor, which consists of "truth," "justice," "gospel of peace," "faith," "salvation," and "Spirit." Standing where Paul places "salvation," the *Pilgrimage* depicts "Temperance," suggesting the importance of moderating the senses—and the body as a whole, as we saw in the previous chapter—as integral to salvation. The language of enclosure and inward-turning within descriptions of the helmet of Temperance that the *Pilgrimage* relies on creates within the text the movement from the outside to the inside of the pilgrim, modeling the movement the text requires to reach beyond itself and affect its audience's devotional habits. The *Pilgrimage* draws on the understanding common in the Middle Ages that the practice of devotion can create a removal or suppression of the senses.

Aristotle's construction of two types of sensing can shed light on how the *Pilgrimage* and other devotional texts act: because the capacity to sense exists even when the body senses nothing, a person can sense even when there is nothing stimulating the physical senses. The *Pilgrimage*, then, has the opportunity to interact with these internal senses, which Aristotle terms the "potential senses," by asking its audience to imagine types of sensory stimulation. After all, Aristotle notes, "...we speak of perceiving in two senses (for we say that that which has the power of hearing and seeing hears and sees, even if it happens to be asleep, as well as when the faculty is actually operative), so the term sensation must be used in two senses, as potential and as actual" (Aristotle 95-96, II.v). When the senses are not "operative," or actively sensing, they are passive. I suggest

that the *Pilgrimage*'s figuration of the senses—as receptive, as enclosed by armor—indicates the text's interest in binding the audience's senses and moving in through the gates of the senses not the audience's own physical (actual) sensations, but the regulated senses that the *Pilgrimage* provides. Mary Carruthers sees this type of intervention in aesthetic experience as typical of medieval art, which “seeks to effect in its audience... ‘a confident consent to believe’” (Carruthers 14). Although the *Pilgrimage* cannot directly affect the audience's bodily senses, the text's activation of the pilgrim's senses also activates the audience's potential senses. Aristotle pinpoints receptivity as one of the essential markers of potential sensation, explaining that “sense is that which is receptive of the form of sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold, and receives the impression of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze...the sense organ in its primary meaning is that in which this potentiality lies” (Aristotle 137, II.xii). The *Pilgrimage*'s representation of the pilgrim's senses emphasizes their receptivity—their ability to be impressed-upon. This receptivity is why the pilgrim needs such close-fitting armor to defend against the darts of Detraction.

The pilgrim's senses are particularly figured as receptive in the five gates of the senses that only received filth into the chamber and could not let it out again. The potentiality and receptivity of the senses as depicted in the *Pilgrimage* form an integral part of the text's methods in regulating its lay audience because it allows the *Pilgrimage* to model the “promised bodies” Dailey identifies as one of the most efficacious aspects of meditative devotion. These promised bodies appear when “the mystic undergoes what I call an *unlived* experience, an experience that does not find its roots in the time and place

of the body proper, ... but in the inner body and a promise that will unfold itself in time while never being entirely realized” (Dailey 24). The *Pilgrimage*’s constant attempts to re-form the pilgrim’s senses model the receptivity necessary for the *Pilgrimage*’s audience to allow the outer bodies of the text to mold the inner bodies of the audience, just like the pilgrim’s armor tries to mold the pilgrim’s body and soul.

The *Pilgrimage* creates a regulated, known audience out of the unknown audience by acting as the “active agent” in the type of sensing that Thomas Aquinas details in his commentary on Aristotle’s conception of potential senses. Aquinas identifies two aspects in sensing—the thing capable of sensing and the agent that acts on the senses. The agent must be separate and different from the thing capable of sensing, and it acts on the senses to make them like the agent, as in the signet and wax example above. Aquinas explains that “the agent, in other words, when it actualizes the things affected, makes [the thing capable of sensing] like itself... at the beginning, when it is being changed and affected, it is unlike. But at the end, when it has been changed and affected, it is like” (Aquinas 417a: 17-21; ll. 118-131, p. 189).³⁰ When the agent acts on the thing capable of sensing, it activates the potential sense; doing so makes that sense like itself. The *Pilgrimage* works as an agent and activates the potential sense of the audience to make the audience like itself, constructing a regulated audience that looks more like the *Pilgrimage*’s ideal audience than the unknown and unregulated lay audience that has access to the *Pilgrimage* because of its composition in the English vernacular. The *Pilgrimage*

³⁰ In this dissertation, the first number in my citations of Aquinas refers to the standard Bekker line numbers referring to the section of Aristotle’s *De Anima* being referenced in Aquinas’s commentary, with the letters referring to the lines referenced. The second numbers refer to René-Antoine Gauthier’s line numbers, and the final number refers to the page number of Robert Pasnau’s translation of the *Commentary*. All quotations of Aquinas in this chapter come from Robert Pasnau’s translation: Thomas Aquinas, *A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, translated by Robert Pasnau (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

stimulates the audience's senses from outside the audience, acting as the agent that is separate from the person sensing. The *Pilgrimage* functions as the agent for the pilgrim by providing the armor that restricts the pilgrim's senses. Then the pilgrim, conflated with the audience, can act as agent to the audience through his own senses, which are separate from the audience's senses: the pilgrim's sensations activate the audience's potential senses. The *Pilgrimage*'s reliance on text and image to activate the pilgrim's potential senses recognizes that they "serv[e] a mediating function, allowing the subject to know the object" (Akbari 6), and in that way, the text and the senses both create meaning within the perceiver. However, just as the *Pilgrimage*'s allegorical form allows misunderstanding and misinterpretation, Akbari notes that "both language and the senses are always imperfect mediators, defective due to the Fall..." (Akbari 6). The *Pilgrimage* uses the senses to suggest the movement it aims to create between the content of itself, as a devotional text, and its audience—movement that shifts the pilgrim's senses from within the narrative of the *Pilgrimage* to within the audience. But just as the pilgrim's senses are vulnerable to the "Dartys off Detraccyoun," the text of the *Pilgrimage* cannot ensure that the audience will allow the *Pilgrimage* to act on it closely enough and regulate it so that there are no gaps through which the audience becomes vulnerable to danger—in particular, to dangerous words.

The pilgrim's encounter with Detraction—warned against in the section on the spiritual armor, and appearing as the pilgrim journeys towards the New Jerusalem—demonstrates the connection between the *Pilgrimage*'s focus on the senses and the dangers of false words and misinformation that informs the text's anxieties over its lay

audience. When the pilgrim encounters Detraction, the vice identifies herself as a cook who serves her mother, Envy:

“I serue hire of eren percede þat ben put and
spited thoruh with my spere with þe sharpe yren, in wise of
smale hastelettes. Mi tunge I clepe my spere, for his wounde
which he maketh cruelle: it perceth and smitheth sorere
and more cruelliche þan any spere or any kervinge thing...
...þe eren þat þou
seest spited and shoven on þilke spere ben þe eres of
hereres and herkeneres of þat þat I seye. Þilke þat heeren
gladliche my seyinges, putten here eres upon my spere for to
serue with my mooder which þei seen languishe.” (Henry *Vol. 1*
110-11, ll. 4605-4615)

What is interesting about the prose translation’s figuration of Detraction is that her danger comes from multiple sources, capable of originating within and without those she afflicts. She does use her tongue as a spear that “perceth and smitheth” grievously, which recalls the darts about which Grace warned the pilgrim in the armor scene. However, here the darts have been changed to a sharp tongue, both drawing the danger of Detraction closer to her body and also identifying her danger with the use of the tongue, which is also the gate of tasting. Detraction aligns herself, though, with the filth that can enter through the gate of hearing, as she pierces ears and spits them on her spear (her tongue) so that she can cook them and serve them to her mother, Envy. The dangers of Detraction certainly lie in her actions, identified through the active verbs ascribed to her actions when she “perced,” “spited” and has “shoven” the ears on her spear-tongue. However,

Detraction shifts the action from herself onto those that hear her for a brief moment, saying that “those that gladly hear my sayings put their ears upon my spear” [Pilke þat heeren/ gladliche my seyinges, putten here eres upon my spere]. Those who listen to Detraction become the ones wounding themselves; they are the ones putting their ears on her spear. This switch indicates that the danger of the sense of hearing can come from without, as when Detraction places the ears on her spear herself, but that the danger can also come from inside the listener, and the danger comes from the way the listener feels about the detractions heard: if the listener hears them gladly, then he or she places his or her own ears on the spear. This connection between emotional feeling and the way sensory experience is understood shows the inner self and outer body to be equally dependent on one another. Lydgate’s translation leaves the agency in Detraction completely open to interpretation, as Detraction speaks of her tongue as a tool “Wyth wych fful many a man ys kut”; the passive construction of “ys kut” places agency neither with Detraction nor with the listener, but leaves the user of this sharp tool unknown. The connection between listening and the openness warned against in the armor scene, figured as glad listening here, demonstrates the dangers of receptivity, but at the same time the *Pilgrimage* needs its audience to be receptive to its own words; after all, “[i]n sermons on the biblical parable of ‘the sower and the seed,’ . . .the Word is imagined as a generative germ that enters parishioners’ aural receptivity—the extent to which their ears can be penetrated and their hearts fertilized by the seed-Word” (Bloom 112). The *Pilgrimage* cannot regulate its lay audience if the lay audience is not receptive to the *Pilgrimage*’s penetration, and so it tries to balance representing the senses as open and enclosed.

Although many medieval visionary accounts are extremely personal and are told in the first person (“I saw...”), the *Pilgrimage* blends this personal visionary experience with communal, generalized devotional experience to transform individual experience (such as that of the pilgrim) into universal experience (such as that of everyone on the pilgrimage of the life of man). Universalizing what the pilgrim experiences moves those experiences from the pilgrim’s individualized intradiegetic narrative space into the shared, communal space created by the text’s claims that everyone’s life is a pilgrimage. This shift from individual to universal mimics the text’s conflation of the pilgrim and audience by encouraging the pilgrim’s individualized experiences and sensations to operate as communal sensation. Once the allegory of the pilgrimage and the dream vision begins, the text’s language is typical of personal visionary accounts: “Me thowhte as I slepte þat I was a pilgrime...” (Henry *Vol. I* 1, l. 19). This statement identifies the story to come as a dream vision (“I slepte”) and as having a level of uncertainty common in dream visions (“Me thowhte”). However, before the reader arrives at this typical construction, the text evokes a much wider community, imploring all to listen by saying “Now cometh neer and gadereth yow/ togideres alle folk, and herkeneth wel...for þis towcheth/ alle, boþe grete and smale...” (Henry *Vol. I* 1, ll. 8-12). Thus the reader’s senses are not only conflated with the pilgrim’s, but also with those of other members of the audience, bringing the reader to an awareness that the senses the text evokes can also belong to other readers/audience members. Additionally, the *Pilgrimage* figures itself as a body that can touch all of its audience members when it claims that the story the author figure will tell “towcheth/ alle,” and so the *Pilgrimage* opens by using the senses to evoke movement between inner and outer, between itself and its audience. Beth Williamson

notes this evocation of community worship in private devotional texts expressed through the notation of music within the text of medieval manuscripts. She points out that consideration of the way texts evoke the inward senses, “a set of interior or inner senses that operated on an imaginative level and were related to, but distinct from, the outer, physical senses,” also provides a pathway to considerations of forms of a sense that are not the physical use of that sense, but still evocative of those senses in productive ways (Williamson 3-4). So, by acknowledging the community of worship that the reader is participating in through the act of reading the *Pilgrimage*, the text provides the audience with senses that are not his or her own. They are senses but each expression of the senses is different from the lived experience of the sense. They are, perhaps, a part of communal sensing. This removal of the individualized sense leaves the reader reliant on community sensation and remembered sensation rather than immediate sensation, allowing the *Pilgrimage* to regulate its lay audience by providing the senses they properly should experience.

This community sensation takes over the sending and receiving of sensual information between the body and soul in a cyclical movement that replicates the relationship between the five gates of the senses and the sixth gate of the confessing mouth. One final examination of the allegorical figures the pilgrim encounters will demonstrate how the *Pilgrimage* brings together movement between inner and outer experiences through its representations of the senses. When the pilgrim encounters the vice of Gluttony on his journey, the *Pilgrimage* figures the senses as messengers, once again connecting movement to the senses and this time expressing it as purposeful

movement. Gluttony's description of herself focuses so obsessively on the sense of touch that the pilgrim asks her to define this sense:

“I bere”,
quod she, “so pestilencial a touche in my mouth þat whan it
hath touched to þe morsell, it taketh swich reuelle in it þat
if to þat ooper it ne touchede, as out of witte it
shulde be. Þat oon after þat ooper I wole touche withoute
stinting. It reccheth him neuere of my profite, but þat
withoute more he haue his delite.” “Sey me”, quod I, “how it
is nempned and cleped, þilke touche.” “It is”, quod she: “a
wichche, a fleing messenger þat seith and telleth to alle þat
þat þe herte hath comaunded.” (Henry *Vol. 1* 133-34, ll. 5574-
5586)

During one of these conversations, when the pilgrim asks Gluttony how she would describe touch, her response reasserts that the *Pilgrimage* treats the senses as part of a relationship between the pilgrim's internal and external portions, in which the external is lived experience and the internal is the person's understanding of that experience. When the pilgrim asks what touch is, Gluttony responds, “It is... ‘a/ wichche, a fleinge messenger þat seith and telleth to alle þat/ þat þe herte hath comaunded’” (Henry *Vol. 1* 134, ll. 5581-83). Gluttony's explanation of touch positions it, one of the five gates of the senses, as existing between the outer body and the inner soul; as a servant [whichche] (“whichche” Henry *Vol. 2* 581), though, it is subject to both, operating specifically under the heart's command.

In both versions Gluttony responds to the pilgrim's question about touch, but in Lydgate's translation the framing of the question and the response demonstrates the way the *Pilgrimage* figures the communication between the senses and the inner self as a form of movement, particularly as movement into the heart (which is vulnerable to Detraction's darts):

“Ma dame,” quod I, “what euere falle,

What shal I thys Touch ycalle?”

“Thow shalt calle hym, ffer and ner,

The ffleynge massager,

Off wynges swyft, wych wyl nat dwelle,

Euery thyng out for to telle:

Al that euer ys in the herte,

Ther shal no thyng besyde asterte” (Lydgate 352, ll. 12957-12964)

Gluttony personifies Touch and gives him the title of “the ffleying massager” [the fleeing messenger] rather than simply describing him that way, as in the prose translation, making these aspects of touch, fleeing and communicating, representative of this sense. The sense of touch is usually closely tied to the physical body because something must be in contact with the body in order for the body to perceive touch, unlike sight, hearing, and smell, which allow the body to perceive things that are far from the physical body. Therefore, Gluttony's characterization of the sense of touch as something constantly moving—and particularly as something moving *away* (“ffleynge”)—suggests that the *Pilgrimage*'s figuration of touch in this scene is purposefully altered. Indeed, the fact that Gluttony describes herself in terms of touch rather than taste seems striking, as if asserting the role of touching in consumption is particularly important to the *Pilgrimage*'s

didactic goals. In the prose translation above, Gluttony begins her consumption by touching her tongue to something and then her tongue wanting more and more of that thing; it would have been just as easy to say that her tongue *tastes* something and then wants more. Acknowledging Gluttony's tasting, rather than figuring it as "touching with her tongue," would also allow the *Pilgrimage* to invoke the tradition of eating or chewing the scripture, in which "the reader 'tastes' the words of Scripture on the 'palate' of the heart...one has then to 'chew' the text thoroughly and 'digest' it, [or] proceed toward interpretation and personal appropriation" (Robertson 31). The refusal to depict Gluttony as tasting seems particularly strange since, somehow, this personified sense of touch in Lydgate's translation does in fact become conflated with speech acts. These speech acts seem suspiciously like those we saw in the pilgrim's encounter with Detraction: Touch will tell everything that is in the heart ["Euery thyng out for to telle:/ Al that euer ys in the herte"]. Only here, the movement occurs outward as Touch moves information from the heart "out." The forceful avoidance of taste and the connection of Touch with speech acts combine with the personification of touch in Lydgate's poetic translation, in which Touch has attributes of wing-footed Mercury, the messenger of the gods flying "ffer and ner," to make the sense of touch seem even more important.

The modeling and reshaping that the *Pilgrimage* seeks to enact on its lay audience becomes inextricably linked to the *Pilgrimage*'s representation of bodies and their senses. Lisa Cooper reads this reshaping as implying that the soul, represented by the pilgrim, is vulnerable to external influences, "problematically malleable, and that the believer is unable to do more in the face of this malleability than make the crucial choice to submit to the right set of external forces before it is too late" (Cooper 109). I have argued, of

course, that the *Pilgrimage* identifies itself as the “right set of external forces” and takes advantage of the malleability of the soul to assert itself to the reader as this “right set.”

The *Pilgrimage* promotes itself as the proper source of regulation for its audiences in ways that begin with its conflation of the audience with characters within the text, like the pilgrim, but its attention to the senses acting as gates between the pilgrim’s inner and outer selves allows the *Pilgrimage* to project itself as something to be sensed and thus as something that can move from its position external to the audience into a position in the audience’s inner self. In describing and depicting what the pilgrim experiences with his senses, the *Pilgrimage* positions the audience within the text. Stanbury illustrates the way art that encourages imaginative envisioning creates this positioning by pointing out that “[t]o picture the Virgin reading the prophecy of Isaiah is to look over her shoulder” (Stanbury *The Visual Object of Desire* 179). Imagining what the Virgin senses draws the person imagining into a shared space with her. As the *Pilgrimage* encourages its audience to position themselves within the text, sharing the pilgrim’s sensory experiences, it encourages the audience to place itself into the regulated imagined space that the text has constructed. The *Pilgrimage*’s emphasis on the sense of touch in the pilgrim’s conversation with Gluttony in particular draws attention to the allegorical bodies it has constructed and the way the pilgrim’s interaction with those allegorical bodies disrupts the boundary between the audience and the text of the *Pilgrimage*, the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Empty Bodies: Dangers of the Allegorical Text and Image

The illustrations accompanying some manuscripts³¹ of the English *Pilgrimage* reinforce the movement the text evokes through its treatment of the senses to blur the boundaries between the text and its audience. The majority of the illustrations depict the pilgrim interacting with the allegorical figures of the vices and virtues he encounters; the details of these visual representations correspond with details present in the text, but they also incorporate new details, enriching the allegorical narrative of the pilgrim's journey. The combination of the textual and visual representations of the pilgrim's interactions with allegorical figures causes the audience to experience the figures (of the pilgrim as well as the vices and virtues) as inhabiting multiple spaces at once: the space of the text and the space of the illustrations. The way these interactions are repeated, with slight modifications, in textual and visual media creates a sense of movement. Seeta Chaganti has shown how late medieval *danse macabre* art employs this technique to suggest that the skeletons depicted are dynamic rather than static figures, explaining that "the repetition of the death figure, with the incorporation of variation... communicates the scene's implication of motion.... Seeing the repeated figure in different positions encourages the eye to consider, or even construct, dynamic transitions between each instance of the figure" (Chaganti 12). The illustrated manuscripts of the *Pilgrimage* similarly encourage the audience's perception of the interactions between the pilgrim and

³¹ Though not all of the manuscripts of the *Pilgrimage* contain illustrations, Michael Camille points out that most copies of them, whether in the original French or in translation, did contain illustrations. Manuscripts that did not have illustrations had spaces for illustrations, which Camille argues shows that Deguileville "conceived his work from the beginning as a visual-verbal complex" (Camille "The Iconoclast's Desire" 152). The way the illustrations of the English *Pilgrimage* manuscripts interact with the audience's understanding of the allegory further supports the composition of the *Pilgrimage* as a "visual-verbal complex," as this chapter will demonstrate.

the allegorical figures to shift between similar but differing depictions, reinforcing the movement evoked through the text's use of the senses and, this chapter will show, establishing these allegorical bodies as threatening.

These bodies threaten through their movement towards the pilgrim and audience, but also through their potential emptiness, which points to the potential emptiness of allegory. The visual emptiness threatened in the *Pilgrimage's* illustrations destabilizes the *Pilgrimage's* ability to signify meaning, and thus its ability to provide spiritual instruction (and particularly its ability to teach its audience to read properly). Though we have seen the *Pilgrimage* identify itself as a mirror in which audiences should see themselves and try to improve, mirrors have distorting properties as well. The allegorical pilgrimage begins when the author figure sees the Heavenly Jerusalem in a mirror, and I would like to turn back to these lines, though we have seen them before: "Me thowte as I slepte þat I was a pilgrime and þat I/ was stired to go to þe citee of Jerusalem in a mirour" (Henry *Vol. I* 1, ll. 19-20). Though we have already discussed the uncertainty brought forth by the phrase "me thowte," I would like to point out that the author figure also describes the place he would like to go as "in a mirour." The author figure does not say that he was stirred to go to the Heavenly Jerusalem *by* a vision in a mirror; he does not say that he was stirred to go to the Heavenly Jerusalem that *he saw* in a mirror. The author figure, instead, wants to go to the Heavenly Jerusalem *in* the mirror—a movement which is, of course, impossible.³² The Heavenly Jerusalem the author figure sees in the mirror is only an image, which is all a mirror can produce. A mirror does not actually

³² The syntax of the author figure's wish could also indicate that he was stirred in a mirror to go to the city of Jerusalem, but I argue that the word choice and syntax make this meaning of the phrase more difficult to recover than the meaning that the author figure desires to go to the city in a mirror.

contain the thing presented. I suggest that this moment of the author figure desiring to journey to a place in a mirror, a place that is not there, connects the text's allegorical form with the text's treatment of images, where both forms of communication may turn out to conceal emptiness. Michael Camille has pointed out that "[v]isible forms, whether paintings or reflections, convey things not really in them by hinting at objective characteristics not actually there" (Camille "Before the Gaze" 210). Camille's description of images, that they "hin[t] at...characteristics not actually there," could easily describe the Heavenly Jerusalem the pilgrim saw in his mirror³³ or, for that matter, allegory. An allegorical text like the *Pilgrimage* presents bodies where there are none—giving the grace of God a beautiful body and the vice of avarice a monstrous body, for example. This allegory gives material form to the immaterial and "elicits continual interpretation as its primary aesthetic effect, giving us the feeling that we are moving at once inward and upward toward the transcendental 'other'" (Teskey 4). The *Pilgrimage* negotiates with its own allegorical form, which requires constant interpretation on the audience's part, by attempting to teach the audience how to conduct that interpretation properly. However, as Gordon Teskey notes, for an allegory to elicit this constant sense of higher meaning waiting only for the audience's interpretation to reveal the text's truth, "an allegory must be...incoherent on the narrative level, forcing us to unify the work by imposing meaning on it" (Teskey 5). This basic incoherence, or absence of meaning, is clear in the author figure's statement of desire to go to a place in the mirror. The fact that the author figure is trying to journey to a reflection, a flattened image that has no place in space, does not

³³ I do not suggest that the *Pilgrimage* indicates that, because it appears in a mirror, the Heavenly Jerusalem does not exist, only that the Heavenly Jerusalem itself, as a place that inhabits a space, exists inside the pilgrim's mirror.

prevent the author figure from becoming the pilgrim and journeying towards the Heavenly Jerusalem. What it does, I suggest, is point to a problem with meaning that the pilgrim, and the audience, will encounter throughout the narrative.

The *Pilgrimage's* presentation of the image in the mirror as a frame for the allegorical pilgrimage suggests that images and allegory will signify (and fail to signify) in similar ways in the *Pilgrimage*. This chapter will recognize the importance of this interplay by examining the *Pilgrimage's* representations of allegorical bodies both visually and textually, identifying how the representation of these allegorical bodies relies on both visual and textual forms of representation to signal the porous boundary between the audience and the allegory. This porous boundary suggests a movement between spaces that should not be possible, as when the author figure desires to move into the space of the mirror that contained the image of the Heavenly Jerusalem. As the audience experiences the sights, sounds, smells, and feelings the pilgrim experiences, the text becomes internalized in the audience. Hilary Maddocks explains this internalization in terms that echo Teskey's characterization of allegory as presenting itself as requiring upward movement on the part of the audience; she says of the *Pilgrimage* that the "gradual process whereby the pilgrim (and the reader) sees, describes in words, and then comprehends the meaning of each Sin, is itself a metaphor for spiritual enlightenment" (Maddocks 208). I contend that this similarity between the "upward" movement of the "spiritual enlightenment" and of the "the transcendental 'other,'" two types of movement that come together in the *Pilgrimage's* allegorical figures, manifests the *Pilgrimage's* interest in the allegorical form as a mode of spiritual instruction. Though allegory does allow the audience to experience a "gradual process" of understanding, it also creates a

risk that the audience will interpret incorrectly because allegory tries to “capture” meaning that is unstable (Teskey 8). This concern over misinterpretation permeates the *Pilgrimage*, as we have seen, and the *Pilgrimage*’s attempts to regulate its audience’s interpretation have frequently involved it closing the distance between the text and the audience. The movement created by the double representation of allegorical bodies—through both visual and textual description—echoes the tension the *Pilgrimage* has contained throughout its attempts to construct its audience: it attempts both to conflate and separate the audience’s position with and from itself. The *Pilgrimage*’s anxieties about translation, as discussed in Chapter 1, further suggest the text’s interest in movement between forms, whether between the visual and textual descriptions of allegorical moments of the pilgrim’s journey or between the form of the text contained in the manuscript and the form of the text absorbed into the audience’s body. Three representations of allegorical figures in the *Pilgrimage* will demonstrate most clearly the way the text uses allegorical bodies to negotiate the dangers of its own allegorical form. The figure of Avarice will demonstrate the potential for similarity between the pilgrim’s body and the monstrous body, the figure of Idolatry will show the emptiness residing inside the allegorical body, and the figure of Penitence will show the disappearing distance between the pilgrim’s body and allegorical body.

When the pilgrim encounters allegorical vices as well as virtues, he understands their bodies in terms of how he identifies his own body, but the visual and textual depictions of the pilgrim in relation to these allegorical figures and their allegorical bodies invite the audience to imagine these bodies in close proximity to one another, either because the pilgrim’s unmarked body provides contrast to the monstrous

allegorical body or because the allegorical body proposes acting on the pilgrim's body. I suggest that the movement of these bodies—the pilgrim's, the allegorical vices', and the allegorical virtues'—between textual and visual representations models the *Pilgrimage's* desire to create movement between the audience and itself. The visual and textual representations of the allegorical figures in the *Pilgrimage* work together to break down the boundaries between the text and the audience in a way that would not be possible for either medium acting alone. Shannon Gayk notes that Lydgate's work in general demonstrates this productive interaction between text and image because he “understands his own textual practice as intrinsically connected to images, which become places of tension in his work that he attempts to mediate and perhaps even resolve through poetic amplification and figural exegesis” (Gayk 95). The “poetic amplification” of the text's allegory and “figural exegesis” required by the descriptions of the allegorical figures that delay the figures' names work together in the *Pilgrimage* to complicate interpretation of the text. This complication runs counter to the *Pilgrimage's* claim that it is written in the vernacular “so þat lewede mowe vnderstande it;/ and þerinne may iche wight lerne whiche wey men shulden/ taken and which forsake and leue” (Henry *Vol. 1* 1, ll. 13-14).³⁴

I suggest that the difficulty in interpreting the *Pilgrimage* created by its allegorical form and the multiple, differing representations of its allegorical figures shows the English translations of the *Pilgrimage* grappling with their own accessibility. Translation into the vernacular of the non-elite made the content of the *Pilgrimage* available to the laity in ways similar to the way that religious images were supposed to provide books for

³⁴ All references to the prose translation of the *Pilgrimage* include the page number followed by the line numbers and reference the following edition: Avril Henry, ed. *The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode*. Vol. 1, Introduction and Text (London: Oxford University Press, 1985). Print.

the laity: “For the worship of a picture is one thing but learning what should be worshipped through the story on a picture is something else. For what writing provides for readers, this a picture provides for uneducated people looking at it, for in it the ignorant see what they should follow and the illiterate read the same from it. Thus a picture serves as a text, especially for pagans” (*The Letters of Gregory the Great* Letters of Gregory the Great 11.10). Because it includes text for readers literate in English and also images—“text” for “the illiterate [to] read”—the *Pilgrimage* demonstrates how these two representations of laymen “reading” come together in fifteenth-century England. By juxtaposing these two different types of “books” for the “unlettered” as a text asking its audience to read both textual and visual representations of allegorical figures, the *Pilgrimage* demonstrates a fear common to concerns about the use of religious images and concerns about lay reading: the potential for these audiences to misunderstand the meaning.

The *Pilgrimage*'s presentation of these two concerns further reveals the connection between the improper use of images and the dangers of improper lay reading: lay readers may fail to recognize the emptiness of the images and commit idolatry, or they may fail to understand the allegorical figures that have no stable meaning and derive improper beliefs from the text. The *Pilgrimage* identifies the fifteenth-century concerns over the use of the English vernacular in religious writing in England as part of ongoing concerns over how to imagine and construct audiences for devotional items, whether visual or textual. The *Pilgrimage* responds to this control by attempting to reach beyond the manuscript to enact change on its audience, and so I conclude this study of the *Pilgrimage*'s regulation of its audience with an examination of how the illustrations in

the *Pilgrimage* foster interaction between readerly bodies and the allegorical bodies of the manuscript.

The *Pilgrimage*'s multiple ways of intervening in its audience's reading experience recognizes what Caroline Walker Bynum and other critics³⁵ have asserted about other illustrated manuscripts: that "medieval iconography does not float free from the objects on which it is found" (Bynum 216). The location of the illustrations of the *Pilgrimage*, appearing above, below, and in the middle of the words of the text (see Figures 1³⁶ and 2³⁷ for examples of the interaction of text and image in these manuscripts), insists on contextual consideration, both in terms of the text forming context for the images and for images forming context for the text, and so this analysis of the *Pilgrimage*'s methods of constructing and controlling its audience must include the way the *Pilgrimage* uses these images. Considering how the images of the *Pilgrimage* interact with the text's audience demonstrates not only another way the *Pilgrimage* attempts to regulate its audience, but also how all of the regulatory moves we have seen in the *Pilgrimage* come together to illustrate the connection between the image debate and the debate over religious writing in the vernacular in fifteenth-century England. Representations, by signifying something other than themselves, always risk improper interpretation. Thus religious representations always have the potential to subvert, and this potential leads to regulating moves, whether that regulation becomes encoded into

³⁵ Bynum notes that Paul Binski, Eamon Duffy, Bruno Reudenbach and Flora Lewis have made similar assertions, pointing to a consensus regarding the need to attend to the way medieval art interacts with its context. I suggest that the role the images play in the *Pilgrimage*'s assertion of control over its audience exemplifies the importance of considering the interactions between images and their contexts.

³⁶ Figure 1. The pilgrim encounters Avarice. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS. Laud Misc. 740 85v. Available online through the Bodleian Library.

³⁷ Figure 2. The pilgrim encounters Avarice. State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 63r. Available online at < <http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/93606>>.

church law, like Arundel's *Constitutions*, or whether it becomes part of the form of a devotional text like the *Pilgrimage*.

The *Pilgrimage* uses its images of Avarice and Penitence to model devotional behavior and expand its reach beyond the manuscript page. Beth Williamson's recent discussion of images modeling devotional behavior shows a clear example of how this type of interaction between an image and its audience's bodies can occur. The image Williamson examines, of Margaret Tudor, wife of James IV of Scotland, shows the queen engaged in private devotion, and "the portrait of the queen juxtaposes her inner vision with the sculpted figures on the altar and presents the inner vision as the higher level of experience, presumably gained as the result of a progression through—and then beyond—the use of material texts and images" (Williamson 23). Williamson's purpose in discussing this image is to articulate how the image works with its placement in the Book of Hours to model the devotional experience the reader should have. First, the queen contemplates devotional objects, and then she moves "beyond" those objects to attain spiritual sight; likewise, the audience of the Book of Hours should expect the same movement. The figures of Avarice and Penitence within the *Pilgrimage* encourage the audience to undertake actions directed by the warnings arising from Avarice's figuration and by the suggestions arising from Penitence's figuration.

In the case of both Avarice and Penitence, the manuscript illustrations of these figures' bodies model the type of behaviors the audience should undertake. The textual descriptions of how these allegorical bodies move rely heavily on violence, which reinforces the relationship the *Pilgrimage* has established between the body and the text. I suggest that this violence can move the audience physically, spurring the audience into an

idealized set of actions—such as penitential actions—comprising the audience’s devotional practice. The *Pilgrimage* pursues this goal by enacting physical violence on the pilgrim, and while this violence usually comes from the vices he encounters, at times it comes from “good” figures as well. This section of the chapter will examine the types of punishment the *Pilgrimage* enacts on the pilgrim’s body through Avarice and through Penitence since those figures will allow us to see “bad” bodily interactions as well as “good” bodily interactions (or, in terms of the *Pilgrimage*’s didactic purpose, bodily interactions to be avoided and bodily actions to be embraced). Through these two figures, the *Pilgrimage* demonstrates how the audience’s body can be the same as the allegorical body, especially through shared bodily experiences. As we examine the textual and visual representations of Avarice and Penitence in the *Pilgrimage*, we will see how the *Pilgrimage* attempts to regulate its audience’s bodily movements to specify the type of devotion its audience practices.

As a text that is both a religious allegory and a dream vision, the *Pilgrimage* has leeway to use fantastical sights, smells, and sounds to flesh out allegorical characters that the pilgrim encounters, and the illustrations in the *Pilgrimage* demonstrate how much of these characters’ signification is rooted in their bodies. The characters in this allegory come in a variety of forms, but in all cases the character’s appearance should provide readers clues as to the character’s nature. Figure 3,³⁸ an illustration from Bodleian Library MS. Laud Misc. 740, depicts the pilgrim’s encounter with Avarice, who has six grasping hands and two stumps where her hands have been cut off. The two stumps are Avarice’s giving hands, and the six hands are her grasping hands. The six hands occupy

³⁸ Figure 3. Detail of Avarice’s hands. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS. Laud Misc. 740 85v. Available online through the Bodleian Library.

themselves with various types of grasping.³⁹ Starting clockwise from Avarice's right shoulder, we see the first grasping hand; these hands are marked by the blue sleeve of the arm connected to the hand. The contents of the first grasping hand have been obscured in this image, but the second grasping hand holds a bowl and a bag, the third a set of scales, the fourth a star-like item, the fifth a staff, and the sixth grasps Avarice's exceedingly long tongue. Looking at Figure 4,⁴⁰ we can see that Avarice also has a red figure on her head who wraps his hands around her cheeks, which, along with the bloody stumps on her shoulders, creates a sinister frame for Avarice's face.

Avarice's sixth hand, which she calls by multiple names including Treachery and Deception, has been changed in the visual representation of this allegorical figure in a way that exposes once more the *Pilgrimage's* anxieties over its audience's devotional practice. In the visual representation of Avarice, her sixth hand holds her long tongue, indicating that one of the ways she grasps with her avaricious hands involves speaking.⁴¹ Henry argues that the best name for this hand is Fraud (Henry *Vol. 2* 476), and Avarice's description of the way she defrauds those who venerate visual religious art lends credence to Henry's argument. To "make þe/ preest winne," Avarice drills holes in holy images, by which she presumably refers to three-dimensional art, and then she pours in oil, water, or wine. Then she brings "trewaundes and make hem to seeme embosed or

³⁹ Though Avarice's explanations of her different grasping hands and their content are spread across many lines in the prose translation, Henry helpfully summarizes them as follows: "Avarice has six hands plus two stumps. Those with...griffin-claws are Hands 1 (Rapine) and 2 (Larceny). Hand 3 (Usury) carries a file and scales, Hand 4 (Knavery) a dish and a bag, Hand 5 (Simony) a crook, while Hand 6 (Deception/Treachery) moves between her wounded hip and her mouth" (Henry *Vol. 2* 468).

⁴⁰ Figure 4. Avarice. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS. Laud Misc. 740 85v. Available online through the Bodleian Library.

⁴¹ When the pilgrim sees Avarice for the first time, he describes her sixth hand as moving constantly between her tongue and a wound on her hip. The change in her representation in the image asserts the priority of her tongue in the danger this vice presents.

contract/or deff or down”, (Henry *Vol. 1* 128, ll. 5335-6), and once she has disguised these truants, or idle beggars (Henry *Vol. 2* 571, "trewaundes n. pl."), making them seem to have various problems with their bodies, she easily tricks worshippers into incorrect or false worship, profiting from their donations. Avarice gloats:

...I make hem come bifore þe
ymage, and crye ‘Las, holi ymage, hele me! After God in yow
I haue grettest feith!’ And þanne al hool I reise hem and in
short time with myn hand I shewe hem hol. But wunder is it
nouht, for harm hadden þei noon ne sykenesse: al oonliche myn
euel þei hadden. But þe fold weenen it nouht: þei arretten
it to þe ymage, and þus þe preest winneth and þe folk maken a
fals feste. (Henry *Vol. 1* 128, ll. 5329-5343)

Although the vice under consideration here is Avarice, not Idolatry, the criticism of too-ready belief in images is hard to ignore in this passage. The fraud of Avarice’s minions relies on a belief that a “holi ymage” has not only the power to act, but also the power to act miraculously. The audience to whom these “trewaundes” present this show of miraculous healing must believe that having “grettest feith” in a holy image—faith second only to faith in God—could be the cause of such healing in order for the fraud to succeed. Avarice turns these holy images into false bodies that seem to bleed or weep like a real body but in fact are simply empty vessels filled by Avarice. Confusion over the signification of these holy images results in “þe folk maken a/ fals feste” [the people giving (it) pointless respect] (Henry *Vol. 2* 531, “feste n.”), and the people venerating the empty holy image fail to understand that image correctly. The people venerating these misleading bodies, which seem life-like but are in fact empty, act out the anxiety so

prevalent in late medieval religion, that audiences would fail to look through the image and see that it was empty and would, instead, worship the image rather than what it represents. The unknown interior of the holy image in Avarice's example corresponds to the unknown interior of allegory, demonstrating a fear that audiences will also fail to look through the *Pilgrimage's* allegorical narrative to see the "truth" within. At the same time, though, the "hidden" meaning that allegory points to, and that audiences may fail to read properly, refuses to remain stable. Teskey asserts that this hidden meaning is simply what disguises the empty center of allegory, saying that "[t]he very word *allegory* evokes a schism in consciousness—between a life and a mystery, between the real and the ideal, between a literal tale and its moral" (Teskey 2). The allegorical figures of the *Pilgrimage*, with their impossible bodies, seem to signify something "real" behind those bodies; the allegorical narrative presents those bodies as a way to get at the meaning hidden by the bodies. Because the *Pilgrimage* is an allegory, it can never truly point to the exact understanding its audience should have, and so it compensates for that inability by trying to control the audience's understanding and use of itself in the ways we have seen throughout this study. The role of the empty image of the body in the example above reminds the audience to call into question the allegorical bodies that house the vices and virtues the pilgrim encounters, and even the body of the pilgrim himself. The pilgrim's body joins the potentially empty bodies of these allegorical figures and, because of the *Pilgrimage's* conflation of the pilgrim with the audience, the audience must see themselves as potentially empty figures. This emptying of the allegory and the audience undermines the *Pilgrimage's* didactic purpose of providing spiritual instruction, and it presents bodies (and particularly images of bodies) as something that can be filled by

someone or something else. Even if this sort of empty vessel would present an ideal audience the *Pilgrimage* might construct, the emptiness of the idol in the above passage—not to mention the glee with which Avarice describes the deception—makes the empty body monstrous, not idealized, to the reader.

Figure 4 demonstrates the way in which allegory constructs a body as monstrous because it juxtaposes the body of the pilgrim, which exhibits no fantastical elements and even has no bright colors, with the body of the allegorical figure of Avarice, with her six hands, two bleeding stumps, and bright red creature wrapped around her head. The juxtaposition of the pilgrim's body next to Avarice's body not only identifies the contrast between the pilgrim's unmarked body and Avarice's monstrous body, but also highlights the underlying similarity between the two figures: they both are recognizably human bodies wearing robes of a similar style, if not color. The underlying similarity between these two figures makes the attributes of Avarice even more potentially monstrous to the human reader because they move her away from the realm of the human even though her underlying human shape is clear. Avarice's dual appearance as both human and monstrous in this image allows her to represent a possible future of the pilgrim in which the pilgrim is scarcely recognizable as human (the didactic benefit of the allegory here is, of course, an attention to the dehumanizing potential of the vice of greed). Also worth attention is the literal distance between Avarice and the pilgrim, which can be compared to the distance between Avarice and the only other object in the frame: a tree. A tree that, like Avarice, has two stumps waving around its top. This tree reinforces the distance between the pilgrim's body and the allegorical figure's body as well as the closeness between that allegorical body and the non-human figure of the tree.

If we turn to another illustration of Avarice, appearing in State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94, Figure 5,⁴² we see even further similarities in the body of Avarice and in the non-human tree. In this image, the proliferation of trees behind the pilgrim and Avarice makes the blurring of Avarice's body with the non-human entities in the frame even more apparent. As close examination of Avarice's hands in this image shows (Figure 6),⁴³ the artist's rendering of her hands and stumps bears a marked similarity to the rendering of the tree branches. In fact, the hand holding the file becomes indistinguishable from the tree behind the hand, particularly because of the apparent lack of a trunk for that tree. Avarice's stump next to the hand grasping the file seems like both a stump on Avarice's body and a stump on the tree. Avarice's nakedness and great size in relation to the pilgrim and the tree further separates Avarice's body from the human body of the pilgrim. These two images of Avarice demonstrate the flexibility of the allegorical body to move between human bodies and non-human bodies and, I propose, mimics a movement that the *Pilgrimage* attempts to enact between the content of the *Pilgrimage* and the material reality of its audience.

The difference between the visual and textual descriptions of Avarice also suggests that the audience must penetrate the "outside," or images and written words, to access the "inside," or content, in order to fully appreciate the dangers of Avarice's character, whose full spectrum of attributes only become revealed when the textual and visual representations are considered together. This penetration is the same type required

⁴² Figure 5. The pilgrim encounters Avarice. State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 63r. Available online at < <http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/93606>>.

⁴³ Figure 6. Detail of Avarice. State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 63r. Available online at < <http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/93606>>.

by the allegorical reading the *Pilgrimage* has demonstrated. Even though the allegory itself evokes a disparity between inner and surface through its use of metaphor, I suggest that valuing the “inner” meaning over the “surface” meaning and, transitively, the textual meaning over the visual meaning, fails to take into account the productive work each representation of Avarice, both visual and textual, can do. Richard Emmerson takes the same stance, noting that, within illustrated texts, “[t]he nonrepresentation of verbal details is not a failure...but a fundamental technique of visual translation, which results in a new creation: an image with its own emphases, perspectives, and communicative power” (Emmerson 21). This movement between textual and visual representation that results in an enriched characterization of the figure of allegory also suggests the movement of these figures as the audience must imagine them in similar but different positions, as discussed above. I suggest that this movement encourages the audience to become another one of these bodies moving within the allegory because the audience’s own identity has been so frequently conflated with figures within the narrative.

The *Pilgrimage* further reveals this crossover between the manuscript page and the reader within the text of the *Pilgrimage* when the pilgrim’s first sight of Avarice defines the figure in terms of her body, evoking a sense of wrongness located in her body. The textual representation of Avarice draws attention to the differences between the pilgrim’s human body and Avarice’s body, as we have seen in the manuscript illustrations, and the text has the pilgrim himself draw the audience’s attention to Avarice’s body. Upon seeing her approaching, the pilgrim identifies her as “[b]oystows” (Henry *Vol. 1* 116, l. 4862), or “one who limps” (Henry *Vol. 2* 516, “boistous, n.”), and asserts that she is “wrong-shapen and enbosed” (Henry *Vol. 1* 116, l. 4862)

[hunchbacked] (Henry *Vol. 2* 526, “embosed, pp.”). The pilgrim’s initial impressions of Avarice concern the movement, quality, and shape of her body. As she comes closer, the pilgrim’s description of her body becomes more detailed, attending to specific attributes of Avarice’s body. This close attention to details of her body that signify her allegorical character forces the audience into the same type of bodily interpretation that the pilgrim conducts. Forcing the audience into this type of interpretation allows the *Pilgrimage* to set parameters on the type of interpretation the audience conducts. The textual description of Avarice can attempt this dictation more easily because the audience cannot see whatever markers the pilgrim interprets as being ill-formed, whereas the audience is freer to form an opinion and interpret these markers in the visual depiction.

In the textual description of Avarice, she also appears with her six grasping hands and her two stumps. Two other elements of her monstrosity appear in the textual description much more graphically, however, than they do in the visual description. In the text the pilgrim describes Avarice’s tongue as “mesel” [diseased] and “foule defaced” (Henry *Vol. 1* 117, ll. 4867-8); (Henry *Vol. 2* 550, “mesel, adj.”). Avarice’s diseased tongue proclaims the monstrosity of her body in a way that, like the larger contextual image Figure 4 from MS Laud 740, demonstrates her underlying humanity. Her tongue is diseased and deformed, but something that was diseased might be cured, or at one point might not have been diseased; this characterization leaves room for Avarice’s allegorical body to be rooted in a human body like the pilgrim’s. Her tongue is disfigured, but it is recognizable as a tongue, just like Avarice’s robed, human body is recognizable under her six arms in the MS Laud 740 illustration. Both the text and the illustrations of the *Pilgrimage* focus the audience’s attention on ways the allegorical body of Avarice

interacts with a human body like that of the pilgrim (and, as we will see shortly, like that of the audience of the *Pilgrimage*). This focus, both visual and textual, on the allegorical body of Avarice suggests the body as a locus for the text's didactic lessons, a suggestion reinforced in the pilgrim's interaction with Penitence, addressed below.

The *Pilgrimage* emphasizes Avarice's body more than that of other allegorical figures that the pilgrim encounters, who are represented through tools (Penitence) or mental effect (Idolatry). Camille sees a contrast in representations of Avarice and Idolatry, marked by the "bodily deformity or excess" of Avarice in contrast with the location of Idolatry's "horror" in her ways of acting. The *Pilgrimage*'s representation of Idolatry terrifies because of her attempt to coerce the pilgrim into spiritually damaging action: "She does not hold out her arms to worship an idol, but violently stretches them out towards the pilgrim" (Camille "The Iconoclast's Desire" 155). The figure of Idolatry, which does not appear in the first recension of Deguileville's *Pilgrimage* (and so does not appear in the Middle English prose translation of that version), receives more attention in Lydgate's translation than in Deguileville's original second recension as Lydgate expands the interaction between Idolatry, the idolater, and the pilgrim (Camille "The Iconoclast's Desire" 165). In light of the *Pilgrimage*'s efforts to draw the audience into itself and to control the audience, the extended response of the idolater (a carpenter), becomes another potential moment of self-critique dangerous to the *Pilgrimage* when the idolater (identified in Lydgate's version as a pilgrim) defends his idolatry by pointing out the similar behavior of Christians. His words seem to speak directly to the image debates of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when he asserts the powerlessness of devotional objects:

'How darestow me her repreue,

Or thyn herte so to greue
 To sen me don swych óbservaunce
 ...Syth pylgrymes, in ther passáges
 Honowre and worshepe, euerychon,
 Ymages of tymber and off ston,
 And crystene peple, ful nyh alle,
 On ther knes to-forn hem falle,
 And whan al to-gydre ys souht,
 They may helpe yow ryht nowht,
 Nor done to yow noon ávauntage,
 No mor than her, may myn ymage.' (Lydgate 559, ll. 20961-
 20974)⁴⁴

The pilgrim insists that the images Christians venerate are "as merours, that represente/
 Ther trewe menyng and ther entente," providing an earnest response to the peasant's
 accusations, claiming that images are seemingly perfectly straightforward, representing
 as in a mirror their true meaning. Indeed, the pilgrim's response to the peasant's
 assertions of the uselessness of images relies on the very conventional argument of
 images being books for the unlettered. The comparison to mirrors is a charged one,
 though, as we have already seen that mirrors can distort and reflect an empty image that
 resembles the threatening emptiness of the idol in the text's depiction of Avarice. I
 suggest that the audience will struggle to feel the same earnestness that the pilgrim
 expresses in this response:

⁴⁴ All references to Lydgate's poetic translation of the second recension of the *Pilgrimage* include the page number followed by the line numbers and reference the following edition: John Lydgate, *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man*. 1426. Eds. F.J. Furnivall and Katharine B. Locock (London: Early English Text Society, 1904). Print.

“Ymáges présente to Our mynde,
And to vs, clerly expresse,
Off her lyvyng the holynesse;
And for thys skyle, (with-oute let)
Ymages in cherches ben vp set;
And vn-to folkys many On
fful gret profyt also they done,
Namly, to swych (I yow ensure)
That ne kan, no lettrure;
ffor, on ymáges whan they lookys,
Ther they rede, as in ther bookys,
What they ouhte off rhyt to sue,
And also what they shal eschewe,
Ther they may yt clerly lere.” (Lydgate 560, ll. 21002-21015)

This passage comes after the pilgrim’s encounter with Avarice, and so the audience has seen that images indeed might *not* “clerly express” the holiness of the martyrs, saints, apostles, and others populating the extensive list of holy figures the pilgrim details (Lydgate 559, ll. 20980-21001). The audience has seen how this veneration of images might lead to profit for the avaricious rather than profit “vn-to folkys many,” and that what appears to be an expression of “her lyvyng the holynesse” [the holiness of their living] may in fact be depictions of emptiness, or even of falseness. And so the pilgrim’s assertion that images serve as books for the unlettered rings false, and instead hints that the problem lies not in the potential falseness of the images or the empty allegorical bodies, but instead in the inability of the audience to read correctly, the very fears underlying the *Pilgrimage*’s anxiety about its circulation as an English vernacular

devotional object. Perhaps the lack of illustrations of holy figures deserving of veneration⁴⁵ serves to help the *Pilgrimage*'s audience avoid having to walk the fine line between veneration and idolatry that the pilgrim outlines in his response.

The pilgrim's reference to images as mirrors reminds the audience of the pilgrim's description of his dream vision of the Heavenly Jerusalem, which commenced the entire allegorical pilgrimage: "me thouht I hadde a syht/ With-Inne a merour large & bryht,/ Off that hevenly ffayr cyte" [I thought I had a sight within a mirror large and bright, of that heavenly fair city] (Lydgate 9, ll. 317-19). Even here the author figure/pilgrim's language is that of doubt ("me thouht"), demonstrating uncertainty about what he actually did see in that mirror. The uncertainty of what lies inside the mirror of the dream vision and the mirror of the images connects with the emptiness that both the peasant and the pilgrim acknowledges lies inside the idol, recalling the empty bodies revealed in the false images that Avarice so enjoyed. Camille reads the knowledge of this emptiness as essential to the allegorical figure of Idolatry, asserting that she derives her pleasure from watching others worship what she knows to be an empty figure: "This gap between the personification of the act, who enjoys looking at the act, and the person who is performing the act itself, makes Idolatry into a voyeur. She, along with the reader/viewer of this manuscript, can observe someone's foolish and illicit relationship with an image—presented by means of a licit image" (Camille "The Iconoclast's Desire" 158-59). I suggest, however, that the *Pilgrimage* fails to maintain its images as licit and as different from the empty images associated with the pilgrim's encounter with Avarice

⁴⁵ The one exception to this claim is Moses, who is one of the only named figures in the narrative. At the same time, Moses functions more like a generalized allegorical figure of a bishop rather than as a discrete figure known for his short temper and miracles.

and Idolatry, and so the audience of the *Pilgrimage* can recognize the potential emptiness of the *Pilgrimage* itself as a devotional object. The bodies on the manuscript page, both textual and visual, come to threaten the audience as they suggest an emptiness to the bodies that begin to merge with the pilgrim's, and this threat undermines the *Pilgrimage's* attempts to draw the audience into the text.

Even as the *Pilgrimage* has attempted to conflate the audience with the pilgrim figure to draw the audience into the text, its anxieties over the audience's power remain because, on some level, it recognizes that "the reader mirrored in the page is both performer and spectator, reflecting the importance of someone looking, whether that person is the reader scrutinizing the book's performances, or God watching the reader's" (Brantley 21). The allegory in the *Pilgrimage* requires the audience's performance of interpretation, and yet the audience's gaze comes to seem troublingly similar to the gazes of Avarice and Idolatry; this potentially greedy or idolatrous gaze invited by allegorical representation underlies the *Pilgrimage's* anxieties over its audience's power, over the way the audience uses the *Pilgrimage* as a devotional object. At the same time, allegory itself gives material forms to immaterial ideas, and the *Pilgrimage's* attempts to control its audience's devotion—in effect, trying to move its immaterial existence in terms of content into the material existence of the reader—find perfect expression in the nature of allegory, where the material and immaterial exist in the same space. As Teskey has noted, allegory "imprint[s] abstract forms directly on the material of historical life, capturing some portion of what lies on the other side of the rift and holding it up for inspection" (Teskey 30), and so allegory offers a devotional text like the *Pilgrimage* a chance at regulating and controlling its audience.

The *Pilgrimage*'s status as an allegory makes its illustrations even more open to interpretation because the combination of visual and textual representations of the allegorical figures expands the limits of potential interpretations. Even though "images are themselves regulatory insofar as they limit the type of devotional materials accessible to lay audiences" (Gayk 13), the allegorical figures of the *Pilgrimage* do not exist only in image form; the proliferation these figures' representations leads to a proliferation of potential interpretations of these figures. Additionally, the *Pilgrimage*'s allegorical form disrupts the regulating potential of the images because it "habitually draws the reader's attention to the discursive construction of reality (including the body and desire), to the play of meanings in discourse, and to the ambivalence of cultural artifacts generally" (Guynn 3). The images in the *Pilgrimage* do limit the audience's responses in some ways—the audience knows that Avarice has many grasping hands and the image specifies the number of hands as six—but at the same time, because the figure depicted is allegorical, when the audience begins to try to understand the image, seeing the measure and balance in her hand and interpreting it to refer to Avarice's desire to receive her proper portion, the body and figure represented in the image begin to disappear, being replaced by the abstract ideas represented by many of the allegorical figures in the *Pilgrimage*. And so the *Pilgrimage*'s allegorical nature undermines the potentially regulating function of its illustration, which might have helped regulate the audience's understanding of the text. Instead of limiting the signification of Avarice to a figure of something monstrous and not worthy of devotion, the allegory dissolves the boundaries of Avarice's body so that it becomes unconstrained by the figure on the page; when

Avarice escapes these boundaries, she threatens to close the distance between herself and the pilgrim in the image and leaves the figure on the manuscript page empty of meaning.

The *Pilgrimage* does not present all images as threatening though; to do so would risk appearing iconoclastic and overly critical of images, and the pilgrim's interactions with Avarice and Idolatry can be read expressing iconoclastic sentiments. The rise of Wycliffism and its distrust of images in England in the late fourteenth and fifteenth century prompted the Church to speak out on images, making the decision to use visual material in devotion potentially fraught. Gayk notes the pivotal role that the use of images in devotional practice played in England in particular because of John Wyclif's critiques of the practice, pointing out that "after Wyclif, to question the value of religious images or their veneration was to risk suspicion of heresy. Yet Wyclif's own position was remarkably conventional. Wyclif argued that images might be useful as *libri laicorum* or as aids to devotion but should not be venerated with either *latria* or *dulia*" (Gayk 9). The need for distinctions like *latria* and *dulia*, which Gayk defines in relation to the veneration of images as "the worship due only to God" (Gayk 5) and "the lesser form of worship demonstrated in the reverence shown to people and corporeal artifacts" (Gayk 6), respectively, identifies the potential usefulness as well as the potential danger of the use of images in devotional practice. On the one hand, many medieval theologians, including Pope Gregory the Great, identify the use of images as important for the devotional practice of lay audiences because images can function as a *libri laicorum* (Gayk 5). On the other hand, the veneration the unlearned laity directs towards these images could shift from the appropriate *dulia* form of veneration and slip into the *latria* veneration that should be reserved only for God. This contradictory role of devotional

aids has, as we have seen, appeared in the *Pilgrimage* as a source of frustration for the text as it tries to navigate achieving the didactic goal of itself as a devotional document—spiritual instruction—with the potential for misuse of the devotional document, during which it is used to spur its readers to heterodox ideas.

The *Pilgrimage* makes clear when the pilgrim has misunderstood or chosen incorrectly by doling out corporeal punishment. This corporeal punishment uses the pilgrim's body to provide the audience with spiritual instruction, and so further asserts the inseparability of the material body and the immaterial soul discussed in Chapter 2. Lisa Cooper identifies artisanal work as integral to lay spiritual practice, pointing to Lydgate's version of the *Pilgrimage* as an example. She continues, "This new pastoral literature emphasized the role individual Christians could and should play in their own salvation, and tended to focus on the proper maintenance of an inner self" (Cooper 107). Cooper's work highlights the importance of the material to the spiritual work modeled in the *Pilgrimage*, and the figure of Penitence in the *Pilgrimage* most clearly exemplifies this responsibility placed on the individual for his or her own salvation, modeled allegorically through work on the pilgrim's body.

Many times the pilgrim suffers corporeal punishment at the hands of the vice figures, but the appearance of Penitence early in the text associates this bodily punishment with virtues as well. When the pilgrim is in Grace's house, Grace introduces the pilgrim to Penitence, whose purpose is to beat her charges until they repent of their transgressions. The pilgrim's description of Penitence, who advocates bodily work to achieve spiritual goals, makes even more explicit a connection between the allegorical bodies of the *Pilgrimage* and the devotional body of the reader. Rather than being

disgusted by this allegorical figure's strange appearance, the pilgrim is "wundred" [amazed] (Henry *Vol. 1* 27, l. 1095) by Penitence, and rather than focusing on her strange body, he describes her appearance based on what she holds: a mallet and a rod in her hands and a broom in her teeth. This type of focus reminds the audience of the ability of all aspects of an allegorical figure to signify; just as Avarice's many arms indicated her grasping nature, Penitence's tools signify her ability to work with tools to create spiritual improvement. First we will look at a manuscript image and textual description of Penitence to identify the purpose of different representations of her tools. Next we will turn to the dialogue between Penitence and the pilgrim that changes her work into the pilgrim's work. Finally we will look at the allegory's non-human representations of the virtue of penitence to recognize the way the *Pilgrimage* breaks down the boundary between the non-human and the human in order to demonstrate its ability to control its own audience's devotion.

BL MS Laud 740, f. 19v (Figure 7)⁴⁶ depicts Penitence and her tools in a way that differs noticeably from her textual description, and the differences attempt to dissolve the boundary between the content of the allegory and the audience by asking the audience to supply imaginatively Penitence's tools, which are missing in the illustration.⁴⁷ On folio 19v, Penitence's face is completely unobscured by any of the implements ascribed to her in the text of the *Pilgrimage*, and the broom is a pale yellow object that looks like sheaf of wheat clutched in Penitence's hand. As is clear in the larger context of the image in

⁴⁶ Figure 7. Penitence detail. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Laud 740 19v. Available online through the Bodleian Library.

⁴⁷ In the illustration of Penitence in State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94, Penitence has all three of her tools, though she holds the rod in her mouth rather than the broom. Though the image that moves her tools underscores my argument about the figure of Penitence asserting the audience's need to complete the work of Penitence, the fact that her tools appear in the illustration in the Melbourne manuscript does not negate this argument.

which Penitence appears (Figure 8),⁴⁸ the broom is difficult to detect in front of Penitence's lavender robe, and the color the broom shares with the hair of Charity and the grass surrounding the figures' feet certainly does not clarify the fact that the object in Penitence's hand is a broom. MS Laud 740's removal of Penitence's mallet and rod as well as the movement of the broom from her mouth to her hand ask the audience to fill in the expected tools of Penitence, reminding the audience that penitence involves work that the audience must do on themselves for their own spiritual betterment and that they must supply the tools for their own penitence. MS Laud 740 requires the audience to supply imaginatively the missing mallet and rod that the text ascribes to Penitence, particularly since Penitence's companion, Charity, is depicted holding the Testament of Peace ascribed to her in the text. Asking the audience to supply imaginatively Penitence's missing tools also asks the audience to supply his or her own penitence outside the text, thus moving the content of the allegory outside of the narrative and into the audience's lived experience.

The dialogic exchanges between the pilgrim and Penitence in the text reinforce this movement; when she first describes her function, Penitence tells the pilgrim, “with þe/ mailet I breke and brose bi contricioun and angwich þe/ herte of man” (Henry *Vol. I* 27, ll. 1112-1114), explaining the purpose of the tools in her hands: she uses them to break and bruise the heart of man into contrition. And yet, forty lines later, Penitence commands the pilgrim to enact this same work on himself, saying “ye shulden breke al,/ and brose bi smale gobbettes and parties, in grete syhinges and gret hachees, in thinkinge swiche a tyme/ þou didest þus” [you should break all, and bruise by small gobbets and

⁴⁸ Figure 8. The pilgrim encounters Penitence. Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Laud 740 19v. Available online through the Bodleian Library.

parts, in great sighing and great anguish, in thinking (that) such a time you did thus] (Henry *Vol. 1* 28 ll. 1157-60). Her use of the same words to describe the work she does and the work the pilgrim should do, “breke” and “brose,” shows that the work done by the allegorical body of Penitence is the same as the work done by the pilgrim’s human body. Furthermore, the second person imperative “ye shulden” uses direct address to draw the audience into the dialogue and to conflate the audience with the pilgrim. Penitence has asserted her power to break and bruise the heart of man and also the need for the pilgrim to break and bruise his own heart, and these actions demonstrate a permeable boundary between the flesh and the spirit because bodily work can earn spiritual gain. Because Penitence and the pilgrim are to perform the same work on the pilgrim’s body, her allegorical body has become conflated with the pilgrim’s human body, as was threatened in the interaction with Avarice, and she and the pilgrim occupy the same space. Penitence’s imperative direct address that “ye shulden” think on how “þou didest þus” moves the conversation outside of an enclosed conversation between Penitence and the pilgrim and now includes the reader of the text, who occupies the same “you” position as the pilgrim. And so the allegorical figure of Penitence merges herself with the pilgrim through the shared breaking and bruising that they must do, and she has merged the pilgrim with the reader through the imperative that they both think on the things for which they should repent. Thus, transitively, the allegorical body of Penitence breaks and bruises the heart of the reader, attempting to incite penitence in the readers. Suzanne Conklin Akbari sees this direct contact between allegory and its audience as an inherent aspect of allegory, arguing that “by avoiding the limitations inherent in literal language, allegory creates meaning within the reader, bypassing the inevitable

degeneration of meaning as it passes through the obscuring veil which makes the transmission of meaning—the revelation—possible.” (Akbari 9). The work the allegorical figure of Penitence proposes to do combined with the absence of her tools in the image coheres for the audience in an understanding that the audience must conduct the work of Penitence on their own selves.

This aspect of Penitence, in which she uses her mallet to break and bruise the heart of man, shows her disciplining the bodies of sinners in order to bring them to a spiritual state of repentance. Because the spiritual work of the allegorical figure of Penitence and the devotional work of the audience become the same, the *Pilgrimage* has demonstrated how it can use immaterial, allegorical bodies to attempt to influence the material bodies of its audience. Penitence’s discipline acts as another form of regulation that the *Pilgrimage* uses to try to control its audience’s devotion, and this figure provides a particularly useful way of seeing the intersection of discipline and audience regulation in the *Pilgrimage*. The etymology of the word *disciplina*, which Rita Copeland has traced, shows its development from the idea of an order to be followed to the idea of punishment, particularly punishment in regard to broken rules or disobedience, containing within itself a combination of rules and punishment. *Disciplina* even becomes particularly associated with the body, making Penitence a particularly powerful tool for encouraging action on the part of the *Pilgrimage*’s audience. Copeland explains that “by the early Middle Ages the idea of intellectual regulation, of observing a rule or scientific order, is identified semantically with the idea of physical punishment, *disciplina corporis*, disciplining of the body to correct or guard against vice, whether imposed by parent, teacher, monastic rule, civil law, or self” (Copeland 143). Within the *Pilgrimage*, this

disciplining of the body can come from a teacher in the form of the text of the *Pilgrimage*, but Penitence's direct address command to the audience—"ye shulden breke al"—demonstrates that the discipline should come from the self as well, allowing another kind of movement between the text of the *Pilgrimage* and its audience as they both enact the same role as dispenser of discipline.

An image of penitence appears again later in the pilgrim's journey, and once again the work of penitence involves violence to the body; this episode simultaneously figures the pilgrim in two bodies, one human and one non-human. This dual figuration destabilizes the pilgrim's—and the audience's—perception of himself as having a discrete body. The violence is enacted on a rock that represents "þe herte of þilke þat/witingeliche hath left þe wey of saluacioun" [the heart of those that wittingly have left the way of salvation] (Henry *Vol. 1* 145, ll. 6052-53). Figure 9 from State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 78r brings together the movement evoked by the images as well as the conflation of the pilgrim's body with allegorical bodies. This image once again depicts the pilgrim next to an allegorical figure—this time it is Grace. The pilgrim stands on her right and at her left hand appears a rocky formation with an elliptical shape in the rock; lines indicating falling liquid connect the elliptical shape to a bucket at the foot of the rocky formation. The caption of this image informs us that Grace is gesturing to "an eye in a rock," even though the eye in the rock in the image looks quite different from the eyes of the pilgrim and Grace. The lines indicating liquid moving from the eye to the rock demonstrate their direction by appearing closer together at the source—the eye—and wider apart at their destination—the bucket. This image does not signify as clearly as the images of Avarice or of Penitence, who have multiple arms or

brooms and mallets to indicate the grasping, cleaning, and beating that define these figures' conduct. Instead, this image juxtaposes clear signs, such as the pilgrim, Grace, and Grace's pointing finger (which indicate that Grace is showing the pilgrim something she wants him to know) next to an image whose parts have potential meaning (the rocky outcropping and the bucket catching liquid are relatively clear), but whose sum creates an unclear meaning. Rosemond Tuve identifies with concern the inscrutability of the images in the *Pilgrimage* when seen without the explanatory text accompanying them, calling the events from the story that were illustrated "reprehensible" in refusing to offer up clear communication without the image (Tuve 187). I suggest, however, that this image of the weeping eye in the rock demonstrates a very important function that the images serve in the *Pilgrimage*: even when the text fully explains the rock, which Grace will explain is the heart of those who have left the path of salvation, the image reminds the reader of the inscrutability of the visual depiction of the eye in the rock and, at the same time, the difficulty of understanding what lies inside this allegory. The weeping eye in the rock becomes another way for the *Pilgrimage* to assert the audience's ignorance even as it provides instruction and, as we will see, even as it allows the *Pilgrimage* to try once again to reach beyond the boundaries of the manuscript.

The textual description of the narrative moment depicted in Figure 9⁴⁹ relies on the virtue of penitence again to conflate the pilgrim's body and the allegorical body in an attempt to incite action in the audience. The pilgrim asks Grace about the eye in the rock "þat droppede dropes/ of water—and [the] kowuele þer [that] was binethe þat resceyuede alle/ þe dropes" (Henry *Vol. I* 145, ll. 6044-46) [that dropped drops of water—and (the)

⁴⁹ Figure 9. Grace, the pilgrim, and the weeping rock. State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94 78r. <<http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/93606>>.

tub (that) was beneath there that received all the drops] (Henry *Vol. 2* 544, “kowele, n.”). Grace explains that the pilgrim must wash in the tub; reluctant, the pilgrim demands to know where the water comes from because “þilke eye þat I/ see abasheth me...” [this eye that I see alarms⁵⁰ me] (Henry *Vol. 2* 509, “abasheth, v.”). However, the pilgrim should not be alarmed by the eye in the rock because, as he will soon discover, the eye in the rock is the heart of those who have purposefully left the path of salvation, “as þou hast,” Grace pointedly reminds the pilgrim. This textual moment shows that the two figures standing next to Grace in the image are actually one figure, because the pilgrim’s heart resides inside himself,⁵¹ and yet the pilgrim can look at the allegorical representation of his heart, which “is harded in his errour as roche” (Henry *Vol. 1* 145, ll. 6053), and not recognize it as part of himself. This moment asserts the pilgrim’s inability to recognize himself and to determine what is interior to himself and what is exterior to himself. The illustration of this moment reinforces the conflation and separation of the pilgrim’s self within this scene when it depicts the pilgrim and the weeping rock as parallel. They both stand on either side of Grace, whose wings extend over the top of each and who reaches an arm towards each, and both figures also have a tree at their backs. Grace does not look directly at either figure, instead looking out at the audience of the image, drawing the audience into the narrative of the image. The trees framing the back of the pilgrim and the back of the weeping rock reach beyond the frame of the image, further breaking the

⁵⁰ Though “abasheth” can also indicate embarrassment, when Grace tells him that he must bathe in the tears of the eye, the pilgrim does not yet know that the eye in the rock represents his own heart, so there is no reason for the pilgrim to feel embarrassed yet. Therefore, I interpret “abasheth” as “fear” here.

⁵¹ Isidore of Seville locates the heart as interior in terms of its bodily location and also in terms of its role in sensation and understanding: “The *praecordia* are places close to the heart in which sensation is perceived; and they are called *praecordia* because the origins (*principium*) of the heart (*cor*, also meaning ‘the seat of understanding’) and of deliberating thought (*cogitatio*) are to be found there” (Seville 119, “heart, praecordia”).

boundaries between what is inside the image and what is outside the image. The positioning of the figures in this image disrupt the audience's understanding of whether the figures are inside or outside of the narrative space, just like the textual description of this moment disrupts the audience's understanding of whether the allegorical bodies it encounters are inside or outside the pilgrim, and thus inside or outside the narrative. The problems with the narrative, which seems to disrupt clear boundaries between the human and non-human as well as between what is inside and what is outside the allegory, appear in Grace's explanation of the rock that so alarms the pilgrim:

'Now vnderstonde a litel,' quod she, 'and turne to me þin
ere. Þilke roche þat þou seest þeere is þe herte of þilke þat
witingeliche hath left þe wey of saluacioun, as þou hast: þat
is harded in his errour as roche. Now I telle þee þat whan I
haue left it þus a gret while in his sinne, I am
sumtime take with pitee of him, and with his eye I make him
conuerte and turne to himself, for he schulde biholde hise
owene dedes; and þanne whan þe eye hath wel seyn þe hardshipe
of þe herte, anon it is stired harde to weepe and to droppe
teres.' (Henry *Vol. I* 145, ll. 6043-6059)

Grace removes any separation between the human and non-human when she explains that the "Þilke roche þat þou seest þeere is þe herte of þilke þat/ witingeliche hath left þe wey of saluacioun, as þou hast"; those who could be on the path of salvation are human like the pilgrim, and Grace explicitly compares those who have left that path to the pilgrim, so "þilke" refers to someone like the pilgrim. Considering how much work the *Pilgrimage* has done to conflate the pilgrim and the audience, the "þilke" also gestures to the

audience. As Grace's explanation gets more specific, she connects the rock not only to "pilke," but also to their human bodies when she slips from metaphor into simile: the heart of anyone who has left the path of salvation "is harded in his error as roche" [is hardened as rock in error]. In explaining the rock that the pilgrim sees before him, Grace explains it as a symbol, and yet the pilgrim can see and touch it. The rock is not purely symbolic to the pilgrim; it has physical presence and it has fantastical features like other allegorical figures the pilgrim has encountered. This slippage from the metaphor of the allegory in which the pilgrim is asked to read symbolically like the audience of the *Pilgrimage* has been reading symbolically conflates the pilgrim and audience in a way that also reaches beyond the frame of the allegory.

Grace's explanation also changes locations of the pilgrim's own body parts, moving them outside of his own body and further confusing the issue of what is inside and what is outside in the allegory. Grace locates his heart outside of his body, and the fact that she expects the pilgrim to bathe in the tub of tears that are falling from the eye in the rock that is supposed to be the pilgrim's heart reinforces the confusing disjunction between where the pilgrim's heart should be and where he encounters it. When Grace explains that using the eye in the rock she "make[th] him/ conuerte and turne to himself, for he shulde biholde hise/ owene dedes" [makes him change (his) attitude and turn towards himself, for he should behold his own deeds] (Henry *Vol. 2* 520, "conuerte, v."), she further fragments the pilgrim's body. Finally, with the context of the text, the image of the eye in Figure 9 makes sense: the eye appears different from Grace's and the pilgrim's eyes because the pilgrim (and the audience) are seeing the back of the eye, not the front. The eye is turned inward, beholding the deeds of the person who has

purposefully left the path of salvation. The literalization of the inward eye again invites the pilgrim to read metaphorically and again moves the pilgrim into the position of the allegory's audience, and the confusion between the allegorical body and the pilgrim's body becomes the confusion between the allegorical body and the audience's body. This moment depicting the pilgrim and the weeping rock demonstrates the capture that Teskey describes as one aspect of allegory's purpose: "What the act of capture exhibits is the truth over which allegory is always drawing its veil: the fundamental disorder out of which the illusion of order is raised" (Teskey 19). The relatively straightforward meaning of the pilgrim's encounter with the weeping rock, which tells him that he should look at his actions, only arises from chaotic fragmentations of the pilgrim's body and of the boundaries of the allegory.

The potential power of these images as they combine with the text of the *Pilgrimage* to create richer allegorical meaning than either image or text achieves on its own appears in a historical moment very much concerned with the power of religious images. By the early fifteenth century in England, the veneration of images had become a fraught issue; iconoclastic urgings of Wycliffites combined with the ninth of Arundel's *Constitutions* of 1409, which requires veneration of images, demonstrate the importance of images in devotional practice. The two manuscripts of the *Pilgrimage* we have considered were produced in the first quarter of the fifteenth century (Henry *Vol. 1* xxxviii and xlv).⁵² This early part of the fifteenth century saw intense debates regarding

⁵² Though two manuscripts under discussion in this chapter, Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Laud Misc. 740 and State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia: MS *096 G94, are digitized and available for study from afar, both extant manuscripts (one illustrated) of Lydgate's translation of Deguileville's second recension of the *Pilgrimage*, British Library Cotton MS Vitellius C.xiii, ff. 2-311 and British Library Cotton MS Tiberius A.vii, part i., ff. 39-106, are not digitized. I look forward to being able to incorporate study of these manuscripts into my consideration of the role of the images in the *Pilgrimage*'s attempts to control the reader when I have the opportunity to view them.

the use of images in religious practice, both private and public, rising from Wycliffite critiques of images in the late fourteenth century as well as from Church responses to these critiques, such as the insistence on image veneration appearing in Archbishop Arundel's *Constitutions* in 1409. The ninth constitution proclaims:

But by all it shall be commonly taught and preached, that the cross and the image of the crucifix, and other images of saints, in honour of them whom they represent, are to be worshipped with procession, bowing of knees, offering of frankincense, kissings, oblations, lighting of candles, and pilgrimages, and with all other kind of ceremonies and manners that have been used in the time of our predecessors. (Townsend 246)

This portion of the *Constitutions* identifies both venerating visual religious art and adhering to traditional practices as integral to proper devotion, and the detailed listing of the types of types of worship commanded (“procession, bowing of knees, offering of frankincense,” etc.) offers suggestions for proper behavior in regard to religious images, though the “etc.” indicates that Arundel's concerns rested primarily in ensuring that images continued to receive their proper veneration rather than dictating how that veneration occurs. This debate over the role of visual art in religious practice was not confined to simple distinctions of the Church being entirely in favor of images in religious practices and dissidents being against images in religious practices, though, as it was the iconoclastic actions of a member of the clergy that led Gregory the Great to write the letter that became a source of validation for those in support of incorporating images into religious practice. Chastising the clergy member, Gregory asserted that in images “the ignorant see what they should follow and the illiterate read the same from it” (*The Letters of Gregory the Great* 11.10). However, this formulation assumes that images do

reflect meaning clearly, though we have seen through the allegorical figures of Avarice, Idolatry, and Penitence that images produce meaning much like allegory, creating meaning that is subject to interpretation and potentially false or empty.

One method the *Pilgrimage* employs in trying to regulate its audience's understanding of its allegorical figures is the invitation to interact repeatedly with the text. The *Pilgrimage*'s narrative even encourages multiple reading sessions through narratorial instructions for readers to go away and rest so they do not get tired from reading. Repeated interaction with the text allows it to become an integral part of its readers' devotional practice when the reader habitually includes the *Pilgrimage* in that practice. Breen has tracked discussions of habituation in medieval texts and how habituation integrates practice into a person's character. For instance, she identifies *habitus* as that which allows master artisans to work their craft without constant attention to the way they work their craft, explaining that this habitus is the result of habituating practice that changes the practitioner. Taking as an example a student learning a language, Breen explains that "[a]s he acquires the habitus of grammar, the student does not merely learn rules, but is himself regulated, made regular, by the language he studies and the discipline of the classroom in which he studies it" (Breen 2). Breen's example of the student is useful for thinking about the effects an object of study could hope to have on its audience; if habitual and disciplined study of a language changes the student, as we know it does in terms of his or her ability to read, write, and/or speak that language, then we must acknowledge that habitual and disciplined study of a devotional object like the *Pilgrimage* can hardly fail to change its readers.

In thinking about the way the illustrations in the *Pilgrimage* work alongside its text, it is helpful to think about why the images and text do not depict precisely the same characters, characteristics, or events as one another, even if they aim to illustrate the same moment of the text. Although Beth Williamson's study of the senses in medieval devotion focuses on sound, her methodology demonstrates the way in which devotional art can create various sensations within the beholder. She notes that the combination of sensory stimulation, like the words of a sermon pertaining to the image behind the person preaching, identifies multiple levels of attention that devotional aids could evoke; she explains that in this instance of preaching,

...the eyes of the body were being encouraged to look, but to go beyond what they could actually see, and to draw out, for the mind's contemplation, other qualities of the Virgin that were implied but not represented. In other words, the suggestion here is that Photios [delivering a homily on the image on the wall behind him] was deliberately setting up contradictions between the evidence provided to his listeners by their corporeal eyes and the real truth that could be perceived by looking through or beyond the material image. The discrepancies encouraged the viewer-listeners to think in a different way about what they were seeing. (Williamson 35)

The *Pilgrimage* behaves in the same way, using its images and its texts to force its audience to hold in their minds multiple aspects of the scenes depicted both visually and textually. This exercise in which the audience must hold in mind contradictory elements mimics the contradictory identities—monk, dreamer, pilgrim, audience—constructed and

conflated with one another in the *Pilgrimage*. As the audience attempts to hold these multiple representations in mind, the work of separating them, whether they are representations of Avarice or identities of the “I” figure, becomes increasingly difficult. These conflicting representations begin to merge in the audience’s mind, acceding to the *Pilgrimage*’s regulatory urges to merge the devotional practice it outlines with its actual use by its audiences. The fact that the *Pilgrimage* creates so many opportunities for holding contradictions in mind as it struggles to negotiate conflation and separation—between the pilgrim and audience, the soul and body, the senses, and visual and textual representations—makes clear that forcing its audience into these positions comprises an underlying agenda of the text. This agenda, I conclude, reveals an anxiety within the *Pilgrimage* about its own use as a devotional object and reminds medieval scholars that studies of interactions between audiences and their books would do well to take into account not just how audiences used their books, but also how books used their audiences. Thinking through this question reveals the types of audiences these texts imagined, and the *Pilgrimage* in particular reveals the type of audiences texts imagined when writing in the English vernacular opened up a large new section of readers in fifteenth-century England.

The *Pilgrimage*’s treatment of images as outlined in this chapter demonstrates a connection between the suspect status of images in devotion and the use of the vernacular in devotion, a connection not entirely surprising considering images’ common description as books for the unlettered. Jeffrey Hamburger traces this idea of images as books for the unlettered beyond Gregory the Great’s first articulation of it, noting similar statements by Cistercian monks and Bonaventure (Hamburger 14-15), arguing that “[t]he practice of

piety itself becomes pictorial, with paintings providing not only the substance but also the model and method for a devotional regime” (Hamburger 16). And while images indeed had a long history of usefulness to the laity who could not read the Latin scriptures or other Latin spiritual texts, the common justification of the need for images in order to instruct the laity became vexed as lay literacy increased in late medieval England. The *Pilgrimage*’s circulation in England makes it an especially useful text for interrogating the role of images in lay devotion during this time period because of the very specific concern Wycliffites had with the use of images in devotional practice. When combined, “the spread of lay literacy in this period, the Lollard critique of images, and the demand for religious writing in English complicated traditional justifications of images as books for the unlettered. By the early fifteenth century, laypeople increasingly had access to religious writing in the vernacular and thus ostensibly had less need to be taught by means of images” (Gayk 12). This increased access to devotional texts, granted by their appearance in English, did not preclude their continued inclusion of images, however. The images within the *Pilgrimage* demonstrate how the images and text work together to enhance the story of the pilgrim’s journey and further demonstrate the *Pilgrimage*’s attempts to conflate its audience with the pilgrim in order to control the audience’s devotional use of the *Pilgrimage* itself.

Works Cited

Middle English Dictionary: Regents of the University of Michigan, December 2011.

Print.

The Holy Bible, Translated from the Latin Vulgate (Douay-Rheims). Baltimore,

Maryland: John Murphy Company, 1914.

The Letters of Gregory the Great. Trans. John R. C. Martyn. Vol. 3, Books 10-14.

Toronto, Canada: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004.

Akbari, Suzanne Conklin. *Seeing through the Veil: Optical Theory and Medieval*

Allegory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.

Amsler, Mark. "Affective Literacy: Gestures of Reading in the Later Middle Ages."

Essays in Medieval Studies 18 (2001): 83-110.

Aquinas, Thomas. *A Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*. Trans. Robert Pasnau. New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Aristotle. *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*. Trans. M.A. W. S. Hett. Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Bell, David N. "Monastic Libraries: 1400-1557." *The Cambridge History of the Book in*

Britain: 1400-1557. Eds. Lotte Hellinga and J.B. Trapp. Vol. III. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999. 229-54.

Bloom, Gina. *Voice in Motion: Staging Gender, Shaping Sound in Early Modern*

England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.

Bolduc, Michelle. "The Poetics of Authorship and Vernacular Religious Devotion."

Varieties of Devotion in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Ed. Susan C. Karant-

Nunn. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2003. 125-43.

- Bolens, Guillemette. *The Style of Gestures: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
- Bose, Mishtooni. "Religious Authority and Dissent." *A Companion to Medieval English Literature and Culture C. 1350 - C. 1500*. Ed. Peter Brown. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 40-55.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. "Habitus." *Habitus: A Sense of Place*. Eds. Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby. Burlington: Ashgate, 2002. 27-36.
- Brantley, Jessica. *Reading in the Wilderness: Private Devotion and Public Performance in Late Medieval England*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Breen, Katharine. *Imagining an English Reading Public, 1150-1400*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Bryan, Jennifer. *Looking Inward: Devotional Reading and the Private Self in Late Medieval England*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
- Bynum, Caroline Walker. "Seeing and Seeing Beyond: The Mass of St. Gregory in the Fifteenth Century." *The Mind's Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages*. Eds. Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Ann-Marie Bouche. Princeton: Art and Archeology Department, 2006. 208-40.
- Camille, Michael. "Before the Gaze: The Internal Senses and Late Medieval Practices of Seeing." *Visuality before and Beyond the Renaissance: Seeing as Others Saw*. Ed. Robert S. Nelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 197-223.
- . "The Iconoclast's Desire: Deguileville's Idolatry in France and England." *Images, Idolatry, and Iconoclasm in Late Medieval England: Textuality and the Visual*

- Image*. Eds. Jeremy Dimmick, James Simpson and Nicolette Zeeman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 151-71.
- Carruthers, Mary. *The Experience of Beauty in the Middle Ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Chaganti, Seeta. "Danse Macabre and the Virtual Courtyard." *postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies* 3 (2012): 7-26.
- Chaucer, Geoffrey. "Dream Visions and Other Poems." Ed. Kathryn L. Lynch. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007. Print.
- Cooper, Lisa H. *Artisans and Narrative Craft in Late Medieval England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Copeland, Rita. "The Pardoner's Body and the Disciplining of Rhetoric." *Framing Medieval Bodies*. Eds. Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994. 138-59.
- Copeland, Rita, and Stephen Melville. "Allegory and Allegoresis, Rhetoric and Hermeneutics." *Exemplaria* 3.1 (March 1991): 159-87.
- Cruz, Jo Ann H. Moran. "England: Education and Society." *A Companion to Britain in the Later Middle Ages*. Ed. S.H. Rigby. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 451-71.
- Dailey, Patricia. *Promised Bodies: Time, Language, & Corporeality in Medieval Women's Mystical Texts*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
- Edwards, A.S.G. "Manuscripts and Readers." *A Companion to Medieval English Literature and Culture, C. 1350-1500*. Ed. Peter Brown. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 93-106.

- Ellington, Donna Spivey. *From Sacred Body to Angelic Soul: Understanding Mary in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001.
- Emmerson, Richard K. "Visual Translation in Fifteenth-Century Manuscripts." *Medieval Poetics and Social Practice: Responding to the Work of Penn R. Szittyá*. Ed. Seeta Chaganti. New York: Fordham University Press, 2012. 11-32.
- Garrison, Jennifer. "Mediated Piety: Eucharistic Theology and Lay Devotion in Robert Mannyng's *Handlyng Synne*." *Speculum* 85.4 (2010): 894-922.
- Gayk, Shannon. *Image, Text, and Religious Reform in Fifteenth-Century England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Groom, Matthew. "England: Piety, Heresy and Anti-Clericalism." *A Companion to Britain in the Later Middle Ages*. Ed. S.H. Rigby. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 381-95.
- Guynn, Noah. *Allegory and Sexual Ethics in the High Middle Ages*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007.
- Hamburger, Jeffrey F. "The Place of Theology in Medieval Art History: Problems, Positions, Possibilities." *The Mind's Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages*. Eds. Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Ann-Marie Bouche. Princeton: Department of Art and Archeology, 2006. 11-31.
- Hanna, Ralph. *Pursuing History: Middle English Manuscripts and Their Texts*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Henry, Avril, ed. *The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode*. Vol. 1, Introduction and Text. London: Oxford University Press, 1985.

- , ed. *The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode*. Vol. 2, Explanatory Notes, Bibliography, and Glossary. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Hogeterp, Albert L. A. "The Relation between Body and Soul in the *Apocalypse of Paul*." *The Visio Pauli and the Gnostic Apocalypse of Paul*. Eds. Jan N. Bremer and István Czachesz. Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2007.
- Jones, E. A. "Literature of Religious Instruction." *A Companion to Medieval English Literature and Culture, C. 1350-1500*. Ed. Peter Brown. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 406-23.
- Justice, Steven. *Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Kamath, Stephanie A. Viereck Gibbs. *Authorship and First-Person Allegory in Late Medieval France and England*. Gallica. Ed. Sarah Kay. Vol. 26. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2012.
- Kay, Sarah. *The Place of Thought: The Complexity of One in Late Medieval French Didactic Poetry*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
- Kibbee, Douglas A. *For to Speke Frenche Trewely: The French Language in England, 1000-1600: Its Status, Description and Instruction*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1991.
- Lerer, Seth. *Chaucer and His Readers: Imagining the Author in Late-Medieval England*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- . *Courty Letters in the Age of Henry VIII*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

- Lydgate, John. *The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man*. 1426. Eds. F.J. Furnivall and Katharine B. Locock. London: Early English Text Society, 1904.
- Maddocks, Hilary. "Seeing Is Believing: Reading the Deadly Sins in Deguileville's Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode in the State Library of Victoria." *Imagination, Books & Community in Medieval Europe*. Ed. Gregory Kratzmann. Victoria: MacMillan and the State Library of Victoria, 2008. 204-11.
- Meyer-Lee, Robert J. *Poets and Power from Chaucer to Wyatt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Milner, Matthew. *The Senses and the English Reformation*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011.
- Newman, Barbara. "What Did It Mean to Say 'I Saw'? : The Clash between Theory and Practice in Medieval Visionary Culture." *Speculum* 80 (2005): 1-43.
- Parkes, M.B. "The Literacy of the Laity." *Scribes, Scripts and Readers: Studies in the Communication, Presentation and Dissemination of Medieval Texts*. London: The Hambledon Press, 1991. 275-98.
- Rice, Nicole R. *Lay Piety and Religious Discipline in Middle English Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Robertson, Duncan. *Lectio Divina: The Medieval Experience of Reading*. Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2011.
- Salter, Elisabeth, and Helen Wicker, eds. *Vernacularity in England and Wales C. 1300-1550*. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011.
- Seville, Isidore of. *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- Simpson, James. "Killing Authors: Skelton's Dreadful *Bowge of Court*." *Form and Reform: Reading across the Fifteenth Century*. Eds. Shannon Gayk and Kathleen Tonry. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2011. 180-96.
- Spearing, A.C. *Textual Subjectivity: The Encoding of Subjectivity in Medieval Narratives and Lyrics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Stanbury, Sarah. *Seeing the Gawain-Poet: Description and the Act of Perception*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.
- . *The Visual Object of Desire in Late Medieval England*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
- Steiner, Wendy. *Documentary Culture and the Making of Medieval English Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Taylor, Andrew. "Reading and Privacy in Late Medieval England." *The Practice and Representation of Reading in England*. Eds. James Raven, Helen Small and Naomi Tadmor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 41-61.
- Teskey, Gordon. *Allegory and Violence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Townsend, George. *The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe: With a Life of the Martyrologist, and Vindication of the Work*. New York: AMS Press Inc., 1964.
- Tuve, Rosemond. *Allegorical Imagery: Some Mediaeval Books and Their Posterity*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Watson, Nicholas. "Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel's Constitutions of 1409." *Speculum* 70.4 (October 1995): 822-64.

Williamson, Beth. "Sensory Experience in Medieval Devotion: Sound and Vision, Invisibility and Silence." *Speculum* 88.1 (January 2013): 1-43.

Wogan-Browne, Jocelyn, et al., eds. *The Idea of the Vernacular: An Anthology of Middle English Literary Theory, 1280-1520*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

Woolgar, C.M. *The Senses in Late Medieval England*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.